Why some divestment campaigns achieve divestment while others do not: the influence of Leadership, Organization, Institutions, Culture and Resources.

Master Thesis

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Executive summary

As a reaction to slowly moving climate policy, people across the globe have initiated a mass climate movement. One of the fastest growing branches of this movement is the fossil fuel divestment movement, which through its Fossil Free campaign tries to combat climate change by urging institutions of all types to ‘divest’ (i.e. retire their investments) from the fossil fuel industry. While some of the Fossil Free campaigns have been successful in attaining this goal, others are facing continuous struggles. The main purpose of this thesis is to uncover what factors this difference in goal attainment is dependent on.

After introducing the aforementioned problem in Chapter 1, this thesis continues with the literature review in Chapter 2. The first part of this chapter explores a number of factors with which scholars have tried to explain campaigning outcome. A contrast is shown between studies that attribute outcome to factors internal to the campaign, such as organizational leadership, structure, strategy, and tactics; and studies that focus on the influence of external factors, such as cultural frames, institutional contexts, and resource availability. To be able to place the reviewed factors in a theoretical framework, the need arises to develop a better understanding of the Fossil Free campaigns, as well as the context in which they originated. Therefore, the second part of Chapter 2 addresses the three main theoretical branches that have influenced the fossil fuel divestment movement: the climate movement literature, the divestment literature, and the student activism literature.

Having delivered a clear understanding of the fossil fuel divestment movement itself, and having elaborated on the factors with which researchers have tried to explain campaigning outcome, a solid way is paved for the development of four theoretical propositions, which are presented in Chapter 3. These propositions are based on the idea that the outcome of a campaign is dependent on its ability to generate an effective strategy. While the first two propositions hypothesize that this ability is influenced by internal factors, the latter two stress the importance of external factors. Once having presented these, the chapter continues outlining a theoretical framework, integrating both internal and external factors.

Chapter 4 proceeds with outlining the methodology used in this thesis: the case study. It elaborates on the three phases of the current research: case study design, data collection, and data analysis. The design adopted is a multiple case design with embedded units of analysis. The selected cases are GUCA Fossil Free, a campaign that has achieved divestment at the University of Glasgow (UK); and DivestVU, a campaign that has been struggling to convince the VU University Amsterdam (the Netherlands) to divest. The units of analysis are the campaigners. The data on these cases was collected through interviews and unobtrusive methods, the latter including research documents, social media, websites, and visual data. The data was analyzed while using the ‘explanation building’ technique, aimed at uncovering the factors that account for the differences in goal attainment across the two campaigns.
Chapter 5 outlines the main findings of the case study analysis, showing that the outcomes of the chosen campaigns on the one hand were strongly affected by their leadership teams, as well as organizational structure, which both are internal organizational factors. However, on the other hand, evidence shows the importance of taking external environmental factors into account when analyzing campaigning outcome, as the influence of institutional and cultural constraints as well as the availability of resources proved to have a significant effect on the outcome of both campaigns.

Having presented the results of the case study analysis, the thesis turns towards the discussion of these findings in Chapter 6. While looking back at the theoretical propositions, it is explained how each of them holds in the light of the newly obtained insights. Hence, the importance of using an inclusive and integrative framework is confirmed, one that takes both internal and external influences on campaigning outcome into account. Apart from discussing these new insights, in this chapter several findings of previous studies are further confirmed, specifically referring to findings on organizational leadership, campaigning tactics, campaigning size, diversity, and student activism.

In Chapter 7 the conclusion is presented, summarizing the main findings of the research and their implications. Furthermore, in this chapter the limitations of this study are outlined, as well as directions for further investigation.
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Acronyms

°C - Degrees Celsius
ABP - (Dutch: Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds) Civil Servants Pension Fund, the Netherlands
ADVVALVAS - The college newspaper of the VU Amsterdam
AGM - Annual General Meeting
CO₂ - Carbon Dioxide
COP21 - Conference Of Parties 21 (2015)
ETFs - Exchange Traded Funds
G-8 summits - G8 is the Group of Eight, an international forum for eight industrialized nations, also known as the G7+1
GDD - Global Divestment Day
GHGs - Greenhouse Gases
Gt - Gigatonne
GUCA - Glasgow University Climate Action society
HvA - (Dutch: Hogeschool van Amsterdam) Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences
MSc ERM - Master in Science Environment and Resource Management
NGO - Non-Governmental Organization
SFSA - Students For Sustainability Amsterdam
SMOs - Social Movement Organizations
SOAS - The School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
SRC - Student Representative Council
U.S. - United States of America
UK - United Kingdom
UNFCCC - United Nations Climate Change Conference
UvA - (Dutch: Universiteit van Amsterdam) University of Amsterdam
VoIP - Voice over Internet Protocol
VU - (Dutch: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands
1. Introduction

The world's climate is changing: global air and ocean temperatures are increasing, ice caps are melting, sea levels are rising, the oceans are acidifying and natural disasters are not only occurring more often, but are also becoming more intense (Storm, 2009; IPCC, 2007; Mann et al., 2009). A strong scientific consensus exists on human influence on this changing climate; approximately 97 percent of climate scientists are convinced that climate change is anthropogenic (Anderegg et al., 2010; Cook et al., 2013; Doran and Zimmerman, 2009; Maibach, Myers & Leiserowitz, 2014; Oreskes, 2004). Experts argue that human activities like agriculture, industry, waste disposal, deforestation, and the usage of fossil fuels are increasing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs), which in turn are said to be the major cause of the warming of the climate system (Delworth & Knutson, 2000; Boer et al., 2000; Wigley, 1999; Wuebbles & Jain, 2001). Of all GHGs emitted by humans, carbon dioxide (CO₂) is the one contributing most to climate change (IPCC, 2007).

Policy makers have generally agreed that the average global temperature rise caused by GHG emissions should not exceed two degrees Celsius (2°C) above the average global temperature of pre-industrial times (McGlade & Ekins, 2015). According to Hansen et al. (2008), to reach this temperature threshold, atmospheric CO₂ concentrations will need to be reduced from the current 385 parts per million (ppm) to a maximum of 350 ppm, but likely less than that. To reach this, we have to limit the amount of CO₂ that is emitted into the atmosphere. The Carbon Tracker Initiative (2011) has calculated that, to have at least 80 per cent chance of reaching the above mentioned temperature and atmospheric CO₂ concentration thresholds, the cumulative carbon emissions between 2011 and 2050 need to be restricted to approximately 565 gigatonnes (Gt) of CO₂, which is referred to as the world’s 'carbon budget'.

Computer-based models of the complex processes affecting the carbon cycle show that the major cause of the current peak of atmospheric CO₂ concentrations is the burning of fossil fuels (IPCC, 2007). Thus, it seems human kind will have to reduce its fossil fuel usage if it wishes to stay within the carbon budged of 565 Gt CO₂. However, experts have shown that the GHG emissions contained in present estimates of global fossil fuel reserves are incompatible with this carbon budget (McGlade & Ekins, 2015): according to the Carbon Tracker Initiative (2011) such reserves contain approximately 2,795 Gt of CO₂, which exceeds the carbon budget by almost five times. Thus, it seems a large part of the fossil fuels should remain unused. More specifically, according to McGlade & Ekins (2015) approximately a third of the global oil reserves, half of gas reserves and over 80 per cent of current coal reserves should stay in the ground from 2010 to 2050 in order to meet the target of 2°C.

Hansen et al. (2008) state that, in order to achieve significant reductions of the planet's CO₂ concentration, prompt global policy changes need to take place. While
such climate policy has been slow to materialize, a collective grassroots force has initiated its own social movement: the fossil fuel divestment movement, mainly rooted in the climate movement on the one hand and in the divestment movement on the other hand. This movement “encourages institutions to immediately freeze new investments in the fossil fuel industry and completely rid their endowments of stocks in the 200 fossil fuel companies with the largest reserves” (Fossil Free, 2015a). One of the organizations that has been highly involved in this movement is 350.org, whose name was inspired by the aforementioned atmospheric CO₂ concentration threshold of 350 ppm (350.org, 2015). It organizes mass public actions, online campaigns, as well as grassroots campaigns, targeting a broad range of climate issues. One of these grassroots campaigns specifically focuses on divestment: the ‘Go Fossil Free’ or ‘Fossil Free’ campaign.

The Fossil Free campaign was founded in the U.S. in 2012 by the American writer, environmentalist and 350.org-leader Bill McKibben. Fossil Free is built on the belief that it is morally wrong to invest in fossil fuels, which is why it argues that educational and religious institutions, governments, and other organizations serving the public good should lead by example (Fossil Free, 2015a). Next to its moral argument, Fossil Free has emphasized a key economic argument for divestment, related to the aforementioned carbon budget. The authors postulate that the stock price of major fossil fuel corporations is valued based on the total amount of their reserves. However, global temperatures will surpass the 2°C threshold if these reserves are burned. If policy were to avoid this, then the declared reserves owned by the world’s largest listed coal, oil and gas companies — and their investors — would be subject to impairment. Thus, according to the Carbon Tracker Initiative (2011), if the fossil fuel reserves of these companies have to stay in the ground they will become ‘stranded assets’, leading to severe consequences for the economy. Based on this economic reasoning, the Fossil Free campaign argues that institutional investors will not only do the morally right thing by divesting, but they will also avoid the exposure to the systemic risk of ‘unburnable carbon’ (Fossil Free, 2015a).

Since the foundation of Fossil Free in 2012, nearly one thousand divestment campaigns have been launched at universities, cities and religious institutions across North America, Europe, and Australia (Ritchie & Dowlatabadi, 2015). Though the fossil fuel divestment movement has expanded across the globe to include non-academic institutes, it is mainly students who are leading this movement. Zooming in on the student-led fossil fuel divestment movement at academic institutions specifically, it can be noticed that worldwide twenty-seven colleges and universities have already committed to divestment, but to the disappointment of many Fossil Free

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1 In line with Jamison (2010a), the thesis defines social movements as “the processes of political protest that mobilize resources in networks, linking individual actors and organizations together in the pursuit of a common cause.” (Jamison, 2010a, p. 813).

2 Divestment may be broadly defined as the sale of investments because of ethical motivations. Divestment may also be defined as the sale of investments because of public relations reasons. Disinvestment, however, is the severing of business and financial ties to fossil fuels. In this thesis, businesses disinvest when they cut all ties to fossil fuels, while universities divest when they sell their securities in companies which have not disinvested (Kibbe, 1989; Knight, 1990; Soule, 2008).
campaigners, other academic institutions have refused to do so. This leads the current thesis to ask the following research question:

**Research question:** “Why do some divestment campaigns result in divestment, while others do not?”

There is an ongoing debate amongst scholars about which factors associated with social movement organizations (SMOs) are most important in affecting the relative success of their outcome attainment efforts (Cress & Snow, 2000). On the one hand, some theories have linked the outcomes of SMOs to the external or environmental factors that are influencing the organization. In other words, they say that the success of a SMO or a campaign is mainly affected by its surroundings. Two of the most widely discussed theories of this nature are the resource mobilization theory (see Edwards & McCarthy, 2004) and the framing theory (see Benford & Snow, 2000). On the other hand, however, certain other researchers challenge the aforementioned view by postulating that differences in success amongst SMOs can be explained by their differences in internal organizational factors. One of these researchers is Marshall Ganz, who states that outcome is a product of the capacity of the SMO and its leadership to produce an effective strategy (Ganz, 2000). Although both the external and the internal approaches emphasize the importance of one factor or set of factors over others (Giugni 1998), Cress & Snow (2000) state that there are multiple pathways leading to success, and that different combinations of factors are likely to be associated with different categories of outcomes for different movements. Thus, a conjunction of factors that might be effective for one social movement may not predict success for another. Therefore, it is believed that using a unidimensional approach when trying to answer the above outlined research question is misguided. In line with this argument, the current thesis adopts a combinatorial and interactive approach to determine the specific set of factors that influence the outcome of student-led Fossil Free campaigns.

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3 Social movement organizations (SMOs) are defined as “relatively formal organizations that manage the interdependencies of adherents and activists committed to social movements” (Zald & Ash, 1996). The Fossil Free campaigns are SMOs of the fossil fuel divestment movement. Hence, the terms ‘SMO’ and ‘campaign’ are used interchangeably in the present report.
2. Literature review

The purpose of the current literature review is twofold: (1) to revise the (internal and external) factors with which previous studies have tried to explain the outcome of SMOs, which in turn creates a firm foundation for the development of a theoretical framework; and (2) to construct a better understanding of the fossil fuel divestment movement itself in order to be able to place the theoretical framework in context. Hence, this chapter is split up into two main sections (2.1. and 2.2.) that aim to fulfill the aforementioned purposes correspondingly.

2.1. Theory that links SMOs and outcome

In order to discover the specific set of factors that influence the outcome of student-led Fossil Free campaigns, three different theoretical perspectives that attempt to explain the outcome of SMOs are reviewed. First, the Strategic Capacity Framework of Ganz (2000) is presented, which attributes SMO success to internal, organizational factors. The following two perspectives, the resource mobilization theory and the framing theory, link SMO outcomes to external environmental factors.

2.1.2. Internal factors: Strategic Capacity Framework

Many scholars look at the organizational characteristics of SMOs when studying the success of social movements. For example, Gamson (1975) theorized about the importance of internal variables as determinants of movement success. Etzioni (1970) argues for a link between government responsiveness and the nature of the movement’s organizational structure and stability. Also Brill (1971) looks at internal factors when studying the outcome of social movements, arguing that success is not probable unless movement leaders build a functional organization. In line with these scholars author Marshall Ganz (2000) presents a framework that tries to make sense of the outcome of social movement, in which he attributes success to internal organizational factors. It proves to be interesting to build upon the work of Ganz (2000) in the current thesis, as the case studies on which the author’s framework is based have a similar purpose to that of the present case study; namely, to explain the differences in outcome between two SMOs. According to this author the differences in success of the specific cases of his research –two SMOs that unionize farmworkers– cannot be explained by a variation in external factors amongst these cases. Rather, Ganz (2000) turns towards the internal factors of SMOs. More specifically, the author argues that the success of a SMO can be attributed to its ‘strategic capacity’. This is, the capacity of an organization to produce an effective strategy that allows it to deal with environmental opportunities and obstacles, which in turn will lead to better outcomes. To ensure a better understanding of this concept, a direct quotation of Ganz (2000) is provided below.

“I argue that difference in the outcomes of AWOC and UFW efforts can be explained by differences in their strategy –the targeting, timing, and tactics
through which they mobilized and deployed resources. Differences in their strategy, however, and the likelihood it would be effective in achieving desired goals, were due to differences in leaders' access to salient information about the environment, heuristic use they made of this information, and their motivation—what I call their ‘strategic capacity.’ Differences in strategic capacity, in turn, were due to differences in leaders' life experience, networks, and repertoires of collective action and the deliberative processes, resource flows, and accountability structures of their organizations”

(Ganz, 2000, p. 1005)

A visual representation of this logic can be found in Figure 1 below.

![Strategic Capacity Framework](image)

*Figure 1 – Strategic Capacity Framework (retrieved from Ganz, 2000).*

Because the theoretical framework of the current thesis is largely based on the Strategic Capacity Framework of Ganz (2000), each of the elements of strategic capacity—information heuristics and motivation—is briefly explained in the table below. In the same table the influencing factors of strategic capacity—leadership and organization—are clarified.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic capacity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Heuristics</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Motivation</strong></td>
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### Leadership

The influence of the leaders of the organization – the persons authorized to make strategic choices within the SMO (Oberschall, 1973; Porter, 1996) – on its strategic capacity can be assessed by addressing:

1. the biography of these leaders;
2. their networks; and
3. their knowledge of a diversity of collective action repertoires.

### Organization

The second major set of influences on strategic capacity is related to the degree to which the structure of the organization is supporting:

1. appropriate deliberation, meaning regular and fruitful meetings;
2. the mobilization of resources; and
3. the establishment of routines for leadership selection.

The better the organization is at these three aspects, the more its strategic capacity increases.

**Table A** – Explaining the elements of the Strategic Capacity Framework (summarized from Ganz, 2000).

### 2.1.3. External factors

Two theories that have received a significant amount of attention regarding social movement outcomes are the resource mobilization theory and the framing theory. The former links outcome to the presence of resources in the broader environment of the SMO, as well as its ability to use and mobilize these resources. The latter generally sees SMO outcome as being affected by environmental factors: political/institutional opportunities and constraints, and cultural opportunities and constraints. The background of these theories, as well as the way in which they address SMO outcome is reviewed below.
2.1.3.1. Resource mobilization theory

Since the mid-1970s the resource mobilization theory has generally been regarded as the dominant perspective in social movements (Cress & Snow, 1996). Its central premise is the ability of social movements to acquire resources and mobilize them to advance their cause (Kendall, 2011). Recent literature differentiates five types of resources: human, material, moral, cultural and social-organizational (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004). According to these authors, human resources include labor, experience, skills, and expertise; they are highly dependent on each individual activist, and are therefore not transferable. Material resources refer to fund, equipment, supplies, and other tangible artifacts. Funds are a key resource that can be converted into more or less any other type of resource, with the partial exception of moral resources —partial in the sense that in order to be most effective, moral resources should be spontaneous and not bought (Lin, 2001). Moral resources include solidarity support, sympathetic support, and celebrity support (Cress & Snow 1996; Lahusen 1996; Meyer, 1995; Snow, 1979). Cultural resources are artifacts and cultural products such as conceptual tools and specialized knowledge that have become widely known. These include tacit knowledge about how to accomplish specific tasks like enacting a protest event, holding a news conference, running a meeting, and forming an organization (Oliver & Marwell, 1992). Finally, social-organizational resources refer to both the intentional resources provided by the organization, such as organizational strategies (Coleman 1988), as well as the resources that result from non-movement purposes, such as social networks, and volunteer recruitment (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004).

Since the foundation of the resource mobilization theory, continuous modifications and developments of the theory have been going on. Rather than explaining these developments in detail, the purpose of this study is to highlight the link between the resource mobilization theory and SMO outcome. This link is strongly stressed by McCarthy & Zald (2001), who state that “when movement activists attempt to create collective action (fielding protests, creating SMOs, and the like) through historical time and across geographical locations, their successes are consistently related to the greater presence of available resources in their broader environments.” (p. 116). Although resource mobilization scholars recognize the dependence of SMOs on the presence of resources in their external environment, they also stress the importance of the internal organizational capacity of SMOs to interact with these resources. It is argued that the availability of resources alone will not lead to success; only if such resources are used and mobilized effectively will they facilitate positive outcomes (Kendall, 2011). In this sense, the resource mobilization theory partly overlaps with the Strategic Capacity Framework by Ganz (2000). In fact, Minkoff (1997) and Olzak & Ryo (2007) argue that the resource mobilization theory is especially powerful in supporting an analysis of the internal organizational factors that are possibly related to outcome, such as leadership, organizational strategy and organizational structure. In fact, the Strategic Capacity Framework actually includes part of the resource mobilization theory; as can be noticed (see Figure 1), the capacity of an organization to mobilize resources is seen as one of the six factors that are influencing strategic capacity. Accordingly, the resource mobilization theory and the Strategic Capacity
Framework are not seen as contradictory but rather as complementary. The main difference between both views is related to the actual link they make with SMO success. On the one hand the resource mobilization theory states that social movements unfold as actors predictably respond to newly available resources. Thus, as said before, the success of a movement is partly dependent on the resource availability. However, on the other hand Ganz argues that 'strategic capacity' can compensate for a lack of resources and that therefore a SMO is not necessarily dependent on the availability of such resources. However, in this thesis is argued that, because different types of resources and their relative importance might vary according to the context of SMOs and the social movement in general, the resource availability should also be integrated into the environmental factors of the theoretical framework.

