2005 TOUR REPORT:

Common Threats, Joint Responses

A publication of the University of British Columbia International Relations Students Association
“The essential qualities of a true Pan-Americanism must be the same as those which constitute a good neighbour, namely mutual understanding and… a sympathetic appreciation of the other's point of view.”

-Franklin Delano Roosevelt
This report was prepared by members of the University of British Columbia (UBC) International Relations Students Association (IRSA) between July and September of 2005. The observations of the group were compiled into this report by Milan Ilnyckyj.

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1. Letter of Introduction: Dr. Allen Sens

Dear Friends:

My name is Allen Sens and I am the Chair of the International Relations Program and a Senior Instructor in the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia (UBC). In my additional capacity as Director of the Security and Defence Forum at the Centre of International Relations, it brings me great pleasure to write this letter of introduction for the “Common Threats, Shared Responses” report, detailing a visit made by our students to military facilities in Colorado Springs.

The North American Security Cooperation Assessment (NASCA) student tour is an initiative conceptualized and executed entirely by members of the International Relations Students Association (IRSA). Since 1983, this student organization has made an extraordinary contribution to the study and debate of global issues at UBC, engaging in a wide range of educational and policy-related activities. Among these activities are the faculty-refereed UBC Journal of International Affairs, an annual UBC Model United Nations, and delegation visits to other Model UN and Model NATO conferences beyond Canada. The NASCA student tour is merely the latest of IRSA’s activities that provides an invaluable supplement to learning in the classroom.

The security and prosperity of the United States and Canada have always been interdependent. Throughout the Cold War, joint institutions such as the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) served the purpose of keeping our nations safe from a nuclear attack. In the past fifteen years, joint defence institutions have been obliged to adapt and restructure their operations to meet new and emerging threats posed by rogue states and terrorism. In this report, IRSA has done an exceptional job documenting this change.

As members of an entirely independent student association, those who participated in the NASCA tour have demonstrated critical analytical capabilities and an advanced capacity for policy-related arguments. I believe that the recommendations contained in this report could not have been possible if it were not for the curiosity that drives IRSA students to seek answers to their questions beyond the lecture hall, even when it means driving for five days.

The IR Program and the Centre of International Relations support IRSA in every way we can. We are happy to be a part of this trip, and further appreciate the generous support of the
Department of National Defence in this valuable venture. I hope that you will consider the students’ views seriously, as they truly are the leaders of tomorrow.

Sincerely,

Allen Sens, PhD
Chair
International Relations Program
Department of Political Science
University of British Columbia
Dear Friends:

I am pleased to present the report from our North American Security Cooperation Assessment Student Tour (NASCA). The following pages are the result of an initiative conceptualized and executed in its entirety by students of the University of British Columbia (UBC). Student initiatives such as NASCA are at the forefront of direct student engagement in global politics. Accordingly, NASCA is a formidable result of partnerships between those in the public sector and student organizations such as the UBC International Relations Students Association (IRSA). The impressive amount of experience gained by our group was made possible by the interest, support, and guidance of dedicated men and women at various agencies in Canada and the United States alike.

Over the course of our university careers, we have seen some dramatic changes in the way that our security is represented both within and outside of the classroom. Inevitably, concerns over transnational terrorist networks, rogue states, and the general concept of ‘Homeland Security’ have dominated the discourse surrounding North American security. More than ever, the vital economic interdependence throughout the continent demands that students of International Relations gain a critical understanding of the complex issues that accompany the defense of North America.

The opportunity to come face-to-face with unique institutions such as NORAD and its innovative bi-national command structure has been an unforgettable experience. In this report, the reader will find more than mere descriptions of the numerous informational briefings we received. The report outlines the questions raised during our extensive discussions and, ultimately, our policy recommendations generated with our first-hand experience fresh in our memories. As the Canada-US defence relationship continues to evolve, it is our hope that various stakeholders in North American defence will take a look through this report, a testament to student analysis and engagement.

I wish to thank Maj. General Paul Sullivan, Chief of Staff of NORAD/USNORTHCOM, for his direct manner and the eloquence of his responses. We appreciated the presence of Brig. General Mark McQuillan, the Canadian Liaison to USNORTHCOM, whose position itself is a testament to the inherent importance of cooperation and consultation. Furthermore, we would like to thank the helpful trio of Canadian Forces Majors (Audette, Bangsboll, and Daly) that
accompanied us throughout our visits and provided insight into the military of an unprecedented kind. The briefings from US SPACECOM and the Bi-National Planning Group also play a prominent role in our considerations. On the civilian side, Marissa Maurer, Political and Economic Officer of the United States Consulate General in Vancouver, provided the tour with the best kind of start. Our gratefulness is similarly extended to Dr. Allen Sens of the UBC Centre of International Relations/International Relations Program for his mentorship and support. Finally, our hearts and wallets express considerable gratitude to the Department of National Defence, particularly Aaron Hywarren, Rachel Boyer, Phillipe Lafortune, and Lt Andria Ink.

The remarkable individuals that we encountered throughout our tour demonstrated a candour and openness that reaffirmed our desire to understand the complexities found at the practical level of continental security. Their assistance and in-depth explanations were the perfect complement to the pedagogical foundations that we receive at our Point Grey campus. I hope that our colleagues at UBC and elsewhere find this report useful as a foundation for discussion in the near future.

Sincerely,

Fernando de la Mora
President
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1. Executive Summary

The North American Security Cooperation Assessment (NASCA) 2005 Student Tour consisted of nine current students or recent graduates of the University of British Columbia traveling to Colorado Springs in order to be