2.1.3.2. Social constructionist theory: framing

Another perspective that has explored the outcomes of social movements and SMOs is the framing theory. Through the concept of framing, social constructionist scholars explore the construction of meaning and its attributes to social conflicts (Snow & Benford, 1988). Snow & Benford (1988, p. 214) explain that “frames help to render events or occurrences meaningful, and because of this they function to organize, experience and guide collective action.” In the study of social movements, collective action frames are used to bring people together and motivate them to take action. More specifically "collective action frames are action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a SMO." (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614). Thus, SMOs deploy collective action frames in order to create a set of meanings that will inspire people to act collectively toward some common purpose. Collective action frames are a vital part of the mobilization of any social movement. As Gamson & Meyer (1996, p. 285) explain, “collective action frames deny the immutability of some undesirable situation and the possibility of changing it through some form of collective action.” They define people as potential agents of their own history”. Hence, the author explains, collective action frames define a situation as problematic, but they simultaneously give actors the feeling that the problem can be overcome through concerted efforts, which in turn leads to collective action. Snow & Benford (1998) classify the three core tasks of collective action as (1) diagnostic framing, (2) prognostic framing and (3) motivational framing. Diagnostic framing identifies a problem and attributes blame or causality to some group or entity so that the SMO has a target for its actions. Prognostic framing pinpoints possible solutions or remedies, based on the target previously defined. Motivational framing provides a vocabulary of motives that compel people to take action. Interestingly, these three core tasks of collective actions have a highly overlapping meaning with the aforementioned elements of strategic capacity – information, heuristics and motivation. Information has many similarities with diagnostic framing as they both refer to the knowledge of the SMO about the environment. The second element of strategic capacity, heuristics, shares aspects with prognostic framing since problem solving is the main element the meaning of both. Motivational framing evidently highly relates to the motivational element of
strategic capacity. The aforementioned links show that framing theories are not totally excluded from the Strategic Capacity Framework. Another piece of evidence of the link between Ganz’s (2000) framework and framing theories is the fact that the author points out that “although choices about targeting, timing, and tactics can be directly observed, the strategic ‘frame’ within which we make these choices — and provide them with their coherence— must often be inferred” (p. 1010). Thus, when referring to strategy and strategic capacity, Ganz does recognize the influence of framing processes on SMOs; he just denies the direct effect of such frames on outcome.

Contrary to this argument, numerous studies have acknowledged the importance of framing processes in relation to the goal attainment of SMOs (Benford & Snow, 2000; Capek, 1993; Diani, 1996; Reese, 1996; Walsh et al., 1993; Zdravomyslova, 1996; Zuo & Benford, 1995). Cress & Snow’s (2000) have found that that both prognostic and diagnostic framing have a direct influence on the success of the SMOs that they scrutinized. Although a single investigation cannot generalize the influence of framing processes on outcome across social movements in general, it undoubtedly suggests that for some social movements and SMOs, framing processes are critical to the attainment of desired outcomes (Benford & Snow, 2000). According to Benford & Snow (2000), the formulation of framing processes does not occur in a ‘structural or cultural vacuum’ (Benford & Snow, 2000). Therefore, the outcome of these framing processes has highly influenced a number of elements of the socio-cultural context in which the SMOs are embedded. In other words, contextual or environmental factors have an effect on how SMOs frame strategies and actions, and therefore also have an effect on outcome. Two factors that these authors recognize as particularly important regarding environmental influences on framing processes are: (1) political/institutional opportunities and constraints, and (2) cultural opportunities and constraints (Benford & Snow, 2000).

Political/institutional opportunities and constraints. Over the past 25 years, one of the issues which social movement research and theory has most focused on is the relationship between changes in the structure of political opportunities, especially changes in the institutional structure and/or informal relations of a political system, and movement mobilization (Benford & Snow, 2000; McAdam et al., 1996). Many authors have found that such political/institutional factors constrain and facilitate collective action frames (Anheier et al., 1998; Benford & Valadez, 1998; Evans, 1997; Flam, 1996; Johnston & Snow, 1998; Marullo et al., 1996).

Cultural opportunities and constraints. Goodwin & Jasper (1999) argue that, just as the political opportunity structure constrains and facilitates collective action frames of SMOs, so too does the cultural context in which the SMO is embedded (Benford & Snow, 2000). Such cultural context includes the extant stock of meanings, beliefs, ideologies, practices, values, myths, narratives, and the like (Swidler, 1986). Out of this cultural context new cultural features are created, such as innovative collective action frames (Benford & Snow, 2000). Thus, from this perspective, framing processes such as collective action frames typically reflect wider cultural continuities and changes (Benford & Snow, 2000; Tarrow, 1992).
2.2. Roots of the fossil fuel divestment movement

To be able to analyze the chosen Fossil Free campaigns in terms of the above-explained literature that tries to make sense of the outcome of social movements, it is first necessary to build a better understanding of the background of the Fossil Free campaigns. Therefore, the present section gives a brief outline of the movements that have shaped the fossil fuel divestment movement—the climate movement and former divestment movement—and as the focus of this thesis is exclusively on student Fossil Free campaigns, a brief review of the literature on student activism is provided.

2.2.1. The climate movement

According to Jamison (2010a), the climate movement has its roots in the ‘conventional’ or ‘modern’ environmental movement, which dates back to the post World War II period, when actual environmental awareness began to emerge (Rome, 2003). This modern environmental movement is widely considered to be one of the most successful contemporary movements in North America and in Western Europe (Dunlap & Mertig, 1992; Dalton, 1994). It is centered on ecology, health, and human rights and it seeks to protect these by influencing political processes through lobbying, education and activism. Environmental activists can be defined as the ones who intentionally engage in ecological behaviors in order to contribute to environmental change (O’Shaughnessy & Kennedy, 2010). Similar to other contemporary social movements of the 1960s—such as the women’s liberation movement and the anti-imperialism movement—, the environmental movement grew out of student revolts (McCormick, 1991). University and high-school students highly criticized the way knowledge about the so-called ‘environmental crises’ was presented to society (Jamison, 2001). Environmental activists, like most individuals, are concerned about and dissatisfied with the quality of the environment (Manzo & Weinstein, 1987; Mohai, 1985). Nevertheless, unlike most individuals, they are more actively committed to changing or improving the quality of the movement. They show this commitment by becoming involved in fund raising campaigns or the signing of petitions, writing letters to governments and policy makers, trying to influence people’s attitudes and behaviors toward the environment, as well being members of environmental SMOs.

It was within the context of this environmental movement that climate change was first identified as a potentially significant social and political problem (see Commoner, 1971; Ward & Dubos, 1972; Allen et al., 1972). According to Jamison (2010a) “in the 1970s the idea that human activity could be causing global warming first left the circumscribed confines of academic discussion to enter the bras realms of society” (p. 811). From this point on the climate movement has created an ongoing discussion showing fundamental disagreements over the causes and appropriate manners to deal with global warming (Malone, 2009). Jamison (2010a) groups these disagreements or distinct ‘viewpoints’ in three categories: the oppositional position,
the dominant position, and the emergent position. Below these three positions are explained briefly as they shape the state of the art of the climate movement as we know it today.

2.2.1.1. The oppositional position: the climate skeptics

Jamison (2010a) explains that after a rather political left wing period in the 1960s and 1970s, the 1980s were a key political turning point in both Europe and Northern America, as conservative values and traditions shifted nations to the right. In this context, neo-conservative (in Europe) and neo-nationalist (in the U.S.) movements developed as an opposition to the new social movements of the 1970s. These conservative movements are characterized by a traditional conception of science and knowledge as detached, objective truth-seeking; it denied and opposed the knowledge embodied in the environmental movement, including the existence of anthropogenic climate science. Old scientists, who had enjoyed high prestige in 1940s and 1950s, together with more reactionary people and anti-environmentalists, shaped the so-called ‘climate-skepticism’. The neo-conservative movement provided the context for climate change skepticism to become politically significant. However, contemporary climate skeptics are certainly not all neo-conservatives or neo-nationalists (Lomborg, 2007), many skeptics simply question the truth value of the scientific knowledge claims made on the behalf of climate change.

2.2.1.2. The dominant position: green business

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, while the anti-environmental movement was taking shape, the environmental movement itself took a different path (Oreskes, 2004). In the 1990s, as a result of globalization or neo-liberalism, society started to become more commercial and competitive, and so did the environmental movement. Environmentalism became more market-oriented, making traditional boundaries between academic and commercial worlds and between science and politics increasingly blurry (Hard & Jamison, 2005; Jasanoff et al., 2001). The green business advocates, as Jamison (2010a) calls them, strongly believe the environment can be saved by massively investing in green technology, which will in turn lead to economic growth. Former U.S. vice-president Al Gore is one of the most prominent proponents of the market-oriented environmentalism approach.

Since the emergence of this dominant approach, climate change research, rather than being carried out exclusively in academic institutions, began receiving external funding, not only from business but also from politics. The methods of investigation used in externally funded research have been highly criticized by climate skeptics (Elzinga, 1985; Elzinga, 1996; Jasanoff, 2004; Lahsen, 2008; Yearley, 2009). They question this new way of knowledge production (Gibbon et al., 1994) since ‘entrepreneurial’ values have increasingly been replacing traditional academic values. Whether externally funded research leads to accurate findings or not, it has to be acknowledged that recent research on climate change carried out by ‘green business’ has highly contributed to development of green technologies and has had a powerful influence on climate change politics.
Finally, Jamison (2010a) explains that the dominant position is mainly associated with those who have been most active in raising political awareness about climate change in the past decade, and who have promised substantial lowering of the CO₂ emissions into the atmosphere and transition to what has been termed a low-carbon society.

2.2.1.3. The emergent position: climate justice

Unlike the preceding discussion about the rise of the environmental and the climate movements, which has mainly taken place in ‘the North’ (Europe and the U.S.), the climate justice movement is deeply rooted in ‘the South’. Particularly in Latin America, Asia and Africa groups and alliances have begun to take part of a climate change debate. The climate justice movement is part of a larger global justice movement, which is mainly characterized by being anti-capitalistic and against a neoliberal and corporate-based economy (Culturalpolitics.net, 2015). The global justice movement is not against globalization, it is only against the global expansion of corporate power (Della Porta, 2005). In turn, it advocates an equal distribution of resources as well as fair trade rules. Rather than seeing climate change exclusively as an environmental challenge, as was advocated by the environmental movement in the 1970s, according to Jamison (2010a), climate justice takes a more integral position on the climate crisis. It recognizes both the ecological and human effects of climate change, as well as the intersectional systems of oppression perpetuating social injustice and environmental degradation (Grady-Benson, 2014). Thus, climate justice seeks to change the discourse on climate change from a conversation about carbon concentrations, to an understanding of the uneven causes and unequal impacts of the climate crisis. To do so, in the 2000s several climate-specific organizations were founded, such as 350.org, which in recent years have organized a number of worldwide protests.

The climate justice movement is still in its initial stage, with all the uncertainties that this entails. According to Hardt and Negri (2005), there is little agreement on what the movement should do and how it should organize itself. On the one hand, climate justice tends to mean something very different to activists of the industrialized countries of the North than it does to activists of the industrializing and developing countries of the south (Parks & Roberts, 2010). The very different life experiences and expectations of the participants make it difficult to develop a common understanding and shared belief system, Jamison (2010a) adds. On the other hand, the author explains that there are also intellectual tensions within the movement. The increasing encroachment of a commercial and entrepreneurial value system at universities makes it difficult for concerns with climate justice to be given the attention they deserve in higher education. “The future development [and the success of the climate justice movement] will depend not so much on transcending disciplines as in cross-fertilizing activist and academic knowledge in developing a change-oriented green knowledge.” (Jamison, 2010, p. 820).
2.2.2. The divestment literature

Divestment is not a new concept to political or social advocacy. This tactic was firstly used by activists in the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s to fight the South African Apartheid. The historical success of this movement has inspired many other divestment movements. In the 1980s, for example, as the effects of smoking on human health became widely known, a divestment movement emerged against the tobacco industry. More recently smaller campaigns have targeted divestment from Sudan, which aims to make an end to the genocide in Darfur (Soederberg, 2009); the divestment from weapons manufacturing, which advocates against violence (Campaign to Unload, 2015); as well as a divestment movement which seeks to end the Israeli occupation of Palestine (Barghouti, 2011).

According to Ansar, Caldecott & Tilbury (2013) divestment campaigns typically evolve over three waves. The authors explain that the first wave commonly begins with a small group of investors that sells its shares of the (in their view) morally wrong industry. Although the amounts divested are relatively insignificant, they do lead to media attention, which in turn starts creating public awareness. Both the tobacco and the antiapartheid campaigns have originated in the United States. The first to divest in the tobacco industry were medical and public health organizations, stating they viewed smoking as something contrary to their mission of promoting public health. Similarly, the first to divest from companies related to the South African Apartheid were religious groups and African-American investor groups (Arnold & Hammond, 1998; Lansing & Kuruvilla, 1998). The transition from the first phase to the second phase can take many years; this is when student groups start getting involved. The second phase starts when these student groups are successful at pressuring their universities to divest from the target industry. At first the more progressive universities divest, but it is not until the more prominent universities start divesting that a ‘tipping point’ occurs (Teoh, Welch & Wazzan, 1999), which is when other national and international academic and public institutions begin to follow. The probability is high that the more conservative institutions will not change their investment models, but this will not stop the third wave from rolling in, when the divestment campaign goes global. It begins to target market norms and large financial institutions (Ansar, Caldecott & Tilbury, 2013). The tobacco divestment movement experienced its third wave in the mid-1990s, when large US public pension funds divested their holdings. Similarly, in the case of South Africa, the initially US-centric campaign attracted global firms in Europe and Japan to enhance domestic pressure. In both movements student divestment protesters played a significant role. Achieving what no previous generation of campus activists had ever managed, these student activists created a mass student movement during the term of a conservative government (Altbach & Cohen, 1990).

Like the tobacco and the South African antiapartheid divestment campaigns, the fossil fuel divestment movement began in the U.S. The fossil fuel divestment movement is growing at an exceptional high rate and is rapidly gaining global momentum (the Guardian, 2013). Besides the growing list of divestment successes in the U.S., Fossil Free campaigners at universities, public institutions and religious
Institutions across Europe, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are starting to triumph (for the list of institutions who have committed to divest from fossil fuels see Fossil Free, 2015b). Because of these initial accomplishments and its high rate of student-involvement, it could be said that the fossil fuel divestment campaign is entering the second wave. When looking back at the waves introduced by Ansar, Caldecott & Tilbury (2013), it seems the next challenge of the movement is to reach the tipping point: getting the most prominent universities to divest their endowments from the fossil fuel industry.

2.2.3. Student activism

As can be noted throughout the literature review so far, all the above described social movements have something in common: the importance of the role student activists have played either in founding these movements or in pushing them through. Research indicates that student activism it is a difficult phenomenon to study, partly due the short duration of student movements as well as the brief involvement of the actors within campaigns (Shoben, 1970). Most of the research on student activism takes a historical perspective, showing that it has been a significant component of history in both Europe and the U.S. (Altbach, 1989; Boren, 2001). However, rather then adopting a historical outlook, the present thesis focuses on student activism within the current generation, also referred to as Generation Y, as the fossil fuel divestment movement is a contemporaneous movement in which mainly student of this generations are involved. Research on today’s youth indicates that Generation Y, born approximately between 1985 and 2000, is more engaged in both civic and political life through collective actions than their predecessors — generation X (Kiesa et al., 2007). Generation Y students are not only characterized as more civic-minded, but also as being more affluent, team-oriented, optimistic, better educated (Howe & Strauss, 2000; Pew Research Center, 2015), more confident, diverse, open and technologically savvy (Morukian, 2009).

Technology has actually had a significant influence on contemporary activism. Already in the 1990s (student) activists began making use of cell phones, laptops, photocopiers, word processing, desktop publishing, databases, and portable video cameras for the organization and execution of protests (Brownstein, 2001; Kreider, 2005; Levine, 1999). More recently, through networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter, activists have been able to mobilize groups on a much larger scale (Stripling, 2015). Nowadays technology and student activism are inseparably. Next to the effects of technology, also those of globalization and the worldwide economic downturn have played a significant role in recent instances of activism (Page, 2010). Examples of recent protests in which students have played a major role are those related to the global labor market (Page, 2010; Rhoads, 2005); military policies and the war in Iraq (Biddix, 2006); tuition fee increases (Epstein, 2015); climate-justice related protests, such as the ones at the meetings of the World Trade Organization, the World Economic Forum, and G-8 summits (Rhoads, 2005); and of course protests related to the divestment of fossil fuels, such as the recent Global Divestment Day worldwide marches (Melino & Biggers, 2015).
Today, as in the past, students use a large diversity of tactics to carry out activism. Tactics derive their meaning relative to the specific structural and cultural features of the campaigning group (Tarrow, 1998), and they can be categorized in different ways. The current thesis follows the categories of ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ tactics as presented by King & Soule (2007). According to these authors, some campaigning tactics are considered outsider tactics because they work outside of traditional channels of political decision-making in an attempt to increase the influence of a group that is not involved in decision-making processes. Such tactics are those used to engage a larger public and mobilize masses. Outside tactics can include, but are not limited to, demonstrations and marches, public meetings, mass media statements, pamphlets, petitions, identifying symbols and slogans, and coalition building (Steinberg, 2001). Next to the outside tactics, students also often engage in inside tactics, which include lobbying, negotiation, litigation, and institutional influence. Mostly such tactics occur in direct contact with certain entities of the academic institutions, including Executive Boards, the Financial Committees, or the Student Representative Councils, amongst others (Grady-Benson, 2014) and are not used to mobilize masses (King & Soule, 2007). The choice of tactics can define the identity of a social movement organization (SMO) and can have a significant impact on its success (King & Soule, 2007).
3. Theoretical framework

In the first part of the literature review it was mentioned that the main goal of Ganz (2000) is remarkably analogous to that of the current thesis: to explain the differences in outcome amongst two similar SMOs. Through his Strategic Capacity Framework (see Figure 1 above), the author argues that variation in outcome can be justified by differences in the ability of SMOs to generate effective strategy – their strategic capacity. In turn, strategic capacity is said to be affected by: (1) the biography, networks and repertoires of the leadership team, and (2) the deliberation structure, resource flows and accountability structure of the SMO itself. Because the purpose of Ganz (2000) is so similar to that of the current study, this thesis utilizes the internal factors of the Strategic Capacity Framework to analyze to what extent these are affecting the strategic capacity of the Fossil Free campaigns and thereby their outcome. To reflect this reasoning two propositions are developed.

**Proposition 1a:** The more effective the leadership team of a SMO is in dealing with its environment, the greater its strategic capacity will be.

This thesis sees those individuals who have committed to the organizing Fossil Free committees as being part of the leadership team of their corresponding campaigns. The effectiveness of these leadership teams to deal with their environments is determined by assessing the by Ganz (2000) presented leadership factors, further explained below.

**Biography.** To examine the biography of the leadership team the academic background of these leaders is identified, as well as their previous experience with social movements, their commitment to the movement, their intrinsic motivation, and finally their ability to motivate others. The more experience, commitments and motivation those in the leadership team have, the more effective the SMO’s strategy.

**Networks.** For this factor the relationship of the leadership team with the broader national and international Fossil Free network is analyzed, as well as its ties with the internal network of their corresponding universities. When looking at these relationships it is aimed to determine whether the leadership team is making good use of these networks to enhance the strategic capacity of the campaign.

**Repertoires.** When focusing on the data collection and analysis for this factor, the type of actions that have been carried out by the campaigns in an attempt to achieve divestment are taken into account, keeping in mind the previously identified ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ tactics. The more knowledge of tactics leaders have, the more likely they are to develop effective strategy.

**Proposition 1b:** The more the structure of a SMO allows leadership to deal with its environment, the greater its strategic capacity will be.
To determine how effective the structure of the SMO itself is in supporting its leadership team to develop effective strategy it is assessed whether the structures of the chosen campaigns facilitate deliberation, accountability, and resource flows (in the order below).

**Deliberation.** To determine whether the structure of the chosen campaigns facilitate deliberation, the analysis looks at how frequently the campaigns conduct meetings, whether they support group discussions and reflections, how capable groups are to perform tasks creatively and effectively, and how open-minded the campaign is to heterogeneous points of view.

**Accountability.** To define the accountability structures of the campaign, it is analyzed why actors choose to join the leadership team, what the routines of this teams are concerning leadership selection, whether the team has predefined responsibilities and tasks or not, and what these responsibilities and tasks entail.

**Resource flows.** To discover whether the structure of each campaign is supporting effective resource mobilization opportunities, the origin and use of the campaign’s resources are analyzed. To perform this analysis, the resources types identified by Edwards & McCarthy (2004), which were previously outlined in the literature review, are employed. These are operationalized as follows: (1) the human resources on the one hand are seen as the campaigners themselves, their level of expertize and their experience within social movements, while on the other hand important human resources constitute those persons external to the fossil free committees who have significantly contributed to the campaign; (2) the material resources are seen as the financial support the campaign has received, the various supplies that have been used for campaigning actions, and the supporting documents it has used; (3) the moral resources are seen as the moral support that the campaign has received from other persons or groups; (4) the cultural resources refer to the conceptual tools and specialized knowledge that the campaigns have acquired from their cultural surroundings; and finally (5) the social-organizational resources are seen as the capacity of the campaign to retain and transfer knowledge.

As said before, in line with Cress & Snow (2000), the current thesis adopts the view that multiple combinations of factors and conditions are leading to outcome attainment, which will probably vary depending on the type of social movement. Having revised the roots of the fossil fuel divestment movement –the climate movement, the divestment literature, and the literature on student activism– it becomes more and more evident that the broader environmental context of a campaign is affecting its strategic capacity. For example, the Climate Justice movement –in which Fossil Free is rooted– stresses the global nature of the Fossil Free campaign, in turn showing that the campaign exists in both developed and developing countries. The probability is high that the availability of resources in developed countries is significantly higher than in the developing world, which could put a campaign in a developed country at an advantage over a campaign in a developing country. This example shows that the availability of resources in a SMO’s broader environment is not negligible when it comes to outcome. Another example
displaying the influence of external factors on outcome can be found in the literature on student activism, which shows that the tactics used by campaigns are widely affected by the surrounding culture of this campaign. Since tactics are an essential part of the Strategic Capacity Framework, it seems unreasonable not to take into account the effect cultural frames are having on such tactics. A final example that emphasizes the need to incorporate external factors when analyzing SMO outcome can be found in the divestment literature. In ‘phase two’ of the divestment waves, when academic institutions start joining the movement, it can be observed that some institutions decide to divest on their own volition, even if there was no student divestment campaign. This shows how much impact the decision makers of the university can have, as well as other institutional influences such as the level of progressiveness or conservatism of the institution, or how supportive or restraining the institutional policies are.

These examples show that, at least for the fossil fuel divestment movement, external environmental factors are influencing the outcome of Fossil Free campaigns to a greater degree then acknowledged in the Strategic Capacity Framework. This is confirmed by the revised social movement literature that seeks to make sense of SMO outcome—the resource mobilization and the framing theories—, where further evidence was found on the importance of resource availability, cultural opportunities and constraints, and political/institutional opportunities and constraints when looking at the strategic capacity of organizations. Based on the evidence provided in the literature review, the following propositions are elaborated:

**Proposition 2a:** The more institutional and cultural constraints present in the environment of a SMO, the smaller the strategic capacity of this SMO.

**Proposition 2b:** The absence of essential resources in the environment of a SMO decreases the strategic capacity of this SMO.

By integrating this second set of propositions into this study, it is not presumed that external environmental factors are influencing strategic capacity—and thus outcome—more then internal organizational factors; instead, it is believed that the Strategic Capacity Framework ignores the strong direct influence that such external factors can have on outcome. Henceforth, the two propositions outlined above lead to a modification of the Strategic Capacity Framework by Ganz (2000). The adapted version of this framework is depicted in Figure 2 below, and reflects the assumption that external environmental factors are also affecting the strategic capacity, and thus outcome. After the visual presentation of the theoretical framework the operationalization of each factor is addressed.
Figure 2 – Including a direct impact of environmental factors on strategic capacity in the ‘Strategic process model’ (Ganz, 2000).
4. Methodology

As can be noticed in the previous sections, this study first explores existing social movement theories and it then develops a set of propositions based on this theory; this is done with the aim of ultimately deducing conclusions from these propositions. Hence, the current research adopts a ‘deductive approach’ – contrary to an ‘inductive approach’, which would begin with observations (not theory) to find a pattern (Snieder & Larner, 2009). The chosen research method for testing the propositions is the ‘qualitative explanatory case study’. It is necessary to firstly state why the methodology of this study is explanatory, rather than exploratory or descriptive. Moreover, it essential to outline the reasons for choosing a case study over other qualitative methods.

The link between SMOs and outcome has been researched extensively in the previous chapters. Because of the existing understanding of this matter, there is no need to conduct an exploratory research. Similarly, although a thorough description of the phenomenon at hand is required for a better understanding of the study, merely describing this phenomenon does not add much to the existing literature. Rather, the main purpose of this research is to explain why the phenomenon occurred; in other words, why some SMO achieve divestment while others SMO do not. Yin (2003) states that ‘why’ questions usually lead to qualitative explanatory research. According to this author, the most appropriate methods for carrying out explanatory research are usually case studies, experiments, and histories. For this specific thesis the case study method has been chosen over the other two methods because of two main reasons. First, the fossil fuel divestment movement is a real-life phenomenon; to analyze contemporary events case studies are preferred over histories (Yin, 2009). Experiments, on the other hand, are often used when the investigator aims to manipulate behavior directly, precisely and systematically in order to study the phenomenon at hand (Yin, 2009). If data were manipulated in the present research, it would probably cease to explain the actual reason for differences in outcome amongst the campaigns, as the contextual conditions are believed to be highly relevant to answering the research question. Henceforth, the case study is viewed as the most appropriate method for this research.

4.1. Research design

The research design of the present case study consists in a three-phase approach (see Figure 3 below), which reflects the deductive nature of this study. The main phases of this study are (1) the case study design phase, (2) the data collection phase, and (3) the data analysis phase. All phases are outlined below, but are more thoroughly explained in the subsequent sections.
Phase one, the case study design phase, began after having defined the purpose of the thesis. Namely, discovering why some Fossil Free campaigns are more successful than others in achieving divestment. In order to systematically uncover the context of this topic, the literature was reviewed, the propositions were formulated, and the theoretical framework was developed. Having defined the factors that could possibly be influencing the outcome of Fossil Free campaigns, the need arose to decide upon the case study design. Here the representative cases for this study were selected, the case study boundaries were delimited, and the case study protocol was developed. The exact details on these procedures are explained in Section 4.1.1.

Section 4.1.2. addresses phase 2, the data collection phase, which began with gathering the necessary data while keeping in mind the case study protocol, as well as the previously defined boundaries. The main sources of evidence were interviews and unobtrusive data, the latter including research documents, data found on social media, websites, and visual data. The exact details on these sources of evidence can be found in Table 1 in the appendix. This table includes the specific links to the files of the data collected through the unobtrusive methods; the names of the interviewees, the dates of these interviews, as well as the position that the interviewees occupied within the committee. It is important to mention that the whole life cycle of the campaigns was aimed to be taken into account, as the outcomes of the campaigns can possibly be linked to the notion of time. Hence, it was ensured that the selected interviewees of each group could altogether cover the whole history of the campaign.

Phase three, the data analysis phase, took place once all data had been gathered and once all the interviews had been transcribed. The technique used to analyze the data was the ‘explanation-building’ technique, which sought to find causal relationships between the variables in order to answer the research propositions. The exact details on this technique are provided in Section 4.1.3.
4.1.1. Case study design

When defining the case study design, this research follows the classification provided by Yin (2009), which is depicted in Figure A in the appendix.

When looking at whether this study should use a single-case design or a multiple-case design it soon becomes clear that more than one case has to be employed if it is aimed to compare a campaign that has achieved divestment to one that has not. Hence, this study adopts a multiple-case design, with the cases being GUCA Fossil Free (located in Glasgow, UK) and DivestVU (situated in Amsterdam, the Netherlands). As can be noted in Figure A in the appendix, a multiple-case can have either a single unit of analysis (holistic) or multiple units of analysis (embedded). According to Yin (2009) a holistic case study analysis would pool the results across both campaigns, while embedded case studies separate the findings for each unit of analysis, which in turn allows the researcher to make comparisons between cases (Yin, 2009). Because it is believed that the results of every single interviewee are essential for the cross-case analysis, it is most appropriate to use embedded units of analysis – these being the interviewees at each case.

4.1.1.1. Case selection

The two following cases were selected for the current study: (1) the DivestVU campaign at the VU University Amsterdam, located in the Netherlands, which has been struggling to attain divestment; and (2) the GUCA Fossil Free campaign at the University of Glasgow, located in the UK, which has successfully achieved divestment.

The reason for choosing a case in the Netherlands is mainly related to the provenance and current base of the researcher. The researcher has been involved in several Fossil Free activities in the Netherlands and therefore has easy access to the Fossil Free network. None of the existing 13 university Fossil Free campaigns in the Netherlands have achieved divestment, thus in principle any of these campaigns could have been selected for the current case study. However, there are several reasons for choosing the DivestVU campaign as the most appropriate case for this purpose. To begin with, it was the first campaign set up in the country, which means it has invested the largest amount of time in trying to achieve divestment. Secondly, DivestVU has collected the largest amount of signatures on the Fossil Free online petition platform (see Fossil Free, 2015c), which is an indicator of the devotion of the committee and their efforts to create awareness. And lastly, DivestVU is the campaign that, according to an informal preliminary interview with the national Fossil Free coordinator of the Netherlands has made most progress so far at university board level. All the above show that many efforts have been invested in this campaign, and that these efforts actually led to numerous positive results. However, despite these good outcomes, actual divestment has still not been achieved. Henceforth, when comparing the DivestVU campaign to another campaign that has dedicated a significant amount of efforts to the campaigning process, but which has
actually achieved divestment, there is believed to be a high potential of finding factors that can be linked to the attainment of divestment.

When searching for a campaign that has achieved divestment with which to compare the DivestVU campaign, the Fossil Free website was consulted. When looking exclusively at the twenty-six university campaigns worldwide that have attained divestment (see Fossil Free, 2015b), it can be noticed that twenty-one of these are based in the U.S., one in New Zealand, one on the Marshal Islands, one in Sweden and three in the UK. The researcher decided not to select a campaign in the U.S., nor the ones based in New Zealand and the Marshal Islands, mainly because of geographical distance limitations. When taking the Swedish campaign under consideration for this research, it soon became clear that this campaign did not meet the requirements of this study. Namely, the university had not divested as a consequence of student campaigning, but rather because the board itself decided to do so (see appendix, Figure B). Turning towards an assessment of the UK based campaigns, the campaign at the University of Glasgow was chosen over the ones at the University of Bedfordshire and the SOAS University of London for two reasons: on the one hand because GUCA Fossil Free was the first group in achieving divestment, and on the other hand because the University of Glasgow has stronger ties with the fossil fuel industry. The stronger the ties of the university with the fossil fuel industry, the more challenging the campaigning process, as the risks for the university to commit to divestment increase.

4.1.1.2. Case study boundaries
To further delineate this research, following Baxter & Jack (2008), three additional boundaries for this case study are defined. The first boundary concerns a delimitation of the case study by time and space (Creswell, 2013). As said, the present case study will focus on the Fossil Free campaigns at the two chosen universities. The interviewees are activists of these campaigns whom are asked questions that exclusively concern their corresponding (local) campaigns. As the researcher of this thesis is located in the Netherlands and possesses limited resources to travel abroad, the interviews with the campaigners located in the UK take place by VoIP. A second boundary concerns the case delimitation in terms of time and activity (Stake, 1995). The current case study deals with operational links that need to be traced over time, which is why the Fossil Free campaigns are analyzed from their foundation onwards. As said before, taking the whole life span of the campaigns into account is essential, as the outcome of the campaigns might possibly be linked to the notion of time. A third and last boundary concerns the delimitation of the case by definition and context (Miles & Huberman, 1994), which has been clearly pointed out through both the literature review and the theoretical framework.

4.1.1.3. Case study protocol
The case study protocol was developed just before starting off with the data collection phase, mainly to serve as an instrument for defining the procedures and general rules to be followed during the course of the research. This document
provided to be useful for staying focused on the actual topic of the case study, as well as for carrying out the rest of the study in a structured and efficient manner. Moreover, it served for maintaining a clear ‘chain of evidence’ across cases, which according to Yin (2009) adds validity and reliability to a case study. The protocol was made available online in order to add the necessary transparency to the process (Hamaekers, 2015).

The protocol is divided into four basic episodes. In the first episode an overview of the case study project is given, including a summary of the study, its objectives, the issues being investigated and the relevant readings about the issues at hand. At a later stage of the process, the summary used in the protocol was also sent out to the interviewees in order to provide them with a sufficient amount of background information on the research.

In the second episode of the protocol the case study questions are outlined. These questions are different from the actual interview questions in the sense that they are not meant for the interviewees, but rather for the investigator. In other words, these are the questions that ultimately have to be answered when having carried out the data analysis. This episode includes a table that displays the case study question on the one hand, and the sources of evidence that are used to answer this question on the other hand. Whenever the researcher was deviating too far from the predefined ‘research path’, having a look at the aforementioned table served to re-target the final goal of the case study.

The third episode of the protocol outlines the field procedures carried out during the research. First, it is explained which sources of evidence are involved. Subsequently, a table is presented with the omit credentials for each source of evidence (this table can be found in the appendix, Table 1). After presenting this table the way in which the aforementioned credentials are protected and, where necessary, anonymized. Finally, the interview protocol is outlined, consisting of the actual interview questions. Making a clear overview of the nature and provenance of all data sources, next to adding reliability to the study, provided to be useful for the subsequent data analysis phase, allowing selecting and prioritizing data to be carried out systematically.

The fourth and last episode of the protocol further facilitated the collection, filtering and prioritization of data, as it drafted a preliminary structure of the case study report. Because such draft gave a clear indication of the end goal, this preliminary reporting outline proved to be indispensable for the succeeding data analysis phase.

4.1.2. Data collection

“The ability to deal with [a] full variety of evidence is the unique strength of a case study.” (Yin, 2003, p. 8). In the current research this evidence is collected in the form of interviews and unobtrusive methods, including documents, social media posts, websites, and visual data. The details on each source of evidence are provided below.
4.1.2.1. Interviews

Of the methods used during the data collection phase, the semi-structured interviews were the most important data source. Each interviewee was carefully selected in order to ensure a rich data procurement. The criteria for selecting the respondents were based on the role and tenure of each person within their corresponding fossil free committees. The roles to be covered were: (a) the actual founder of the committee or a person who had been deeply involved in the founding phase; (b) the current coordinator of the campaign; (c) a previous coordinator of the campaign; and (d) a current campaigner with a role other than a coordinating one.

At the DivestVU campaign four interviews were carried out, in which each interviewee covered one of the aforementioned roles. At the Fossil Free campaign of the University of Glasgow one person covered two of the aforementioned roles, which allowed the researcher to carry out one interview less. Prior to the interviews an introductory e-mail was sent to each of the respondents. This e-mail was derived from the case study protocol and addressed the objective of the research, its expectations, as well as the context of the interview (see appendix, Figure C). At the beginning of each interview the researcher asked the respondents for their permission to use a recording device, which would facilitate the transcription of the interviews. At all times it was assured that the interview results were to be processed anonymously, unless the interviewee did not think this was necessary. The duration of each interview ranged from 45 minutes to one hour.

Prior to the interviews an interview protocol was developed. The questions within this protocol were inspired by the theoretical framework and covered six main areas: (1) leadership, (2) organization, (3) strategic capacity, (4) strategy, (5) environmental opportunities and constraints, and (6) outcomes. As the nature of the interview was semi-structured, the questions covering the aforementioned areas were mainly open-ended. Although the researcher kept the structure of the interview protocol in mind during the interview itself, the respondents had the option to take different paths and explore their own thoughts, experiences, and feelings. However, when considered necessary, the researcher brought the interviewees back to the subject under discussion by the means of prompt questions, before allowing the interviewee to explore that particular aspect of the research problem. After each interview the audio files were transcribed and anonymized where needed. The full interview protocols can be found in Table 2 in the appendix.

To be able to analyze the interview data the audio files were transcribed and coded. At the first level of coding, the ‘open-coding’, the researcher began searching for the distinct factors in the data. The codes of these factors were predefined and were highly related to the theoretical framework. A total of 12 codes were used: (1) leadership biography, (2) leadership network, (3) leadership repertoires, (4) organizational structure, (5) deliberation of the organization, (6) resource flows within the organization, (7) accountability structure of the organization, (8) political/institutional opportunities, (9) political/institutional constraints, (10) cultural opportunities, (11) cultural constraints, and (12) resource availability. When having made separate tables in which the parts of text for each code were depicted, the
second level ‘axial coding’ began. Here the researcher thoroughly studied the tabular data in order to ensure that the concepts and categories accurately represented interview responses, as well as to explore how these categories were related. Such a systematic categorization of the data facilitated the analysis of the interviews in a later stage of the process.

4.1.2.2. Unobtrusive methods
According to Marshall & Rossman (2010) unobtrusive methods are ways of collecting data that do not interfere in the ongoing flow of everyday events. For this research, a first type of data, collected through unobtrusive methods, are documents. These varied from research papers produced by the campaigns on topics related to fossil fuel divestment, to letters written by the campaigners to their corresponding universities, in which they pledge for divestment. Furthermore, certain documents produced by the broader network of the campaigns were also collected, since these served as a support to the campaigns. Examples of such documents are action guides, campaigning strategy guides, media guides, as well as external research documents.

A second data type collected though unobtrusive methods are social media posts. The main communication channels of the Fossil Free campaigns towards the broader public are their Facebook and Twitter pages. Therefore, an analysis of the social media activity of both campaigns is considered fundamental.

Another important data source were websites. Although neither of the two campaigns has its own website, they are both part of the overarching websites of their corresponding national Fossil Free initiatives. Furthermore, a separate worldwide Fossil Free website was used, specifically the page on which the online petition of each campaign was found. Besides collecting information from websites related to Fossil Free, also items from other online platforms were gathered. Examples hereof are posts by the Guardian about the Fossil Free campaign at the University of Glasgow (the Guardian, 2014a) and a news item on the NOS website about the DivestVU campaign (NOS, 2015).

Finally, visual data was collected, which includes videos and photographs. All the above-mentioned data sources collected through unobtrusive methods mainly served to support, complement and triangulated the data obtained during the interviews. The interviews pave the pathway towards the discovery of success factors; the rest of the data sources serve mainly to confirm issues and expand stories.

4.1.3. Data analysis
For the current case study the ‘explanation-building’ technique was employed to analyze the case study data. Garson (2001) explains that under this technique, the researcher starts off with case examples chosen to represent diversity on some dependent variable. As mentioned before, in the current study the cases representing this diversity are GUCA Fossil Free and DivestVU; the dependent variable is
‘strategic capacity’, which in turn leads to a higher or lower probability of achieving divestment. After identifying the diversity of such variable, under the explanation-building technique the next step is to carry out a thorough literature review in order to construct a list of possible causes of the dependent variable. This is how the current study identified the before introduced theoretical propositions, which in turn led to the creation of a theoretical framework with both internal and external factors—the independent variables.

The strategic capacity of each case, as explained before, is determined by three elements: information, heuristics and motivation. During the explanation-building stage it was aimed to find out which internal factors (leadership and organization) and external factors (institutional and cultural influences, and resource availability) were influencing one or more of the aforementioned elements of strategic capacity. To start doing so, a table was developed depicting the causal relationships of all the independent variables with the dependent variable (See Table 7 in the appendix).

The data corresponding to the GUCA Fossil Free campaign was placed at the right side of the dependent variable, and the data on DivestVU was placed at the left side. Seeing these cases and the casual relationships next to one another allowed the researcher to systematically analyze the data across cases, which led the researcher to a provisional conclusion: the differentiating factors are the significant causes, while those common to all cases are not.

4.2. Validity and reliability

In this section is explained how the current study complies with the four most commonly used logical tests in empirical research. These tests include (1) construct validity, (2) internal validity, (3) external validity, and (4) reliability (Yin, 2009). Below is indicated how and when the subsequent tests were applied in order to ensure the overall quality of the research.

4.2.1. Construct validity

According to Yin (2009), to establish construct validity, first the correct operational measures for the concepts being studied need to be identified. Once the theoretical framework of the current thesis was developed—which depicts a variety of factors that could be influencing the outcome of fossil free campaigns—the need arose to define how these factors and their relationship would be measured. To ensure construct validity, the same measures were used as those employed in formerly published studies. More specifically, Ganz (2000) was used to operationalize the concepts linked to the internal factors leading to outcome; Cress & Snow (2001) and Edwards & McCarthy (2004) were used to operationalize the external factors. Moreover, for each factor or relationship, multiple sources of evidence were used throughout the data collection phase in order to make sure they had been measured properly. Section 3.1.2.2. provides a clear overview of the data sources that were used for this data triangulation. Finally, to further ensure construct validity a lot of
attention has been given to maintaining a clear chain of evidence throughout the whole case study report.

4.2.2. Internal validity

The internal validity test deals with the degree of accuracy of the inferences made during a case study (Yin, 2009). In other words, it aims to make sure the conclusions made about a causal relationship are correct. For the current study, four main tactics are used for striving towards internal validity. First, the research framework for the given case studies was explicitly derived from existing literature; the author provides a clear diagram and a verbal description of the relationship between the variables of the framework as well as of the outcomes, which according to Yin (2009) increases the internal validity of the study. Second, because the current research adopted a multiple-case study design it was possible for the researcher to employ the ‘constant comparative method’; an attempt to find more than one case that can test out the propositions (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). By first analyzing the DivestVU findings, and later addressing the GUCA Fossil Free case, it could be tested whether the nature of certain relationships between variables found at DivestVU also held for the GUCA case. Third, through ‘pattern matching’, the researcher was able to compare empirically observed patterns with the predicted patterns and with the relationships of SMOs and outcomes established in previous studies with different contexts (i.e. Ganz, 2000; Edwards & McCarthy, 2004; Benford & Snow, 2000); doing so increases the internal validity of the study (Denzin & Lincoln, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989). Fourth, the inferences made were triangulated with experts in the field to ensure the legitimacy of the causal links made, hence, ensuring internal validity (Yin, 1994).

4.2.3. External validity

The external validity test is concerned with the extent to which a study's results can be generalized beyond its immediate boundaries (Yin, 2003). Thus, do the ‘factors that influence strategic capacity’ found in this study apply to other Fossil Free campaigns or even to another type of SMO? Such generalizability can be attained by following a replication logic. When cases are expected to create similar results, then the study follows a ‘literal replication’ logic; if they are expected to produce contrasting results but for anticipated, theoretically grounded reasons, then the study follows a ‘theoretical replication’ logic (Yin, 2009). In the current study two cases with contrasting results were selected in order to find out why their results were so different; the research was then led by a strong theoretical reasoning that gave an indication of the answer to this question. Thus, this study used a theoretical replication logic to ensure external validity. The replication approach is illustrated in Figure 3 previously presented in Section 4.1.
4.2.4. Reliability

Reliability is closely related to the repeatability of a case study. According to Yin, (2003), in order to ensure reliability the procedures of a case study have to be so transparent that they can be easily replicated to attain the same results. By developing the case study protocol previously presented (see Hamaekers, 2015), the current case study aims to attain a high level of transparency. Thereby it aims to facilitate the replication of the study by other investigators. Moreover, as mentioned before, a formal database was developed so that the evidence of this case study can be reviewed easily. Both the protocol and the database add transparency to this study and therefore increase its reliability.

An extra effort was made to guarantee the reliability of the data collected and the inferences made. Namely, the researcher worked on this thesis at the national Fossil Free office of the Netherlands one or two days per week. This immersion offered the researcher the opportunity to receive constant feedback on the progress. Persons deeply involved in the Fossil Free network were able to confirm and correct issues when necessary.
5. Analysis

In the current chapter the results of the data analysis phase are presented. First, the stories of DivestVU and GUCA Fossil Free are outlined (from their inception until the present) in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 correspondingly. In Tables 3 and 4 in the appendix a timeline of each can be found; in Figure D in the appendix these timelines are merged and displayed visually. For each case the dynamics of the internal and external factors of the theoretical framework were analyzed. The data on each of these factors can be found in Table 5 of the appendix for the DivestVU case, and in Table 6 for the GUCA Fossil Free case.

Second, having identified the internal and external factors for each case separately, Section 5.3 turns towards the analysis of the data across cases, and how these factors are affecting the three elements of strategic capacity – information, heuristics, and motivation. Only where significant differences were found results are presented. By studying these differences, conclusions can be drawn towards the reasons why GUCA has been able to achieve divestment while DivestVU has not. A summary of these results can be found in Table 7 of the appendix.

Finally, in Section 5.4. the conclusions of this chapter are presented, pinpointing the most significant aspects of the cross-case analysis and how these account for the difference in goal attainment.

5.1. DivestVU: the story

This is a story about a Fossil Free campaign that has been running for a relatively long period. Many efforts have been made to make the campaign succeed, but it is still struggling to achieve divestment. The story of DivestVU begins with the Urgenda Foundation, a Dutch Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) that promotes sustainability and innovation. In March 2013, inspired by the worldwide fossil fuel divestment movement, Marjan Minnesma, the director of Urgenda, brought the movement to the Netherlands to urge companies and governments to stop investing in fossil fuels. Soon a nationwide Fossil Free campaign named FossielVrij NL was launched. Liset Meddens, at the time still employed by Urgenda, was appointed national coordinator. The campaign later became part of 350.org and initiated campaigns at municipalities, pension funds and universities to pledge for fossil fuel divestment. The first university campaign of the Netherlands was the DivestVU campaign at the VU University Amsterdam, which was founded by two students of the Master Environment and Resource Management (MSc ERM), one of which had close ties with Urgenda. A small group of people began working on an action plan for DivestVU. They started out with drafting a letter to the VU Executive Board (EB), in which they urged the University to withdraw all its direct and indirect investments in the fossil fuel industry by the end of 2013. In this letter the campaigners respectfully requested an official answer to their appeal by the end of April. In order to hand over the letter to Bernadette Langius of the Executive Board at
the VU, on March 22nd, 2013 DivestVU organized an event with the title ‘Bursting the carbon bubble’. Marjan Minnesma gave a short introductory speech on the campaign to a group of approximately 30 people, including a few well-known individuals in the sustainability sector of the Netherlands. Large red balloons, filled with fake money symbolizing the carbon bubble, were burst one by one by those present. The event was covered extensively in the media. Still, it took the Executive Board over two months to answer the letter. In the meantime DivestVU had actually already sent them another letter with a proposal for a face-to-face meeting. Late May the mailman finally arrived with a response, in which it became clear that the VU had no direct investments in the fossil fuel industry. The Executive board explained that the capital of the VU was managed in three different manners: (1) via their savings, held in major Dutch banks; (2) via the ABP pension fund, to which all employees of the University are legally obligated to contribute; and (3) via the VU Association, a separate legal entity related to the VU University and the VU University Medical Center that subsidizes study-related projects. The rest of the letter focused on the Responsible Investment Policy of the VU and on various sustainability initiatives of the University. However, this information somewhat deviated from the divestment request. To the disappointment of the campaigners, no invitation for an in-person meeting was received. As the summer holiday period was approaching and many DivestVU members entered the final phase of their Masters, the campaign wound down. In the summer many DivestVU members graduated from University and left the campaign.

In September 2013 the society ‘Students For Sustainability Amsterdam’ (SFSA, an organization from another University in Amsterdam, the UvA) organized a documentary screening of ‘Do the Math’ by Bill McKibben. The national coordinator of FossielVrij NL was invited to give a short introduction on the DivestVU campaign. One of the students present at this screening, who had recently begun with the MSc ERM at the VU, was captivated by the campaign and decided to get involved. He picked up DivestVU, convincing many fellow students to join. Everyone was enthusiastic and at the first meeting turnout was very high with around 30 persons present. However, it proved challenging to manage such a large amount of people, and it turned out to be difficult to divide tasks within a group of that size. As the weeks passed fewer and fewer people showed up. In November, with approximately five members left, the new DivestVU team began to take action: since the old petition was outdated, they launched a new one; they added many new ‘friends’ to the DivestVU Facebook page; and they initiated a profound research period. During the cold winter months DivestVU focused on mapping the investments of the VU in the fossil fuel industry, into the legalities of University’s finances — including the banks that VU uses, the ABP pension fund and the VU Association’s investment fund. DivestVU discovered that the VU Association did have direct investment in the fossil fuel industry, €17 million to be exact. Just after New-years 2014 the campaigners sent a letter to the VU Association in which the withdrawal of these direct investments was requested. In the same letter they proposed to hold a meeting mid 2014. Meanwhile the campaign group, with support of its network, planned an action to be carried out on February 4th. The plan was to draw the
attention of the public by dressing up with Shell and BP overalls, walking around campus with collecting boxes —representing the collecting boxes that were used in protestant churches to fund the grounds and first building of the VU. By coincidence the University was occupied that same day by another action group, making it impossible for DivestVU to carry out their plan. The overall action was never rescheduled. A month later DivestVU sent a third official letter to the Executive Board of the VU. Knowing that the university itself had no direct investments in fossil fuels, the main request of this letter was for the VU to express its commitment to becoming a fossil free University, mainly by pressuring the entities that manage VU’s capital – banks, the ABP pension fund, and the VU Association— to stop investing in the fossil fuel industry. Although the VU Executive Board did not officially respond to this letter, they did invite DivestVU to a face-to-face meeting in November 2014.

At the end of March 2014 the coordinator of the DivestVU campaign had to leave Amsterdam for a few months, leaving the campaign in the hands of a temporary coordinator. However, it seemed the campaign was not making a lot of progress in the following period. The online petition was still running, and on social media there was some occasional activity, but no major actions were undertaken. This lasted until the end of the summer, when an exchange student decided to do her internship at DivestVU. Her arrival coincided with the return of the former coordinator of the campaign. Together with another loyal campaigner they started recruiting new DivestVU members within their own networks, forming a group of approximately 5 people. After weeks of preparation, in November the meeting with the VU Executive Board took place. The campaigners received good news and bad news. The good news was that the Executive Board agreed upon putting the issue of fossil fuel divestment on the agenda of the ABP pension fund’s corporate governance committee; they also committed to arranging a meeting for DivestVU with the VU Association. The bad news concerned the actual influence of the VU on the major banks and the ABP pension fund; the Executive Board mentioned that the VU did not have enough capital invested in both to actually be able to make a difference. Not giving up, and having the fortune that the VU had an entity that did have direct investments in the fossil fuel industry (i.e. on the VU Association), the campaigners decided to focus on this entity. Moreover, to try to create public awareness about the situation, the campaigners wrote an article for the ADVALVAS student newspaper, which was published at the beginning of December. In the article the link of the VU with the fossil fuel industry was clearly explained, as well as details on the DivestVU campaign itself. A first-year Bachelor student who read the article became so interested in DivestVU that he decided to join the campaign. Later on he became the new coordinator of the DivestVU.

On Valentine’s Day 2015 the first worldwide Global Divestment Day (GDD) was organized. One day before that DivestVU carried out its very first action. During the VU earth-sciences career fair they dressed up with safety-overalls and stood near the Shell stand with signs that said ‘For a sustainable future, turn back immediately.’ They had no permission to be at the fair and they were sent away. Nevertheless their mission was completed: hundreds of students present at the career fair saw the action, and in the meantime they built momentum for the next day, during which a
large worldwide protest against the fossil fuel industry took place. In Amsterdam around 450 people cycled through the city center with flags and banners pledging for fossil fuel divestment. The DivestVU team played a major part in the organization of this event. In the meantime DivestVU had received an invitation from the VU Association for an in-person meeting. It should be noted that this meeting took place more than a year after DivestVU had send the request for such a meeting. Although the VU Association seemed to support the proposal of DivestVU, they said that it was not yet possible for them to go fossil free because there were no fossil free passive investment products available yet. The VU Association, as a passive investor itself cannot develop a fossil free investment portfolio due to costs, thus has to wait until a specialized company does so before being able to consider divesting its funds.

This brings the story to the present; a present in which the DivestVU campaign is figuring out what to do next. They can either wait until the environment itself changes or they can keep on trying to change the environment. A strategy is as of yet being formulated.

5.2. GUCA Fossil Free: the story

GUCA Fossil Free: the campaign that achieved divestment at its University within just over a year. It all began with the Glasgow University Climate Action society (GUCA), which was set up in 2009 by students of the University of Glasgow, Scotland. During its first years GUCA focused creating general awareness on the climate change topic, but it had no specific campaign. At least, not until September 2013, when one of the GUCA members returned from an exchange year in Canada, where she had been involved in the Fossil Free campaign at the University of Toronto. Fully inspired by this initiative, GUCA decided to set up its own Fossil Free action campaign and to start focusing on Fossil Free only. Interestingly, on that exact moment People & Planet — the largest student campaigning network in the UK, to which GUCA was already affiliated — was starting to build up the fossil fuel divestment movement on a nationwide level, another good reason for GUCA to actually set up their campaign in Glasgow. Hence, the small group of existing GUCA members began recruiting new members for the team. During the ‘freshers week’ — which is the first week of term at UK universities, where a lot of events are organized for new students — the Fossil Free campaign was actively promoted. One week later, on the last day of September, GUCA organized a screening of the documentary ‘Do the Math’ by Bill McKibben. Around 20 people attended this screening and even more people showed up a few days later at GUCA’s first official meeting; everyone was really enthusiastic about joining the campaign. This group of approximately 30 people was soon divided into three different teams: the research team, the media team, and the action team. Free choice was given which team to join, even encouraging to join more than one team. Although no hierarchy existed within the group, GUCA Fossil Free deemed to be important having a basic structure from the beginning onwards. Therefore, apart from the three aforementioned teams, a coordinator, a treasurer and a secretary were put in place.
When trying to figure out the best way to approach the divestment process, the research team found out that the regulations of the university did not allow students to directly approach the University Court — the entity that made decisions concerning the university's investments. Apparently, students first had to present a motion with at least 500 signatures to the Student Representative Council (SRC), who then had to pass this motion through its internal meeting. Having discovered this, the action team organized its first creative action on November 20th in order to start collecting signatures. Campaign members of all three teams walked around campus with dinosaur costumes and signs that said ‘Make fossil fuels extinct’ and ‘Glasgow Uni divest from fossil fuels’. Those signing the petition there and then were encouraged to pose in front of the camera holding on of these signs; the pictures were then posted on social media to further spread the word. To team's surprise, within a couple of hours they had collected around 300 signatures. It did not take long before all 500 signatures were collected. One month later, just before the Christmas break, the SRC held a meeting in which two GUCA members brought forward the motion. Apparently there was quite a debate, but the motion was successfully passed. This meant that the SRC representatives sitting at the University Court were now able to bring the motion forward at the University Court's next meeting. During this meeting, which took place on February 12th, 2014, the Court decided to form a Working Group tasked with examining both the financial implications of divestment, and its relation to the university’s values. The working group would also be in charge of providing a final divestment recommendation to the University Court at a later stage of the process.

The GUCA team realized the importance of alternating the serious Court issues (referred to in this thesis as inside tactics) on the one hand, with the creative actions (outside tactics) on the other hand. Two days after the Court meeting, on Valentine’s Day, the action team organized an event which they named ‘The break-up with the fossil fuel industry’. With colorful signs and a choir singing love songs, GUCA aimed to further create visibility and awareness around the campaign. To engage the public even more, on February 24th GUCA hosted a debate on whether or not the university should divest from fossil fuels. Four academics and one politician led the discussion and around 60 to 70 people attended the event. Meanwhile, the research team had been working on a 180-page brief for the University Court (GUCA, 2014), in which GUCA’s numerous arguments for divestment were outlined. To hand over this brief to the Secretary of Court, on March 20th a large visual action was organized. The GUCA team printed out the names of all the 1137 people who had signed the petition so far, and then every single name was cut out; all these slips of paper were consequently attached to a large string, which in turn was tied around the symbolic archways of the University of Glasgow.

Approximately two months later (on May 16th) a small GUCA delegation met with the Working Group of the University Court to discuss the research brief, while the rest of the group held a silent demonstration in front of the venue as a sign of solidarity. The result of this meeting was very positive: the Working Group decided to recommend full divestment and to consider the investment in green energy, but only if such investments were consistent with achieving the financial targets set by the university.
This issue would be further discussed during the following University Court meeting, which would take place late June. During this meeting, the Court was supposed to make a final decision on whether or not to divest. In order to create momentum GUCA placed a huge banner on one of the University buildings pledging for fossil fuel divestment. To the campaigners’ deception, despite the divestment recommendation made by the Working Group the Court decided to put off the final decision until the following Court meeting on October 8th, since many questions around the divestment topic were left unanswered.

Summer was just around the corner and several GUCA members had to leave the campaign because they had graduated. However, holiday was a busy period for those who stayed; they had to organize recruitment activities for the freshers week in order to attract new members, while simultaneously having to prepare the campaigning actions that would take place around the next Court meeting. Notwithstanding this heavy workload, the committee managed to expand the Fossil Free team once more. As the Court meeting came closer and closer, both the action team and the media team strongly focused on gaining more visibility. One week before the big day a creative action on campus was organized, which was playing on the new slogan of the University of Glasgow: ‘World Changers Welcome’. The GUCA team made signs saying ‘How are you going to change the world University of Glasgow? Divest from fossil fuels.’ Students stood in front of the camera with these signs and the pictures were posted on social media. One day before the big decision, a fake oil spill was organized next to the University library and a banner asking for divestment was hung from the student council building. A politician from the Green Party gave a speech at this activity, and GUCA itself gave several speeches too. After this activity the campaigners gathered to discuss a plan for the next day. They came to the conclusion that, if the Court decided not to divest, then GUCA would be prepared to occupy the building until the decision would be reconsidered.

On October 8th the University Court voted in favor of divesting £18 million from the fossil fuel industry and freeze new investments across its entire endowment of £128 million; a process that would take place over a period of 10 years time (the Guardian, 2014a). This decision was made under the condition that the accord could be reversed at any point if financial troubles should arise. It was decided that details on the financials would be discussed during the Court meeting in February 2015.

Hence, it seems all the hard work of the GUCA campaigners had paid off. However, the committee received an unexpected backlash a few days after the divestment decision. The decision of the university to divest provoked a heated response from a group of five academics, who wrote an article for the Guardian in which they stated that they were “utterly dismayed, and vehemently opposed” to what had happened (the Guardian, 2014b). By publicizing this article they had made it seem like the academic community was divided concerning its support of the divestment decision. In trying to prove the opposite, from October 2014 till February 2015 the GUCA team focused on collecting signatures of those academics who did support divestment, reaching a total of 100 supporters. On February 24th, one day before the Court meeting, GUCA organized a big ‘thank you’ action; pictures were taken of the
campaigners in front of the University of Glasgow with big signs thanking the university for divesting. These pictures, together with the petition by the academics, were sent to the Secretary of Court; they were also uploaded on social media to further pressure the University to keep their word. In the Court meeting nothing changed, divestment was actually going to happen. This meant that GUCA had triumphed after all; and thus it became the first Fossil Free university campaign in Europe to achieve divestment.

Currently the GUCA team still consists of approximately 15 active members. Now that divestment has been achieved they are looking at what can be done next. For now they are focusing on building momentum for the next Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP21), which will take place in Paris in December of the current year. Hereafter the campaign might focus on addressing the remaining links (other than direct investments) that the university has with the fossil fuel industry. Furthermore, GUCA has received invitations Fossil Free campaigns from all over the country to come and share their success story.

5.3. Cross-case analysis

5.3.1. Information

The aim of this section is to discover which factors have had most influence on the ability of each campaign to extract the necessary knowledge from its corresponding environment in order to develop an effective strategy.

5.3.1.1. Internal factors influencing information

5.3.1.1.1 Biography

Because one of the main founders already gained experience within another Fossil Free campaign, the GUCA team knew better what to investigate and where to acquire the necessary knowledge. Although the rest of the team members had no previous experience with organizing campaigns, and although not many of them had experience in research and organization (most of them were undergraduates); they had the advantage belonging to different disciplines. In this way, they could complement each other’s knowledge and extract and analyze information from distinct perspectives. Both one of the founders being experienced, as well as the diversity in backgrounds amongst the campaigners had a positive influence on their effectiveness in acquiring information, and thus on strategic capacity.

At DivestVU most members have either been master-degree students or former students of the VU who were already in job situations. The current research shows that, despite the complex financial structure of the VU University, the DivestVU campaigners have succeeded in mapping the investments of the VU. DivestVU campaigners have shown to have noteworthy research skills, but the fact that they were master’s-degree students, and thus have trained such skills for many years,
probably has contributed to some degree to their capability of extracting the necessary knowledge from their environment. Therefore, it can be concluded that their academic experience has positively influenced the strategic capacity of the campaign. Nevertheless, the disadvantage of having a campaign composed mainly of master students or people who were employed, is that they had less time available for the campaign, as the workload of their studies and jobs is often higher than that of undergraduate students. So, even though they have high capabilities in extracting knowledge from their environment, DivestVU’s lack of time might hinder the information extraction capacity of the campaign.

5.3.1.2. Accountability
From the start, the GUCA Fossil Free founders decided to recruit as many enthusiastic members as possible. From the people they had recruited at the freshers introduction week, they were able to retain approximately 15 to 20 persons. Because the core group of this campaign was so large the necessity arose of having a clear overview of what everyone was doing, which is why the group split up in three teams. The fact that one of these teams was specifically focused on research had a strong positive influence on the quantity and quality of the information that the campaign was able to extract.

DivestVU has a team of four to five persons, which is one of the reasons why they did not find it necessary to divide tasks; everyone does everything. This worked for them as long as the group was small. However, at a certain point around 30 people showed up at meetings but soon left again because they had no clear tasks. Thus, in this case not having a clear organizational structure or task division probably has worked against them. Having only a small group means that there are less people available to completely focus on information extraction, which in turn might decrease the capacity of the campaign to acquire the same amount and quality of information in the same amount of time as a larger (well-coordinated) group could do.

Although it cannot be concluded that the accountability structure of one team is better than that of the other to support information extraction; what can be noticed is that having a clear structure and a predefined responsibility distribution has helped GUCA to retain campaigners, who potentially increase the information extraction capacity of the campaign. While on the other hand, DivestVU has let potential qualified campaigners go due to lack of organization: it was not able to assign specific tasks to the persons that were interested in joining.

5.3.1.2. External factors influencing information
5.3.1.2.1. Political/institutional constraints and opportunities
The analysis of the campaigns shows that a significant opportunity for GUCA was that the University of Glasgow actually had direct investments in companies, and it also was transparent about these investments. Thus, it was relatively easy for the campaigners to find the information about how much money was invested in the fossil fuel industry. In turn, having this knowledge allowed the campaign to set clear
targets. In contrast, the DivestVU group ran into a major obstacle at the start of its campaign: the VU University had no direct investments in the fossil fuel industry. If the university had no direct investment then nothing could actually be divested, so the campaign had to change its main goal. In other words, instead of seeking for direct divestment, DivestVU had to target the indirect investments of the university – banks, the ABP pension fund and the VU Association. Such targets made the campaign more complicated, as the campaigners had less access to and influence on these indirect links. Thus, the complex structure of the VU University is seen as an institutional constraint that has negatively affected the information extraction capacity of DivestVU. On the other hand the investment structure of the University of Glasgow and its transparency provided an institutional opportunity for GUCA.

5.3.1.2. Resource availability

As said, the information about the investments of the University of Glasgow was clear, which meant GUCA could start campaigning. However, at DivestVU many months passed without having a clear target, simply because there was not enough information available about the link of the university with the fossil fuel industry. While GUCA had various resources at its disposition in which such link was apparent, no such documents or any other type of information existed for the VU University. This information was too complex for DivestVU to be able to generate on their own, thus, the lack of information present in DivestVU’s environment reduced its strategic capacity. On the other hand, GUCA could formulate clear targets because the necessary information was widely available, increasing its strategic capacity.

5.3.2. Heuristics

In the following section an analysis is presented of the internal and external factors which had an impact on the problem-solving capacity of the Fossil Free campaigns.

5.3.2.1. Internal factors influencing heuristics

5.3.2.1.1. Biography

The fact that one of the founders of GUCA already had gained experience with another Fossil Free campaign was one of the main reasons why, from the beginning on, a lot of struggles were avoided. In Toronto she had learned how certain obstacles could slow down the campaigning process, which she consequently tried to avoid when setting up the campaign in Glasgow. From this experience surged the idea of implementing a task division. Furthermore, through this experience she knew how to combine inside and outside tactics most effectively to solve problems. Thus, previous experience with the movement made it easier for the campaign to anticipate problems and to act upon them.

The DivestVU campaigners had no previous experience with the fossil fuel divestment movement, which could have had a negative effect on their strategic capacity in the sense that they had no idea which problems they were going to encounter. In turn, this could have slowed down the speed with which they solved
problems. Furthermore, the fact that the campaigners did not always have time for the campaign left some problems unaddressed for certain periods of time, further slowing down the process. However, when looking at the DivestVU story and when analyzing the evidence, it can be noticed that in the periods that the campaign was more active their problem solving approach was very professional. Documents were well informed, the campaigners were remarkably well prepared for the talks with the Executive Board and the VU Association, and they showed their ability to make effective use of their surrounding resources and networks by handling several setbacks they experienced during the process. Thus, although the lack of campaigning experience possibly had a negative effect on strategic capacity, their professionalism increased the campaign's strategic capacity.

5.3.2.1.2. Networks
For the comparison of this factor a distinction is made between two types of networks. On the one hand the campaigns have a network coming from their corresponding nationwide Fossil Free organizations, which consist of young professionals, NGOs, and all the Fossil Free campaigns of other cities and countries. On the other hand the campaigns have a network within their corresponding universities, consisting mainly of students and staff. When comparing the campaigns on the first type of network, it can be noticed that both GUCA and DivestVU had strong networks of well-experienced people who are always ready to provide advice to the campaigns. However, when looking at the networks of the campaigns within their universities, it becomes evident that that of GUCA was larger and more effective than that of DivestVU. GUCA was able to recruit more people because it made better use of these university networks (e.g. through the freshers week), which in turn led to a higher quantity of people being interested in getting involved in the campaign. The more people involved, the more brains working on the process. This does not only affects the information extraction capacity, but also the ability of the campaign to come up with possible solutions to problems. However, it must be acknowledged that having more campaigners is not better per se. The specific traits of those involved, as well as their motivation clearly played a significant role. Nonetheless, having a large and varied network does enlarge the pool of potential people that might be interested in joining the campaign, which in turn increases the probability of finding more people with the right motivation and capacity to bring the campaign forward. Therefore, it can be concluded that GUCA’s strong network within its university increased the heuristic capacity of the campaign, while the lack of such network negatively affected heuristics at DivestVU.

5.3.2.1.3. Repertoires
When looking at the campaigning tactics used by DivestVU, it can be noticed that the campaign mainly focused on inside tactics: writing letters and negotiating with the board. DivestVU did not consider it necessary to actively campaign on campus because the board was being very cooperative, thus, they wanted to keep it professional. However, when looking at the GUCA story, whose board was also
being very cooperative, it can be noticed that the various outside tactics they used were of great support to the inside tactics, allowing the campaign to engage a broader public and creating more momentum towards important events. Noticeably, all the outside tactics were kept remarkably positive, not only because one of their main goals was to have fun as a team, but also they wanted to show the board that many people supported their idea that divestment was the morally right thing to do.

DivestVU members indicate that, for them, it often did not make sense to mobilize masses because no direct divestment could be achieved at their institution. However, when observing the pressuring effects the outside tactics had at GUCA, it is noticeable that using such tactics at the VU University could have accelerated their process. Campaigning actions could have been carried out to pressure the university or the VU Association to, for example, move a meeting to an earlier date (instead of six months after the request); or the campaign could have taken action to urge the university to answer the campaign’s letters more rapidly.

Considering the fact that both campaigns operate in different environmental contexts, it cannot be concluded that using more outside tactics would have actually worked for DivestVU. What can be concluded is that such practices helped the GUCA campaign to solve several problems, therefore increasing its strategic capacity.

5.3.2.1. Accountability

GUCA members could join whichever team they preferred—research, action or media—depending on their interest and available time. This task division did not restrict campaigners from doing other tasks, since people were allowed to join all three teams if they wanted to. For GUCA, one of the advantages of having this division is that everyone could focus on what they liked most and what they were good at. According to the campaigners, having a specific set of tasks made them feel more responsible for something and made them work harder. Moreover, because the group of active campaigners was large, if at a certain point someone did not have time for the campaign, then there always was someone else available who could (temporally) replace this person. Because the DivestVU group was much smaller it did not make sense for them to divide tasks, let alone create teams. However, from the GUCA story it can be concluded that when people get to choose a specific task, then they can specialize in that issue and solve problems with eagerness and more effectiveness. Thus, at least in some cases, an open and clear responsibility distribution can have a positive impact on the problem solving capacity of the group. A smaller team size may limit the capacity of a team to handle the variety of problems that it is facing.

At the end of the academic year, just before summer holiday, the GUCA campaign holds elections to choose the campaigners for the following year. Because many undergraduates are part of the campaign, it is possible to retain members more than one year; and by holding such elections it can be ensured that people with experience are able to pass on their knowledge to new campaigners during the following year. The DivestVU group fell apart several times because members had finished their master degrees or had left the campaign for other reasons. Not having
a predefined selection or accountability structure to bring in a new coordinator before the old one left slowed down the campaigning process in several occasions. As is evident from the story, the campaign experienced a great number of problems which sometimes remained unsolved because the campaign had already fallen apart. If people leave the campaign and do not look for direct replacement, then knowledge might get lost, which in turn can delay whole process. Thus, it can be said that the problem solving capacity can be highly influenced by the leadership selection procedures or at least by ensuring a complete team that is up to date.

5.3.2.2. External factors influencing heuristics

5.3.2.2.1. Resource availability
When comparing the resources that both campaigns had at their disposition, one notable difference is the guidance received by their corresponding national Fossil Free coordinators. On the one hand People & Planet is an organization that already existed and decided to pick up the campaign. It had a lot of experience with student campaigning, and its existing organizational and financial structure allowed it to employ two full time staff members who could focus on the university Fossil Free campaigns only. On the other hand, FossielVrij NL is a younger organization that was set up especially for the Fossil Free campaigns, with DivestVU being its first campaign. Its organizational and financial structure only allows it to employ one person, who in turn has to spread her attention over all the Fossil Free campaigns of the country (not only the university campaigns). The data analysis shows that this degree of guidance to a certain extent has an effect in the problem solving capacity of the campaigns, partially explaining a difference in problem solving capacity.

5.3.2.2.2. Political/institutional constraints and opportunities
As outlined in the DivestVU story, the campaign experienced numerous institutional constraints, while it can be said that the University of Glasgow actually provided opportunities for GUCA. These constraints and opportunities did not have a direct effect on the problem-solving capacity of the campaigners per se. Rather, the amount of constraints increased the amount of problems with which DivestVU had to deal, while the amount of problems faced by GUCA were fewer. This means that the problem solving capacity needed in an environment with numerous constraints is larger than the capacity that is necessary in an environment with fewer constraints (and more opportunities). The increase and decrease of problems in the campaigns’ environments had a noteworthy impact of their strategic capacity.

5.3.2.2.3. Cultural opportunities and constraints
GUCA made more use of outside tactics than DivestVU did, which was one of the main reasons why GUCA was able to mobilize the public to put pressure on the university, speeding up the whole process. While GUCA carried out over ten campaigning actions, DivestVU only carried out two. Although the decision to use such outside tactics or not is partly a matter of personal preference, such preferences
are highly influenced by culture. In Glasgow it is much more common and socially accepted to carry out outside tactics. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, campaigners have the feeling that they will be looked upon as activists. In their eyes such imago would take away the professionalism that they want to emit, which in turn would influence the degree to which they are taken seriously by the Executive Board. When demonstrations, strikes, creative actions, and other ‘outside’ tactics are more common in a country or city, then those involved in a campaign are less hesitant to carry out such actions. When campaigning actions are not practiced very often in an environment, then sometimes the possibility to carry out such actions is not even taken into account.

5.3.3. Motivation
This section explains how the motivation of campaigners was affected by the internal and external factors postulated in the theoretical framework, and how this differed across the chosen campaigns.

5.3.3.1. Internal factors influencing motivation

5.3.3.1.1. Background
Campaigners at GUCA were young and often new to the university. They joined because they believed in the power of the campaign: “very local on the one hand, but with a large potential impact on the other hand” (see interview Evens, 2015). At the same time they liked the fact that it was something fun to do: “There is only so much time you can dedicate to something, it can get boring, but we wanted to make [the campaign] fun and do social things together to avoid getting bored.” (see interview Evens, 2015). This spirit kept them motivated, and had a positive impact on their strategic capacity.

Most of the people who have gotten involved in the DivestVU campaign were in a later stage of their studies and some were already employed. This resulted in them considering DivestVU of less priority than could be said of the students at GUCA. Their motivation to join the campaign was construed more of their association with the broader network of FossielVrij NL than direct association with the university’s internal networks of student organizations, which could have potentially strengthened the efficacy of the campaign.

5.3.3.1.2. Deliberation
DivestVU had long periods in which it was waiting for a response (either written or in-person) from decision makers. Often these waiting periods took many months. During these months the campaign prepared outstandingly for upcoming appointments, but campaigning-wise not much was going on. Frequent team meetings were held ‘to keep things warm’, but there was not much more they could do other than waiting, which was not always very motivating. GUCA also held meetings on a regular basis, but from the beginning on they had set schedules with
tight deadlines for research, campaigning actions, and media activity. Thus, at each meeting they could work towards what was next on the schedule. According to the GUCA members, having something to look forward to made it a lot more fun. Thus, having regular meetings in which important issues are discussed can have a positive effect on motivation.

It must be clarified that the main reason for not always having something new on the agenda at the DivestVU campaign is the fact that it experienced so many environmental constraints, which is elaborated on below.

5.3.3.2. External factors influencing motivation

5.3.3.2.1. Political/institutional opportunities and constraints

The institution in which GUCA is embedded provided multiple opportunities for the campaign (i.e. transparency about its investments, regular Court meetings, etc.) to proceed with the campaigning process, the reason for which a solid action plan could be developed with a tight schedule. This kept everyone involved and working hard, and also highly motivated. Therefore, the policies at the University of Glasgow as well as other institutional opportunities had a positive effect on motivation of GUCA campaigners.

DivestVU has experienced more institutional setbacks than GUCA has. It can be observed that such impediments have damaged the motivation of the campaigners. The fact that no high target can be attained (considering the inexistent direct investments) has called for extensive periods of research and of waiting for appointments with the university entities. There was not much motivation to carry out campaigning actions in these periods because the complicated financial structure of the VU University made it difficult to formulate a concrete goal to campaign towards. Thus, at DivestVU an increase in problems or institutional constraints has had a negative effect on motivation.

Another interesting finding is the fact that at the University of Glasgow, if students want to raise an issue such as fossil fuel divestment, then they cannot address the Executive Board of the university directly. Instead, they have to pass a motion through the SRC, who in turn is the one in charge of addressing the issue at the university Court. Contrarily, at the VU University students can take up issues directly with their Executive Board. The positive side hereof is that they have more control over the meeting and they know exactly what happens, which is not the case at GUCA. The drawback being that the campaigners are more dependent on the Executive Boards’ willingness to meet them, which in the case of DivestVU meant long waiting periods. Furthermore, the power gap between DivestVU and the Executive Board is larger than the power gap between GUCA and the SRC. A larger power gap might intimidate the campaigners, which might decrease their motivation to ‘fight back’.
5.3.3.2. Cultural opportunities and constraints

As said, carrying out campaigning actions is not very common amongst students in the Netherlands, which had a negative influence on the motivation of the DivestVU students to do so. On the other hand in Glasgow it is common practice, which makes it easier to actually get people motivated to join. Another influence of cultural differences on motivation is related to the recruitment procedure. While in the UK it is not uncommon for action groups to promote their campaigns at information markets such as the freshers week, in the Netherlands this is not habitual. The VU University actually has an information market during the introduction week, but DivestVU has never taken the opportunity to recruit students there.

5.4. Results summary

From the present cross-case analysis can be concluded that GUCA Fossil Free’s strategy was more effective in achieving divestment than DivestVU’s. Although both campaigns showed to have undertaken noteworthy campaigning efforts, the findings reveal several significant differences that account for the contrast in ultimate goal attainment. When looking at the internal factors, disparities are observed in both the organizational structure and leadership teams. From the beginning onwards, GUCA was able to recruit a greater number of members compared to DivestVU, allowing it to adopt an organizational structure with a clear task division. Moreover, the GUCA leadership team already gained experience in a previous Fossil Free campaign, making it easier for them to identify and handle campaigning obstacles. Consequently, the information extraction capacity as well as the problem solving capacity of GUCA increased, thereby increasing its strategic capacity. Instead, from the start DivestVU consisted of a small team of relatively busy people, which meant fewer campaigning aspects could be covered. In periods when team members had little time available for the campaign, duties often were neglected, leading to a decrease in the team’s ability to carry out effective strategy. This further delayed the campaigning process as a whole and negatively influenced motivation.

When looking at the environmental factors that affected the campaigns’ strategic capacity, noteworthy differences were found for three factors: institutional influences, cultural influences, and resource availability. First, when comparing both campaigns it can be noticed that there were many more institutional constraints present in the broader environment of DivestVU than in that of GUCA. These constraints were mainly related to the lack of direct investments of the VU University, the lack of transparency on behalf of the university concerning its links with the fossil fuel industry, and the relative low support of the national Fossil Free campaign. Second, cultural aspects formed a larger constraint to the DivestVU campaign, as campaigning itself, as well as the use of outsider tactics during the campaigning process, are less common in the Netherlands compared to the UK. Third, resources were more widely available to the GUCA campaign, specifically referring to information resources and human support resources. The above-explained external factors have had a more constraining effect on the information extraction capacity,
the problem solving capacity, as well as the motivation of the DivestVU campaign compared to the GUCA campaign.

From the previous can be concluded that the dynamics concerning both the internal and external factors account for the variances in goal attainments across campaigns.
6. Discussion

Despite the fact that a great deal of research has covered the link between SMOs and outcome, there is little agreement amongst researchers about which factors are relevant (Snow & Benford, 2000). Previous studies exploring this relationship have mostly attributed outcome to either external environmental influences (see McCarthy & Zald, 2001; Edwards & McCarthy, 2004), or internal organizational factors (see Etzioni, 1970; Brill, 1971; Gamson, 1975; Ganz, 2000). The current study contributes to research by adopting a more holistic perspective in attempting to integrate both external and internal actors into one theoretical framework. The logic of this framework has been expressed by means of three theoretical propositions. The present chapter turns back to these propositions with the purpose of discussing how the empirical findings of the cross-case analysis contribute to the relationships portrayed in the propositions. After each proposition is discussed whether or not the proposition holds in the light of the newly obtained data.

**Proposition 1a:** The more effective the leadership team of a SMO is in dealing with its environment, the greater its strategic capacity will be.

**Proposition 1b:** The more the structure of a SMO allows leadership to deal with its environment, the greater its strategic capacity will be.

From the cross-case analysis can be observed that in both cases leadership factors (biography, networks, repertoires) and organizational factors (deliberation, accountability, resource flows) highly influenced the campaigns' capacity to generate effective strategy; either though their information extraction capacity, problem solving capacity, and/or motivation. It can be noticed that in many occasions these internal factors increased the strategic capacity of GUCA while the opposite can be said for DivestVU. Hence, the differences in internal factors across the campaigns partly explain why the strategic capacity of GUCA Fossil Free is larger than that of DivestVU. The word 'partly' is employed because many environmental factors were also found to have a significant impact on the strategic capacities of both campaigns.

**Proposition 2a:** The more institutional and cultural constraints present in the environment of a SMO, the smaller the strategic capacity of this SMO.

In the case study was found that in the environment of the DivestVU campaign a large amount of institutional and cultural constraints were present, while such constraints were absent at the GUCA campaign. For the DivestVU campaign this high amount of constraints had a direct negative effect on its information extraction capacity, as well as its problem solving capacity and motivation. On the other hand, the GUCA analysis shows the same pattern but in the opposite direction. In other words, a lower degree of institutional and cultural constraints increased the strategic capacity of the GUCA campaign. Hence, because a direct link was found between institutional and cultural constraints and strategic capacity, Proposition 2a can be confirmed.
Proposition 2b: The absence of essential resources in the environment of a SMO decreases the strategic capacity of this SMO.

The analysis shows a significant difference in one type of resource across the selected Fossil Free campaigns: information. While for GUCA the information necessary to set up the campaigning process was widely available and easily accessible, this type of information simply did not exist in the boarder environment of DivestVU, which in turn constrained the information extraction capacity of the latter campaign. To a lesser degree the analysis also shows a difference in human support resources across both cases. On the one hand GUCA falls under People & Planet, a financially independent organization that is able to employ two full-time coordinators who focus on the student Fossil Free campaigns only. This provided the campaign with all the necessary human support to overcome campaigning obstacles. On the other hand, DivestVU falls under FossilVrij NL, an organization that is financially dependent on 350.org, and can only employ one Fossil Free coordinator. This coordinator is not only in charge of the university campaigns but also of the rest of the Fossil Free campaigns across the Netherlands, including the municipality campaigns and the pension fund campaign. Since universities in the Netherlands have no direct investments in companies, the Fossil Free university campaigns are no priority at FossilVrij NL. Hence, the human support resources that DivestVU receives are limited, which in occasions has lowered its problem solving capacity when compared to GUCA. The aforementioned results lead to the conclusion that the absence of certain resources in the broader environments of campaigns has a negative effect on their strategic capacity. Although this reasoning leads to the confirmation of Proposition 2b, it remains unclear whether such reasoning holds as well for other types of resources. No definite conclusions can be drawn for example for financial resources, moral resources, or material resources, since no major differences were found amongst the two selected campaigns. More research would be necessary to obtain deeper insight into this matter.

The above discussion illustrates the fact that the data obtained in the present case study confirms all four propositions. Thus, all the factors depicted in the theoretical framework either had an effect on information, heuristics, motivation, or a combination of these elements. Hence, the findings show that strategic capacity is affected by both internal and external factors. In turn, this leads to the conclusion for a SMO both internal and external factors have an effect on its outcome. Because the current study only employed Fossil Free campaigns for its analysis, it cannot be stated that the above results hold for SMOs in general. However, for comparisons between SMOs that operate in such different contexts as GUCA and DivestVU do, it is highly likely that not only the internal organizational factors will be essential to outcome analysis, but also external environmental factors. Perhaps if similar SMOs are operating in the exact same cultural and institutional contexts, then one could turn more towards internal factors when studying differences in outcome.

The global nature of the fossil fuel divestment movement is in fact the main difference between the current thesis and other existing studies that try to make sense of SMO outcome. Namely, the scholars that have studied SMO outcome so far
tend to focus on cases that are located in the same country. For example Cress and Snow (2000) study differences in the outcomes attained by 15 homeless SMOs active in eight U.S. cities; Ganz (2000) compares two farmworkers organizations that are also based in the U.S. to try to explain their differences in success; Etzioni (1970) also focuses on North America, on how demonstrations of SMOs have affected policy. Studying SMOs that are embedded in similar cultural and institutional environments has allowed researchers to isolate the factors that they want to study (such as organizational structure, strategy, tactics, and framing process), which in turn has supported a more in-depth analysis of these specific factors. However, a drawback of this approach is that the results might not hold for other social movements, especially not for those modern social movements that are global in nature. Neither would this approach be valid for studying any type of divestment movement; divestment campaigns are always embedded in certain institutions, be this universities, municipalities, churches, pension funds, or even country governments. Hence, the campaigns will always be highly affected by the nature of these institutions. Accordingly, the study of campaigns within the fossil fuel divestment movement—which are global in nature and highly dependent on their environment—contributes to the existing literature in the sense that it calls for the adoption of a more holistic and inclusive perspective when examining the factors that are affecting their outcome. By comparing SMOs that operate in very different environments and by observing such large environmental influences on outcome, it becomes clear that it is an illusion to presume that the surrounding environment of a SMO has no direct effect on its goal attainment.

In addition to this new insight, the current thesis also confirms several findings of existing studies. First and foremost, in consonance with those who study leadership and organizational processes to explain SMO outcome (see for example Etzioni, 1970; Brill, 1971; Gamson, 1975; Ganz, 2000), the findings of the present research stress the importance of having a competent leadership team and a suitable organizational structure in order to develop an appropriate strategy for dealing with environmental challenges. In line with many scholars who focus on campaigning tactics (see for example Lipsky, 1968; Gamson, 1975; Freeman, 1979; McAdam, 1983; and Tilly, 1985) this thesis has found that one of the most important parts of such strategy is to carry out the right negotiating and campaigning actions on the right moment. It was discovered that especially a combination of ‘inside’ tactics and ‘outside’ tactics presented by King & Soule (2007) and Grady-Benson (2014) is necessary for achieving desired outcome. Next to recognizing the need to employ an appropriate combination of campaigning tactics, in agreement with studies such as Johnson (2008), the current thesis acknowledges the importance of the size of the campaign and the diversity in background of campaigners. According to Johnson (2008), the larger an SMO is, the more supporters this SMO is likely to gather, which in turn makes more resources available with which to influence policy. Furthermore, This author states that the breadth of a SMO also increases with the diversity of its participants, which in turn contribute with a diversity of knowledge and perspectives to the campaign. A last finding that is confirmed by this thesis is one embedded in the student activism literature. Shoben (1970) states that it has been a challenge to
study student activism because students stay involved in movements and campaigns for a relatively short period of time. This challenge was also encountered in the current study, highlighting the importance of putting in place knowledge transfer practices within campaigns. If knowledge is properly passed on from predecessor to successor, then the wheel will not have to be reinvented, which in turn accelerates the campaigning process.

By confirming the findings of other studies, and by contributing to the existing social movements literature with its own findings, the current thesis has substantiated its academic added value. Having done this, the last few words of the present discussion are devoted to the practical contribution that this study delivers to the fossil fuel divestment movement itself. For university Fossil Free campaigns, which ultimately aim to achieve divestment at their academic institutions, this thesis provides a clear insight to what such campaigns should be focusing on while composing the campaigning teams, mapping out their goals, and developing their campaigning strategies. In other words, by highlighting the factors that have an empowering effect on achieving divestment, as well as signaling the factors that constrain campaigns in achieving their goal, the results of the current thesis support the Fossil Free campaigns to increase their strategic capacity in order to achieve their ultimate goal of divestment faster and more efficiently. Based on the results of the current study a set of ten recommendations have been developed which are depicted in Figure E in the appendix. Although they are practical in nature and target university campaigns specifically, they may be useful to other campaigns in general, as they largely apply to the campaigning process itself.
7. Conclusion

To answer the research question of this thesis –‘Why do certain divestment campaigns result in divestment while others do not?’– a comparative case study has been carried out. A Fossil Free campaign that has recently achieved divestment at its university (GUCA, University of Glasgow, UK) was compared to another Fossil Free campaign that continuously struggles to attain this goal (DivestVU, VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands). The comparative analysis shows that achieving divestment at academic institutions depends in great extent on the ability of these campaigns to develop and implement effective strategy. This ability, in turn, is affected by both internal and external campaigning factors. The findings about these factors lead to three main conclusions.

First, the results of this thesis confirm several findings of other studies concerning the importance of internal organizational factors in goal attainment of social movement campaigns (Lipsky, 1968; Etzioni, 1970; Brill, 1971; Gamson, 1975; Freeman, 1979; McAdam, 1983; Tilly, 1985; Ganz, 2000; and Snow & Benford, 2000). More specifically, it confirms the idea that an appropriate leadership team is essential to the development of an effective strategy for a campaign, and that the chances of actually attaining the campaigning goals further increase if the structure of the campaign supports the leadership team in the development and execution of such strategy.

Second, in line with studies that look at how external environmental factors influence goal attainment of social movement campaigns (Benford & Snow, 2000; Edwards & McCarthy, 2004), the current thesis has found that such factors have a major impact on the campaigns' ability to develop an effective strategy. The cultural surroundings of a divestment campaign, as well as the institution in which it is embedded, can either constrain the campaigning process or provide it with opportunities to easily formulate and carry out strategy. Such constraints and opportunities are also observed when the necessary campaigning resources are either absent or present (correspondingly) in the wider environment of the campaign.

The third and major conclusion of this thesis is that, when trying to discover why one campaign has achieved divestment while another one has not, one cannot look exclusively at either internal or external factors; combining both is the key to a realistic and valuable analysis of outcome. Such an integrative approach is especially important when comparing cases that are located in different environments. If campaigns operating in highly similar environmental contexts were to be compared to discover a certain difference in outcome, then research could perhaps turn more towards the analysis of internal organizational factors. Some social movement campaigns might, for example, not be embedded so deeply in an institution as the university Fossil Free campaigns are. Others might operate in the same cultural environment (i.e. the same country). Therefore, the weight of the most influencing factors on outcome may vary for each social movement. However, the environments of divestment campaigns will differ to a certain degree from one another, since
divestment campaigns are always embedded in specific institutions. Henceforward, integrating internal and external factors into the analysis of divestment campaigns proves to be fundamental. Because the two cases selected for the current research were actually located in two different countries, the importance of using an integrative approach was further demonstrated.

Despite the theoretical and practical contributions of the findings of the present thesis, as with any research study, there are inherent limitations to the design and analysis process. First, with the sample size of only two cases many significant findings were encountered, for a more in-depth analysis of how environmental factors influence campaigning outcome, it would have been interesting to include more cases into the research. For example, campaigns running in other countries could have been added to further observe differences in institutional and cultural opportunities and constraints. Alternatively, it would have been interesting to include another case based in the UK that has achieved divestment, as well as another campaign in the Netherlands that is still struggling to do so; this would have further contributed to the replication logic of the findings. Future research could extend the current thesis by replicating the current study while using distinct cases.

Second, many studies focus on internal organizational factors (i.e. leadership, structure, organizational viability, strategy, tactics) to explain outcome. The fact that in this thesis the exact same model as Ganz’s (2000) has been used to analyze such factors, might open the possibility of having omitted certain (internal) factors or relationships that are not present in this model. For future studies aimed at researching campaigning outcome it would be interesting to investigate distinct social movements in order to verify whether the same internal organizational factors are influencing the campaigning process, or whether some factors should be modified or added to the framework.

Lastly, when comparing the selected cases on the basis of the theoretical framework, the current thesis sees campaigning outcome as either having achieved divestment or not. Not adopting a broader perspective on outcome can be seen as another limitation to this study. Namely, taking into account intermediate campaigning goals and their outcomes could have further stipulated the findings of this research. Examples of such intermediate goals are having recruited a desired amount of campaigners; reaching a certain number of petition signers; or convincing the Executive Board members of the campaign’s ideas during a discussion. A noteworthy direction for further research would therefore be to quantify how internal and external factors have an influence on each intermediate goal. In turn, this can lead to finding out how and to what extent each intermediate goal influenced the divestment decision of the academic institution.
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## Appendix

### Chapter 4.1 Research design

Table 1 – Details of the data sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Credentials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| *Interviews*   | *DivestVU*    | Name: Kari Velure (for interview file (in Dutch) click [here](#))  
Email: kari.velure@gmail.com  
Role: current campaigner  
  
Name: Jim Kleijwegt (for interview file (in Dutch) click [here](#))  
Email: jinkleijwegt@msn.com  
Role: current coordinator  
  
Name: Thomas Gallas (for interview file (in Dutch) click [here](#))  
Email: gallasthomas@gmail.com  
Role: former coordinator  
  
Name: Liset Meddens (for interview file (in Dutch) click [here](#))  
Email: liset@350.org  
Role: national coordinator & present during founding phase |
| *GUCA Fossil Free* | *GUCA Fossil Free* | Name: Miriam Wilson (for interview file click [here](#))  
Email: miriam.wilson@peopleandplanet.org  
Role: founder and former coordinator  
  
Name: Sophie Baumert (for interview file click [here](#))  
Email: sophiebaumert@hotmail.de  
Role: current coordinator  
  
Name: Luke Evens (for interview file click [here](#))  
Email: lukeevens@outlook.com  
Role: current campaigner |
| *Social media* | *DivestVU* | Facebook  
Twitter |
|                | *GUCA Fossil Free* | Facebook  
Twitter |
| *Documents*   | *DivestVU* | Self-elaborated research documents  
- NONE  
  
External supporting documents  
- Sample letter for universities  
- Campaign action guide  
  
Letters written to the university  
- Letter to the University Board 2013  
- Answer from the University Board to letter 2013  
- Letter to the University Board 2014  
- Letter to Vu Association 2014 (Dutch)  
  
Offline news articles  
- Article in the VU University Magazine |
|                | *GUCA Fossil Free* | Self-elaborated research documents:  
- Glasgow Divestment Brief |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Websites</th>
<th>DivestVU</th>
<th>GUCA Fossil Free</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **External supporting documents** | - Action guide universities  
- Campaign strategy guide  
- Power mapping guide  
- Media guide  
- A divestment campaign guide for students  
- Ethical Investment Policy briefing  
- Global Divestment Day action guide  
- Glasgow financial report  
- Fossil fuel at university sin the UK  
- List of UK university endowments  
- Socially Responsible Investment Policy University of Glasgow | **Webpage on the Dutch Fossil Free website**  
**Supporting websites**  
- NONE | **Webpage on the UK-wide Fossil Free website**  
**Supporting websites**  
- People & Planet resources toolkit  
- Creative tactics for action | **Online news articles**  
- Student newspaper report about the ‘carbon bubble’ event  
- Warning for dangerous fossil fuels on Global Divestment Day  
- VU University Magazine: retire your money from fossil fuels  
- More and more action against fossil fuels  
- Action group Titanic (VU) occupy the university just on the day DivestVU had planned to carry out an action | **Online news articles**  
- The Guardian: Glasgow becomes first university in Europe to divest from fossil fuels  
- Breaking: Glasgow students win Fossil Fuel Divestment  
- Glasgow divests  
- Glasgow divestment helped spawn a European climate movement  
- Will Glasgow University be the first in the UK to ditch its fossil fuel investments?  
- Glasgow becomes first UK university to divest from fossil  
- Glasgow university magazine: Fossil Free campaign  
- Divestment: now it is time  
- Glasgow University divestment campaign: Go Fossil Free  
- Expert reaction to the University of Glasgow's decision to divest from fossil fuels  
- Six Months Later: Glasgow University's Fossil Fuel Divestment Is Only Just Beginning  
- The hot seat: GUCA | **Visual Data**  
**For picture folder click** [here](#)  
**For video folder click** [here](#) | **For picture folder click** [here](#)  
**For video folder click** [here](#) |
Chapter 4.1.1. Case selection
Figure A – Basic types of designs for case studies (retrieved from Yin, 2009).
Chapter 4.1.1.1. Case selection
Figure B – Email from the Fossil Free coordinator Sweden, bad news.

Chapter 4.1.2.1. Interviews
Figure C – Introduction email to the interviewees explaining the topic.
Chapter 4.1.2.1. Interviews
Table 2 – Interview protocol.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Interview introduction (1 minute)</td>
<td>Good morning/afternoon (name of respondent). Thank you very much for willing to give me this interview; it is truly appreciated. The interview will last from 45 minutes to one hour, during which I would like to hear as much as possible about your personal experience at (name of campaign). As I mentioned before, I am researching why some Fossil Free campaigns do achieve divestment at their universities, while others don’t. To try to discover these factors I have prepared a list of questions for you.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Recording confidentiality (1 minute)</td>
<td>I would like to remind you that the content of this interview is confidential. It will not be disclosed to anyone without your permission. Also, if you find it necessary, the information can be anonymized. I would like to ask your permission to make recording on our conversation. This will allow me to obtain more complete and accurate information, which will in turn support me during the data analysis phase. Do you have any questions before we begin?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Personal Background (5 minutes)</td>
<td>Could you tell me a little bit more about your background and how this background led you to become part of the (name of campaign) campaign?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The story (12-15 minutes)</td>
<td>Could you tell how the campaign was founded and how it has developed through time?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Biggest achievements (5-10 minutes)</td>
<td>Of all the actions you have taken and of everything you have achieved, where are you most proud of?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. External support (5 minutes)</td>
<td>What is the relationship of (name of campaign) with your broader (national and international) Fossil Free network? What type of support do you give or receive from this network? Do you receive any support from other external parties?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Organization and leadership (15 minutes)</td>
<td>What is the structure of the campaign? Do you have formal functions? What is the role of the coordinator?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Internal and external obstacles (5-10 minutes)</td>
<td>Have you experienced difficulties with the way in which the campaign is organized? What are the biggest external obstacles that the campaign has experienced throughout its existence?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Extra question</td>
<td>For DivestVU: What do you believe is the main reason for which attaining divestment has been so difficult? For GUCA: What is the main reason for which your campaign was able to attain divestment, compared to those campaigns that struggle to do so?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Closing questions</td>
<td>Are there particular documents that might be useful for my research, which are not available online? If yes, could you maybe share these additional documents?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concluding remarks</td>
<td>First of all, allow me to say thank you very much for your participation and cooperation in this research. I will process the information I gathered through this interview. When having finalized my thesis, I can definitively send it to you if you wish so. Thank you again for everything.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Chapter 5.1. GUCA Fossil Free

### Table 3 – Timeline GUCA Fossil Free

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2013</strong></td>
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<td><strong>August</strong></td>
<td>- One of the members of the Glasgow University Climate Action society (GUCA) had gone on exchange to the University of Toronto for one year. There she got involved in the Fossil Free campaign of the University. When she returned to Glasgow she returned with the idea of initiating a similar campaign at the University of Glasgow. This coincided with the plans of People &amp; Planet, who were building the Fossil Free movement at a nationwide level. With a group of 4-5 people CUGA decided to set up the campaign.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **September** | - September 22nd. In order to recruit new members, GUCA Fossil Free had a stand at the ‘freshers fair’ (the first week of term at university, where a lot of events are organized for new students; it’s a big deal for clubs and societies to attract new people). The response to the Fossil Free campaign was very positive.  
- September 30th. A screening of the movie ‘Do the Math’ by Bill McKibben was organized. GUCA explained everything about the campaign to the +20 people that attended.  
- A week later a meeting was held and 30 people showed up. The whole group was soon divided into three different teams: the research team, the media team, and the action team. Everyone could choose which team to join; people could also join more then one team. |
| **October** | / |
| **November** | - November 20th. A creative action was held for the signing of the GUCA Fossil Free petition. The group dressed up as dinosaurs. They had made signs that said ‘Make fossil fuels extinct’ and ‘Glasgow Uni divest from fossil fuels’. Pictures were taken of people holding these signs, which were then posted on social media. Within a couple of hours the team collected around 300 signatures.  
- An online petition was created.  
- GUCA Fossil Free began the process of convincing the student representative council to vote for the campaign. |
| **December** | In December, the Student Representative Council (SRC) held a meeting. Two members brought forward GUCA’s motion to ask the university to divest from fossil fuel companies. Apparently, there was quite a debate, but the motion was successfully passed. Thus, the SRC representatives sitting at the University Court were now able to bring our motion forward to the University Court’s next meeting in February. |
| **2014** | |
| **January** | / |
| **February** | - February 12th. Meeting of the University Court. The SRC representatives bring forward the motion. The Court decides to form a working group tasked with examining both the financial implications of divestment, as well as its relation to the University’s values.  
- February 14th (Valentines Day). GUCA Fossil Free organized an event which they named ‘the break-up with the fossil fuel industry’. They made it very visible with colorful signs and a choir that was singing love songs. The main goal of this campaign was to attract the attention of the public, which further did by involving the media.  
- February 24th: GUCA Fossil Free hosted a debate on whether the University should invest from fossil fuels or not; four academics and one politician led the discussion. Around 60 to 70 people attended the event. |
| **March** | March 20th. The campaigners handed in a 137-page brief for divestment to the secretary of Court of the University. By then the campaign was already highly supported by the public, shown by the 1137 signatures they had collected for the online petition so far (by the time, GUCA Fossil Free was the fastest growing campaign in the UK in terms online signatures). To hand in the brief a big visual action was organized. Every single name of the persons that signed the petition was cut out; these pieces of paper were then tied to a large string, which in turn was tied around the symbolic archways of the University of Glasgow. |
| **April** | / |
| **May** | - May 16th. Four members of GUCA joined the Working Group of the University Court in a meeting to discuss divestment and the research brief. The rest of the group held a silent demonstration in front of the venue, as a sign of solidarity. As a result of this meeting (and the working group’s additional considerations) the working group decided to recommend full divestment as well as reinvestment in renewable energy industries to the University Court. |
| **June** | - June 26th. A Court meeting took place in which divestment was discussed. GUCA Fossil Free members hung out a huge banner in front of the university pledging for fossil fuel divestment. |
During the meeting many questions were left unanswered, which is why the Court decided to put off the final divestment decision until the next Court meeting in October.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>During the graduation period at the end of the term, GUCA Fossil Free printed out diplomas that said 'make my degree FOSSIL FREE'. These were handed out to the graduates; some pictures of these graduates holding the diplomas were posted on social media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Several GUCA members left because they had graduated. However, holiday was a busy period for the GUCA Fossil Free campaigners who stayed; they had to prepare for the recruitment of new members during the freshers week, while simultaneously having the final divestment decision approximating.</td>
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| September | September 17th. GUCA Fossil Free again had a stand at the freshers fair.  
- September 25th. Another picture moment was organized, which again was used for social media purposes.  
- As the Court meeting came closer and closer, there was a lot going on around the divestment campaign on the media. |
| October | October 7th. One day before the big decision of the University Court, a fake oil spill was organized besides the library. Politicians were invited to come to speak and GUCA Fossil Free also held several speeches. This was combined with a banner drop (same banner as use don June 25th) asking the Principal of the University to divest. Furthermore, the campaigners discussed an action plan for the next day; if the Court decided not to divest, then GUCA was going to occupy the building.  
- October 8th. The University decided to divest its endowments from the fossil fuel industry over a period of 10 years. Victory for GUCA Fossil Free! Yet, the of this decision had to be further evaluated. The decision could be reversed at any point if financial troubles arose.  
- October 9th. The divestment decision provoked heated response of Professor Paul Younger, Rankine chair of engineering and professor of energy engineering at the university. He said he was "utterly dismayed, and vehemently opposed". This academic backlash was very unexpected for the GUCA Fossil Free campaign. |
| November | / |
| December | The GUCA Fossil Free team collected 100 of signatures from academics at the University in order to prove the fact that academics did support the campaign and the divestment decision, and that the academic community actually wasn't divided. |
| January | Further academic signature collection and writing of the financial report. |
| February | February 24th. One day before the Court meeting (in which the financial implication of divestment would be discussed), a big 'thank you' action was organized. GUCA Fossil Free took many pictures with big signs with which they thanked the university for divesting. These pictures were uploaded on social media and aimed to further pressure the university towards sticking to the divestment decision. They also sent the pictures, together with the petition by academics, to the Secretary of Court.  
- February 25th. GUCA handed in the Financial Report which they had been preparing just before the Court meeting began. In this court meeting the financial implications of divestment were further discussed. The Court did not revert their former divestment decision. |
| March | / |
| April | April 15th. Another Court meeting took place, in which divestment was discussed again. The Court said that, although some financial details were still being figured out, they were still committed to divest. |
### Timeline DivestVU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Events</th>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td><strong>January</strong></td>
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<td><strong>December</strong></td>
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<td>2014</td>
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<td><strong>July</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>August</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
September | - DivestVU recruited new members within the MSc ERM.

October | /

November | - November 27th. DivestVU met with Executive board, which overall reacted positively to the issues raised by DivestVU. The board agreed upon putting the concern on the agenda of ABP. They also committed to arranging a meeting for DivestVU with the VU Association. Concerning the VU’s influence on big banks and the ABP pension fund, the Executive Board mentioned that the VU did not have enough capital invested in both to actually be able to make a difference.

December | - December 3rd. DivestVU brought out an article in the ADVALVAS student newspaper. This article was about the link of the VU with the fossil fuel industry and about the DivestVU campaign itself. One of the students who read the article became so interested in DivestVU that he decided to get involved. Later on he became the new coordinator of the campaign.

| **2015** |

January | /

February | - February 13th. The DivestVU team carried out an action at the VU career fair. They dressed up with coveralls and stood near the Shell stand with signs that said, amongst others; ‘For a sustainable future, turn back immediately.’ They had no permission to be at the fair so they were sent away pretty quickly.
- February 14th. The DivestVU team played a big role in the organization of the first Global Divestment Day, which in the Netherlands took place in Amsterdam. A large group of approximately 450 people cycled around Amsterdam with flags and banners pledging for fossil fuel divestment.

March | - March 28th. The DivestVU team met with the VU Association. Although the VU Association seemed to support the proposal of DivestVU, they said that it was not possible (yet) for them to go fossil free. Namely, the Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) in which they invest currently do not, as of yet, include fossil free options. Once such product is developed (which apparently is in process, as BlackRock announced it in August 2014) they can look into the option of going fossil free. One condition hereof is that such an ETF should be of the same risk/return profile as the current investments of the VU-Association.
Chapter 5.1 & 5.2 - GUCA Fossil Free & DivestVU

Figure D - Visual representation timeline
## Chapter 5.1. GUCA Fossil Free

### Table 5 – Internal and external factors affecting GUCA Fossil Free

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GUCA Fossil Free</th>
<th>Internal factors</th>
<th>Organizational structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction structure</strong></td>
<td>As explained above, the GUCA Fossil Free campaign falls under the guidance of People &amp; Planet, a student-led non profit organization based in the UK, which has supported student activism and global citizenship since 1969 (People &amp; Planet, 2015). As its name indicates, People &amp; Planet focuses on a 'people's' campaign and a 'planet' campaign: currently these are Sweatshop Free and Fossil Free. The guidance it provides for the Fossil Free campaigns is only meant for university and college campaigns, thus, not for those Fossil Free campaigns ran at municipalities, pension funds, churches, or other entities. To provide guidance to these 65 university Fossil Free campaigns, People &amp; Planet employs two full-time coordinators. The responsibility of these coordinators is not only to give advice to the campaigns whenever necessary, but also to help them getting more media attention by publishing press releases; to expand their networks by linking one campaign to another; support them with the development of their campaigning skills by providing frequent workshops; and to raise money for the nationwide movement (see interview Wilson, 2015). In the UK the Fossil Free campaign is not entirely funded by 350.org; it also receives financial resources from other NGOs such as Greenpeace and Oxfam, and it generates income through crowdfunding campaigns. When talking about the structure of GUCA Fossil Free itself, it can be noticed that the size of the campaign has fluctuated: &quot;[...] just around the decision there were more people, but when the university had decided to divest the meetings got quite dry, which is when some campaigners left.&quot; (see interview Baumert, 2015). So far, on average the core team of the campaign each year has consisted of 15 to 20 persons. These persons, as explained fore, were divided in three teams according to the responsibilities that each person wanted to carry. More information about these roles will be provided in the section ‘accountability’ below.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deliberation</strong></td>
<td>In the very beginning of the campaign, when the above outlined task division had not been made yet, the team held meetings two times a week in order to discuss the structure, strategy and deadlines for the campaign. Once those issues had been decided upon, the team met once a week, with the frequency of meetings increasing whenever important events approached Later on, meetings of the sub-groups were held, to discuss content only relevant to them. Campaigners alternated the preparation and coordination of the meetings to keep everyone involved and to ensure that tasks would be evenly distributed. GUCA has always tried to encourage newcomers to join the meeting and the campaign as a whole, no matter at which point of the year: &quot;There was a time when at each meeting we had a new person, we then spent the first 15 minutes explaining what we were doing. We try to be as inclusive as possible so people can join all the time.&quot; (see interview Baumert, 2015); &quot;We really strive to have an open campaign by always be willing to reinvigorate the campaign by bringing in new people.&quot; (see interview Evens, 2015). Next to holding meetings, a few core campaigners of GUCA organized workshops once in a while. In this way they wanted to make sure that the whole team was up to date on what was going on in the campaign, while at the same time supporting the enhancement of creativity amongst members. One matter that the GUCA team has always kept in mind is that the hard working has to be balanced with having fun: “Sometimes we have food together and avoid talking about the campaign, which really works to keep the team together. Also, we had a camping trip after exams to do other things, some social stuff.” (see interview Baumert, 2015); If things get dry and boring then people become less enthusiastic, that's why we wanted to make it really fun. I think that's also the reason why we didn’t burn out.” (see interview Evens, 2015).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Accountability</strong></td>
<td>As explained before, the responsibilities of the campaigners were divided over three teams: (1) the research team, which prepared the documents outlining all the arguments supporting divestment; (2) the action team, which organized creative, fun, lively, and enjoyable campaigning actions in order to raise public awareness and exert pressure on the university; and (3) the media team, which composed articles for the student newspaper and took care of social media. Each of these teams has its own coordinator, who is in charge of making sure that the specific tasks of the corresponding teams are carried out and that deadlines are met. The other fixed roles are that of the secretary, treasurer, and the general coordinator, which were already motioned above. The fact that roles and tasks were set does not mean that some persons are more important than others; as mentioned before, GUCA is a non-hierarchical campaign. The role division was merely done with the purpose of being more organized as a group — which was necessary with such a large number of people. Such structure also permitted a more equal workload distribution amongst the campaigners, while simultaneously maximizing the creativity of the group as a whole: &quot;I think that when people have a defined role they often feel more officially responsible.&quot; (see interview Wilson, 2015).</td>
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</table>
2015). Even though certain roles are fixed for this campaign, its structure is still very flexible; campaigners can be part of whichever team they wish, of all of them if they want to, “nothing is mandatory, everyone only carries out those tasks they like.” (see interview Evens, 2015).

The elections for the new GUCA committee are held each year just before summer break during GUCA’s Annual General Meeting (AGM). The reason for holding the elections at the end of the year is to make sure that enough people of the old committee can transfer all the necessary knowledge to the new team. Whoever is interested in taking more responsibility can put him- or herself forward; if there are two persons who want to assume the same role then a voting round takes place. Essentially the people who put themselves forward and who eventually get elected to the committee are those who have been working on the campaign for the previous year already. Although this procedure sounds very formal, “the elections are done in a very relaxed way” (see interview Evens, 2015). Once someone gets elected it does not mean that this person is more important than the others, nor does it mean that this person has to work harder; the functions simply entail a larger responsibility and accountability. For the secretary this means being responsible for the administrative issues; the treasurer is held accountable for the financial issues; and the general coordinator is responsible for overseeing the campaign as a whole and for ensuring a proper cooperation amongst the distinct working teams.

**Resource flows**  
**Human.** As explained before, the students involved in the GUCA campaign were mainly recruited during the freshers week. As this week is open for all the (new) students of the university, the campaign has been able to attract people with a large variety of backgrounds. Moreover, it can be noticed that students often joined the campaign in an early stage of their studies—in the second or third year of their undergraduate degree. Most of those who have joined the GUCA team stayed with the campaign for one or two years. Fortunately, since the core campaigning group of GUCA has always been relatively large, it was never a real challenge to replace the work of those who did leave the campaign or of those who were going though busy times. Next to the campaigners themselves, other essential human resources for the campaign were the national Fossil Free coordinators working at People & Planet: “We wouldn’t have been able to proceed or we would have found it very difficult if they hadn’t been there; they provided the knowledge and experience that we needed.”; “It was nice to be able to pick up the phone and contact them whenever we were stumbling.” (see interview Wilson, 2015).

**Material.** Although People & Planet does not have an extreme large budget for the Fossil Free campaigns, it did contribute with material resources when necessary. For example, for the freshers week it provided a package with basic promotion material. Major costs of the various supplies used for campaigning actions were often covered by People & Planet; but when the costs of such supplies were minimal then the campaigners covered them themselves. Moreover, perhaps the most important material resources for the GUCA campaign were the supporting campaigning documents, such as the action guide and the resource guide provided by People & Planet, and the divestment brief elaborated by the Toronto University Fossil Free campaign (which was used as an example for the GUCA research brief).

**Moral.** The GUCA campaign often worked together with several Fossil Free campaigns over the UK, especially with the campaign at the University of Edinburgh. They attend each other’s events in order to make a larger impact at their corresponding universities.

**Cultural.** GUCA campaigners have acquired a broad knowledge base on action repertoires, as campaigning actions are not uncommon in Glasgow.

**Social-organizational.** Even though some campaigners left after a year, much of the knowledge of each team –research, action and media— and of the campaign as a whole could be retained thanks to the organizational structure. As explained before, in each team there was always somebody from the previous year, who could explain every detail to the new members.

**Leadership**

**Explanation of the leadership**  
For GUCA, this thesis sees the core team of approximately 15 campaigners as the leading group of the movement. This core group is analyzed in terms of their background, their network, and the variety of repertoires or tactics they have used.
### Biography

It was already explained that one of the main founders of GUCA Fossil Free had previously been involved in the Toronto University Fossil Free campaign. Thus, she had already learned how to get organized as a group, how to run a campaign, how to write a comprehensive brief to the university about why it should divest, and she had also attended a training event called ‘training for trainers’, which was specifically for Fossil Free groups on how to start a campaign. This experience proved to be a good basis for setting up the GUCA Fossil Free network, as well as for structuring and carrying out the campaign. All the other people involved in GUCA had little or no experience with campaigning. However, the fact that their academic backgrounds were so distinct resulted in an “interesting mix of skills and knowledge” (see interview Baumert, 2015).

### Networks

GUCA has a close relationship with many other Fossil Free campaigns within the UK, and evidently also with the network it gained in Toronto. Furthermore, within the University of Glasgow itself, GUCA has an equally strong and diverse network: “besides the core team we also had a wider group of around 30 to 50 people who would come to our actions.” (see interview Wilson, 2015). Again, this is partly related to the variety in backgrounds of the campaigners; “The distinct friend groups of campaigns can be called-in when more people are needed for an activity. Once we made a flash mob, and I actually managed to get my whole class of 40 to join us.” (see interview Evens, 2015).

### Repertoires

To be effective, the GUCA team believes it is important to find a balance between outside and inside tactics. Their inside tactics — the negotiations with the board, the Student Union, and the Working Group — are seen as the basis of the campaign, since achieving divestment would have been virtually impossible without talking to the actual decision makers. However, the outside tactics — the active campaigning on campus — were a vital part of the process too: “I don’t think that one would have worked very successfully without the other.” (see interview Wilson, 2015). According to the GUCA campaigners, the outside tactics enhanced the effectiveness of inside tactics, as they gave more urgency to the problem by mobilizing masses: “Those outside strategies can be very effective when used correctly. To what level you carry out such tactics can vary form low level positive creative actions at the beginning of the campaign, to high level escalatory actions if the campaign is ignored or rejected by the university.” (see interview Wilson, 2015). As can be noticed above in ‘The story of the GUCA Fossil Free campaign’, GUCA has implemented both types of tactics extensively. However, when carrying out actions on campus the campaigners were always very careful: “The university was very supportive during the whole process; carrying out radical or aggressive actions could have brought the campaign in danger” (see interview Baumert, 2015). Hence, what GUCA did was to keep their actions as positive as possible, always trying to send an encouraging message to the university. Also, the team made sure to limit the amount of outside tactics: “If too many actions are carried out it gets boring. I would recommend to campaign on campus once every two or three months, just to be out there and visible, and to keep everybody talking about the campaign. In this way you can really increase social pressure.” (see interview Evens, 2015).

### External factors

#### Institutional opportunities and constraints

When the GUCA campaign was being set up, its founders began researching the financial structure of the University of Glasgow. On the website of the university they could easily find the list of companies in which the university invested and which of these companies belonged to the fossil fuel industry (see University of Glasgow, 2015). The team found out that the total amount of endowments of the university by that time was of £128 million, of which at least £18 million was invested in fossil fuel companies (the Guardian, 2014a). The transparency of behalf of the university helped the campaigners to formulate a clear vision to work towards (see interview Wilson, 2015), and therefore this can be seen as a political opportunity for the GUCA campaigners. Furthermore, the University of Glasgow had a Socially Responsible Investment Policy in place, which explicitly stated that the university would consider its investments on the basis of environmental and humanitarian concern. This policy allowed the general public to challenge the investments of the university when considered necessary:

“Groups from within the University may make representations in respect of an investment or investments held by the University, where those groups have concerns. Representations should be made in writing to the Secretary of Court. Such representations will be considered on the following basis: […]”

(University of Glasgow, 2009)

The fact that a clearly defined procedure to address issues with regard to the university’s investments already existed permitted the campaigners to systematically structure their campaign: they knew they first had to hand in a motion with 500 signatures to the SRC, and once the SRC had passed the motion the corresponding case had to be addressed in the Court meeting (of which the session dates are already fixed). Thus, this institutional policy provided the opportunity for the campaigners to plan far ahead and set clear deadlines within the working teams.

When comparing the University of Glasgow with its surrounding universities, it can be noticed that not all academic institutions in the UK have a Socially Responsible Investment Policy. The Fossil Free initiatives campaigning at universities that did not have such policy apparently struggled more than GUCA: “We were lucky that our university
already had Socially Responsible Investment Policy; we had contact with other campaigns where that was not the case. Their first step was thus trying to create such policy in order to be able to ask for divestment. This is a very long process.” (see interview Baumert, 2015). When looking at further institutional differences amongst Fossil Free campaigns across the country, the GUCA members notice that another factor that highly influences the Fossil Free campaigns is the relationship that universities have with the fossil fuel industry besides their endowments. According to the campaigners, several large universities in the UK, such as Oxford or the big engineering universities, have really strong ties with the fossil fuel industry (see interview Evans, 2015). Such ties can be related to recruitment agreements, research support, sponsoring, etc. One of the GUCA campaigners notices that these ties are hardly present at the University of Glasgow: “I don’t think our university has such a strong link to the fossil fuel industry […] So I guess that they didn’t have that much to lose.” (see interview Evans, 2015). Another example that supports this argument is the recent divestment success of the SOAS University of London Fossil Free campaign: “The divestment at SOAS was definitively the product of a good student campaign, but I think the reason why they were able to push for such extensive commitments [to divest fully from all companies within 3 years] is because those connections with the industry didn’t exist at that institution.” (see interview Wilson, 2015). Thus, a significant institutional factor that has positively influenced Fossil Free campaigns is a weak relationship of the university with the fossil fuel industry.

A last detail to be added in this section is the fact that the Secretary of Court, David Newall, supported the campaign from the start, as he was in favor of divestment (see interview Baumert, 2015). According to one of the campaigners this was a significant opportunity for the campaign to succeed.

### Cultural opportunities and constraints

The GUCA campaigners notice that Glasgow is a progressive city in which a lot of political debate takes place (Evens, 2015; Wilson, 2015). They mention that the city has a long history of activism with progressive decisions: “One of the largest student occupations in the UK actually was at the University of Glasgow a few years ago. It’s really in the culture of Glasgow.” (see interview Evans, 2015). Therefore, carrying out campaigning actions on campus was self evident for GUCA members: “I have a friend who is leading the campaign in Heidelberg, Germany, and when I was suggesting to do actions and demonstrations on campus he got really enthusiastic. It was as if it hadn’t really crossed their minds before, which is just an interesting thought because in Glasgow it was a no-brainer to carry out actions.” (see interview Evans, 2015).

Although the GUCA campaigners do not believe that culture is a factor that will ‘make or break’ a campaign, they do think it can have an influence on the nature of the actions that campaigners are used to carry out.

### Resource availability

As stated before, this factor is based on the idea that resources can only be mobilized by the campaign if they are available in its wider environment. It can be said that many of the necessary resources were indeed easily accessible to the GUCA campaign. Much of the data necessary to support the development of the GUCA’s divestment brief already existed. For example, details about the investments of the university, as said, were relatively easy to find on the university’s website. There also existed a report published by People & Planet in which the investments in the fossil fuel industry of all UK Universities were addressed. Also, GUCA could use the Toronto divestment brief as a guiding example for its own brief. Finally, two full-time national Fossil Free coordinators often contacted the campaign to support them and advise them on things they were struggling with (see interview Wilson, 2015). All the above positively influenced the campaigning process.
### Chapter 5.2. DivestVU

Table 6 – Internal and external factors affecting DivestVU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DivestVU</th>
<th>Internal factors</th>
<th>Organizational structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction</strong></td>
<td>To be able to analyze the organizational factors presented by Ganz (2000) – deliberation, resource flows and accountability– it is necessary to first outline the actual structure of the DivestVU campaign, as well as its position within its larger network.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Deliberation</strong></td>
<td>DivestVU tries to be as welcoming as possible to newcomers. For example, whenever someone new joins a meeting, then part of the meeting is dedicated to giving this person amble background information so that he or she can understand what is going on. The DivestVU team thinks it is important to keep on explaining what the campaign is about to anyone who might be interested, even if this means that they have to have the same type of discussion over and over again. The campaigners try to conduct frequent meetings, even during times when not much is going on around the campaign, &quot;just to keep it warm&quot; (see interview Velure, 2015). The turnouts of the meetings vary a lot depending on how busy everyone is with work, studies, exams, or other duties. When the group is large enough more formal and structured meetings are held, mostly at a room at the VU University or at the office of FossilVrij NL. When only three or four persons show up then the meetings are held in a more informal setting, in a coffee bar for example. As said above, FossilVrij NL organizes a monthly national gathering for all the Fossil Free groups. During these meetings is discussed what is happening at each campaign, what major problems the campaigns are facing, and how campaigns have been able to overcome obstacles. Sometimes workshops are given on specific topics, such as on how to carry out creative actions. There was a time when many university Fossil Free campaigns met altogether either before the monthly national gatherings, or on random dates somewhere in one of the hometowns of the campaigns. During these meetings more specific knowledge on university issues, and general campaign tactics were shared. For a while the university campaigns met one or two times per week, but at a certain point DivestVU stopped attending with frequency. Again, all the Fossil Free campaigns try to be as flexible as possible, nothing is mandatory, and campaigners only attend gatherings if they choose to.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
| **Accountability** | DivestVU has not organized specific events for recruitment purposes only. Until now the core campaigners of DivestVU have come in contact with the campaign via activities that have been organized by the SFSF (such as the 'Do the Math' screening), articles that have been posted (such as an article about DivestVU in the VU student newspaper), and via the network of people that were already involved in Fossil Free. Once people have decided to join the campaign they can decide for themselves how active they want to be. If a person wishes to become very active and join the core team, then he or she is allowed to do so. There are no official selection procedures neither for the coordinator nor for the other core campaigners, everything is discussed and decided upon either during meetings during informal conversations. There is no hierarchy within the DivestVU campaign, and in general the campaign has no division of tasks and roles. The only role that is defined is the coordinating role, but even the tasks of the coordinator are not fixed. The consensus amongst the DivestVU campaigners is that there is no need to assign more specific roles and tasks within the group: "A conventional organizational structure with
predefined responsibilities would miss the whole point of the movement in the sense that divestment campaigns are grassroots [...] a very large part of the appeal of the movement would be lost." (see interview Gallas, 2015): "We let the structure of our campaign emerge naturally, and naturally people are not picking up specific roles, so there are no specific roles." (see interview Kleijwegt, 2015). Thus, campaigners just do what they can and contribute with what they are good at; "everyone is responsible for everything" (see interview Velure, 2015). All campaigners have the passwords of the social media accounts and of the e-mail address, and everyone has access to the documents that have been stored online. Hence, if something has to be researched or communicated, then anyone can carry out the task at hand.

Resource flows

**Human.** The human resources that DivestVU has been able to attract for its core team, as explained, are mainly students who are doing a master’s degree. Although this has brought along several challenges with it (which were already outlined above), having somewhat more experienced students has its advantages. Namely, they already have set up a network; their research skills are often more developed; and they tend to be more confident than younger students, and therefore they are less insecure when it comes to talking to an Executive Board or carrying out actions (see interview Kleijwegt, 2015). Apart from the campaigners themselves, other human resources that have been essential to the campaign are volunteers –the 'young professionals’– in the FossielVrij NL network, and contribute to the campaign through sharing their skills and expertise. They have helped DivestVU with the execution of various tasks such as drafting letters for the Executive Board and for the VU Association, helping DivestVU to prepare for meetings, as well as with carrying out background research on the financial and legal aspects of the campaign.

**Material.** The budget of FossielVrij NL is limited, and therefore there very little money available for DivestVU. Only when materials are needed for actions or other core activities, FossielVrij NL covers the costs.

**Moral.** DivestVU has been morally supported by other university Fossil Free campaigns, especially by the Fossil Free UvA & HvA campaign – the other university campaign located in Amsterdam. The two campaigns have often cooperated on research and the organization of events, and they regularly attend each other’s activities. Furthermore, because DivestVU was the first Fossil Free campaign in the Netherlands, it initially received a great deal of media attention, also since renowned individuals from the sustainability world in the Netherlands, such as Marian Minnesma, were involved in setting up the network. At a later stage the campaign was mainly supported by the aforementioned young professionals, who brought support and confidence to the campaigners throughout the process.

**Cultural.** Because DivestVU operates in the Netherlands one of its cultural resources is language. Letters to the Executive Board and to the VU Association were often sent (and/or answered) in Dutch and the conversations with these entities were also held in the Dutch language.

**Social-organizational.** As explained before, the core team of DivestVU has changed a few times. The transfer of knowledge between predecessors and successors about the organization itself and its strategies is not carried out trough official knowledge-transfer documents. Rather, the persons just sit together in an informal setting and the predecessor verbally communicates his or her knowledge, experience, and plans to the successor. The recruitment of volunteers has mainly taken place within the MSc ERM network. More details on this are provided below in the section ‘Networks’.

Leadership

**Explanation of the leadership**

Rather than seeing leadership at DivestVU only with the coordinator of the campaign, this thesis sees leadership with the whole core team, thus, the four to five persons of the committee that have helped the movement forward.

**Biography**

Because DivestVU was set up within the MSc ERM, many of the students who have been involved in the campaign have joined through this network. The fact that mainly master-degree students have been involved in this campaign has brought some challenges. One of those challenges is that these students only stay for approximately one year at university, which means they often cannot stay involved for a longer period of time. Furthermore, master-degree students generally have a higher work load than students in an earlier stage of their studies. During the MSc ERM at the VU, students often have to do an internship or have to go abroad for a few months. Keeping a team together can be more difficult if everyone is very busy or if campaigners are far away from each other. In the case students do stay involved in the campaign after their master’s, or in the case a former master students gets involved (which has occurred in DivestVU), their connection with the University might be less strong than that of a current student. DivestVU itself has indicated that it would be easier to have people in the core team who are "going to stay around for some time" (see interview Kleijwegt, 2015).
**Networks**

DivestVU has strong connections with other Fossil Free initiatives in the Netherlands: with FossilVrij NL, with other Fossil Free campaigns located in Amsterdam, and with several fellow university campaigns. Within DivestVU’s core team, the connection of each person with this broader network varies: “Some people prefer to stay active only within the DivestVU team, others enjoy taking part in the activities organized by FossilVrij NL or by other campaigns.” Via FossilVrij NL DivestVU also has a strong network tie with other NGOs, such as Greenpeace and Milieudefensie.

The fact that DivestVU is part of a larger worldwide divestment movement has been the prima motivator for many of the DivestVU campaigners. As already mentioned, for the Global Divestment Day (on February the 14th 2015), for example, DivestVU carried out its second creative action (the first one being the ‘Bursting the carbon bubble’ action). The fact that countless other campaigns worldwide were doing similar creative actions gave DivestVU a true boost (see interview Meddens, 2015).

Within the VU University itself the DivestVU’s network is limited. As already mentioned in one of the previous sections, the active campaigners always stayed within or around the ERM circle. However, this may be about to change: as explained, the current coordinator of DivestVU (who found out about the campaign through the DivestVU article in the student newspaper) is a first year bachelor’s student of another faculty, providing new opportunities for the expansion of DivestVU’s network.

**Repertoires**

Of the types of tactics mentioned in the literature review, it can be noticed that DivestVU mainly has implemented ‘inside’ tactics in the attempt to try to reach divestment. From its inception onwards the campaign focused on writing letters to the Executive Board and the VU Association, with the objective of getting a meeting with these entities. In essence, DivestVU is not against the implementation of ‘outside’ tactics. However, the campaign believes that focusing on inside tactics keeps the campaign more professional. In this way they believe the Executive Board will take them more seriously: “So far the Executive Board has been quite supportive, more radical actions might put them off.” (see interview Kleijwegt, 2015). Moreover, the campaigners believe that it makes no sense to mobilize masses at this point in time, since the main obstacle to divestment (concerning only the VU Association) goes beyond the reach of the Association itself. Namely, the Association has to wait until BlackRock (or another firm like it) develops a fossil free investment product. In the eyes of DivestVU, exerting pressure on the VU Association seems futile in speeding up the development of such products in the general financial market.

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**External factors**

**Institutional opportunities and constraints**

As formerly explicated, in the very beginning of DivestVU, when the first campaigners started to research what the VU investments encompassed, it soon became clear that universities in the Netherlands actually do not hold direct investments in companies. However, they do have indirect financial ties with the fossil fuel industry. For the VU specifically, these indirect ties are linked to three different entities – the banks where the VU has its savings accounts, the ABP pension fund, and the VU Association. All three entities have part of their endowments directly invested in the fossil fuel industry. Thus, to achieve its goal of detaching the VU University from this industry, DivestVU began addressing the aforementioned indirect ties. Therefore, in its third letter to the Executive Board, DivestVU requested the VU University to become fossil free in the sense that:

1. The VU makes a public statement that it will become 100% fossil free. It furthermore engages with the banks it currently uses to ear-mark the University’s current and future reserves and temporal liquidities so that these are put in savings accounts without being involved in loans or investments in fossil fuel producing companies.
2. The VU does what it lies in its power to influence the ABP pension fund to become fossil free.
3. The VU Association immediately freezes any new investment in fossil fuel companies, and divests from direct ownership and any company funds that include fossil fuel public equities in the top two hundred publicly traded fossil fuel companies in the world.”

(DivestVU, 2014)

When discussing the above request during a face-to-face meeting with the Executive Board, the Board did not directly reject the concerns pointed out by DivestVU. However, they mentioned that there was not much the VU itself could do. The arguments with which they supported their statement are outlined below.

Banks. The Executive Board explained to the DivestVU members that the sums of money that the university has in its saving accounts are not large enough for the university to be in the position to tell the banks where or not to invest in. Furthermore, Gallas (2015) explains that the issue is even more complex: “It's complicated, but simply said... on the one side of the balance sheet of a bank there are the savings of, for example, the VU University; then on the other side there are the companies in which the bank invests (or lends money to). However, these two sides of the balance sheet are not directly linked to each other. You cannot tell exactly which eur of the savings account matches that other eur of the bank's investments.” Because of this structural complexity and the relative insignificance of the university savings, the Executive Board says to have no influence on whether these savings go to the fossil fuel industry or not (see interview Gallas, 2015). Furthermore, it is not possible for the VU University to switch to a more sustainable bank that does not invest in the fossil fuel industry. Dutch universities are in fact bound to a government rule that says that university
savings have to be deposited in a bank that holds enough money (VOX, 2015). Neither of the two sustainable banks in the Netherlands—ASN Bank and Triodos Bank—complies with this requisite (VOX, 2015).

ABP pension fund. ABP is the largest pension fund in the Netherlands and the fifth biggest pension fund in the world. It has a total of €334 billion worth of assets under its management, which are invested on behalf of 2.8 million employees in the government and education sectors. Currently, ABP invests approximately 10% of these assets, around €33 billion, in CO2-intensive companies and the fossil fuel industry, such as Shell, ExxonMobil, Total, Chevron and Petroleio Brasilero (ABP fossielvrij, 2015). Because one of the Executive Board members of the VU was closely linked to the advisory board of ABP, during the meeting with DivestVU he agreed upon raising the divestment issue within ABP. However, again it was stressed that the VU had no power to actually exert pressure on the investment policy of ABP.

VU Association. The influence that the VU University has on the VU Association is much stronger than the influence it has on the investments of banks or ABP. During the aforementioned face-to-face meeting the Executive Board agreed upon arranging an appointment for DivestVU with the Association itself, so further divestment issues could be discussed directly with those concerned. When this meeting with the Association took place in March 2015, on the one hand the results seemed fairly positive, as the Association said they might consider going fossil free in the future. On the other hand, however, they explained to DivestVU that this was currently not an option. Namely, the Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) in which they invest their capital do not include any fossil free options, as of yet. Once such product is developed—which apparently is in process, as a company named BlackRock announced it in August 2014— and if this is successfully done they can look into the option of going fossil free, always under the condition that such an ETF should be of the same risk/return profile as the current investments of the VU Association (see interview Gallas, 2015).

As can be noticed from the story above, the fact that the university has no direct investments in fossil fuel companies, as well as the fact that the financial structure of the university is so complex, have cost DivestVU a significant amount of effort and time and have somewhat hindered the campaign in achieving its goals. One of the interviewees explains: “If the VU would have had direct investments in the fossil fuel industry, then the focus of the campaign would have been more clear from the beginning, and probably the whole process would have gone way faster.” (see interview Kleijwegt, 2015). Moreover, campaigners were less motivated when they discovered the complexity of the issue, explains the national coordinator of Fossilvrij NL: “The university Fossil Free campaigning groups in the Netherlands, including DivestVU, kept on failing apart because of the fact that they could not find where exactly the universities invested in.” (see interview Meddens, 2015). Concerning this matter, the DivestVU campaign actually has a significant advantage over the rest of the Dutch university campaigns; as far as is known, the VU is the only university in the country that is closely connected to an entity that does have direct investments in the fossil fuel industry—the VU Association (see interview Kleijwegt, 2015). This has provided DivestVU with a clear (intermediate) goal: trying to convince the VU Association to divest. However, it remains difficult to target the VU University itself: “Universities get away with it too easily by saying that they are not allowed to switch to sustainable banks, or that they are not the ones who decide over the investments of ABP.” (see interview Meddens, 2015).

DivestVU has also looked into the options of investigating other links that the VU University has with fossil fuel companies: “Our campaigning goal could become more clear if we knew, for example, whether fossil fuel companies are investing in research at the university, whether they finance certain professors, how much they pay for being present at recruitment events, whether there is someone in the Executive Board of the university who has worked at a fossil fuel company, and these kind of things” (see interview Velure, 2015). The national Fossilvrij coordinator explains that these “fossil fuel tentacles are so intertwined in the university system that there is no transparency about it at all” (see interview Meddens, 2015). To address this lack of transparency—which is another institutional barrier to the campaigns— Fossilvrij NL, together with Greenpeace en Milieudefensie, may soon set up a profound research project targeted at discovering those ‘fossil fuel tentacles’. According to Fossilvrij NL, this can make it easier for students to campaign: “If [Fossil Free campaigners] can present the exact facts to the Executive Board, then their arguments will be much stronger.” (see interview Meddens, 2015).

**Cultural opportunities and constraints**

The DivestVU campaigners have indicated that often the broader public in the Netherlands seems to be unknowing about the facts on which the Fossil Free campaigns are based—climate change, the damage fossil fuels are causing, and the concept of divestment; “Many people do not see the direct link between the fossil fuel industry and climate change.” (see interview Velure, 2015); “I have the feeling people still don’t feel the urgency of this case.” (see interview Kleijwegt, 2015). The campaigners believe that the Dutch media has had a lot to do with this: “When compared to other countries, I believe the Dutch media has not given much attention to the subject, which is one of the reasons why the public does not have much knowledge about the topic.” (see interview Kleijwegt, 2015); “It will take quite some time to build the mindset for the campaign, as it is relatively new, also in the media.” (see interview Velure, 2015). Though the Dutch media is not yet very active on the topic, the campaigners do feel the topic is building on a global level, which is why the Fossil Free campaign has been able to grow so rapidly within only three years. This has certainly had a positive impact on the DivestVU campaign (see interview Gallas, 2015).
Apart from the fact that the topics surrounding climate change are not very hot in the country, the DivestVU campaigners feel that the Netherlands is also a place in which activism is not very popular “neither in the media nor amongst the general public” (see interview Kleijwegt, 2015). The campaigners suspect that it has to do with the relative stability of our society: “We haven’t had to fight that much for our rights in our recent history because we have a strong social system; in countries such as Germany and the U.S. people are much more accustomed to protesting and standing on the barricade.” (see interview Meddens, 2015) “Our country is quite stable and people generally have a good life. Practices such as ‘fracking’ [i.e. the process of drilling down into the earth before a high-pressure water mixture is directed at the rock to release the gas inside (BBC, 2015)] are not permitted and we haven’t experienced real visible consequences of climate change: we don’t have much to worry about, which is why I think many people don’t see the urgency of the matter.” (see interview Kleijwegt, 2015). According to the campaigners, this side of the Dutch culture has had a constraining impact on the development of the Fossil Free campaigns, including the university campaigns. The national FossielVrij coordinator says that she has often seen that students are scared to be placed in a box that says ‘activists’ (see interview Meddens, 2015). Furthermore, she has noted that many of the university Fossil Free campaigns in the Netherlands who have talked to the Executive Boards of their universities are sensitive to the power dynamics: “If people in powerful positions tell students something isn’t possible, then often they don’t challenge this view.” (see interview Meddens, 2015). This has often led to campaigns falling apart or to significant delay in the campaigning process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource availability</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Due to lack of essential resources in its environment, the group campaigning process at DivestVU is severely constrained second constraint is linked to human resources. The fact that the national FossielVrij NL coordinator has to oversee 24 different Fossil Free campaigns in the Netherlands (of which the university campaigns do not receive priority since they have no direct investments) has limited the availability of support and guidance. It is not in the power of DivestVU nor of FossielVrij NL to attract other support and guidance, as (inexistent) financial resources to hire more coordinators would be necessary.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Something else that has significantly gotten in the way of the campaigning process at DivestVU is the lack of information present in the campaign’s broader environment. As explained above, the VU University is not transparent about its link with the fossil fuel industry; and furthermore, no documents elaborated by research entities exist that have tried to uncover this link. Such research is too complex for DivestVU to carry out on its own. If more information on this topic would exist, then DivestVU could mobilize this resource in order to elaborate strong arguments in favor of their campaigning process. The lack of this resource however is inhibiting the team to be able to formulating clear campaigning arguments, goals and strategies.</td>
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## Chapter 5.3. Cross-case analysis

### Table 7 – Summary of the cross-case analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GUCA</th>
<th>Strategic capacity</th>
<th>DivestVU</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Biography</td>
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<tr>
<td>Previous experience FF</td>
<td>→+</td>
<td>← ← No experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity in backgrounds</td>
<td>→+</td>
<td>← + MSc student abilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big team, clear task division</td>
<td>→+</td>
<td>← + Small team, no task division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>University does have direct investments</td>
<td>→+</td>
<td>← ← University has no direct investments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource availability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>University was transparent about its investments</td>
<td>→+</td>
<td>← ← University was not transparent about link fossil fuel industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Biography</td>
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<tr>
<td>Previous experience Fossil Fr.</td>
<td>→+</td>
<td>← ← No experience movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Networks</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Strong Fossil Free network</td>
<td>→+</td>
<td>← + Strong Fossil Free network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong university network</td>
<td>→+</td>
<td>← ← Weak network in university</td>
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<tr>
<td>Repertoires</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inside/(positive)outside tactics</td>
<td>→+</td>
<td>← ± No supportive outside tactics (depends on culture)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big team with task division</td>
<td>→+</td>
<td>← ← Small team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear team selection</td>
<td>→+</td>
<td>← ← No team selection procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource availability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 full-time staff at People &amp; Planet, focus only on university campaigns</td>
<td>→+</td>
<td>← ← 1 full-time staff at FossielVrij NL, focus on all the campaigns in the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Few institutional problems</td>
<td>→+</td>
<td>← ← A lot of institutional problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside tactics are normal</td>
<td>→+</td>
<td>← ← Activism is not very common, neither are outside tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong moral bond with camp.</td>
<td>→+</td>
<td>← + Strong moral bond with camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young students/who also look for something fun and social</td>
<td>→+</td>
<td>← ← Older students/people with other priorities (time wise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequent meetings</td>
<td>→+</td>
<td>← ← Frequent meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarity about Court Meetings, so clear structure action plan</td>
<td>→+</td>
<td>← ← Institution responded slowly, so long waiting periods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedure via SRC</td>
<td>→+</td>
<td>← ← Procedure directly with Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaigning is common</td>
<td>→+</td>
<td>← ← Campaigning is not common</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For a successful Fossil Free campaign

1. RECRUIT AT UNIVERSITY-WIDE LEVEL
   In order to be able to better complete recommendations 2, 3 & 4, begin with recruiting as many campaigners as possible during, for example, the (university-wide) introduction week at the beginning of the academic year.

2. RECRUIT A BIG GROUP
   The more people the campaign is able to recruit, the more hands, brains, and time available for the campaigning process, and thus the more the campaign can get done (as long as the campaigners are properly coordinated).

3. RECRUIT A DIVERSE GROUP
   A diversity in backgrounds of the campaigners is essential for the creation of a large internal network (thus more people who support the campaign). Furthermore, it can help the campaigning group to see problems and solutions from a different point of view.

4. ENSURE LONG-TERM LEADERSHIP
   To make sure knowledge is retained and the strategic plan is carried out, it is helpful to have people in a team who stay for longer periods of time. Thus, recruiting students that are in an early stage of their studies is convenient.

5. DIVIDE TASKS
   Distribute the work among team members to be more efficient. For example, a coordinator, a treasurer, a research team, an action team, and a media team. No hierarchy, just to have a better overview.

6. RESEARCH
   Find out everything about your university or college before carrying out any campaigning actions. The more you know, the better you are prepared for future obstacles. Don’t be afraid to use the global fossil free network when doing research.

7. DEVELOP A GOOD ACTION PLAN
   Set clear intermediate goals and for each goal develop a plan ‘B’ (just in case an obstacle crosses your path). Always be prepared for opposition from people who have vested interests in the fossil fuel industry.

8. COMBINE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE TACTICS
   Strong negotiation processes with the Executive Board or other university entities are the basis of the campaign, but such ‘inside tactics’ are more effective when supported by actual campaigning actions on campus (the ‘outside tactics’). These should be kept positive and motivating when the university is being supportive; when the university ignores or rejects the campaign, then more activist actions could be implemented.

9. CHALLENGE YOUR CULTURAL INSTINCTS
   Dare to speak up for what you stand for, even if at first this goes against your cultural instincts. By undertaking campaigning actions you will involve masses, who in turn will support the campaign in carrying out more pressure and in gaining momentum.

10. HAVE FUN!
    When trying to implement recommendations 1 to 9, always remember that having fun while doing so is the most important thing to keep in mind. Have a good time during the campaigning actions, learn from the inside negotiations, do enjoyable things with the campaigning group, also outside the campaign. And… remember to stay as positive as possible!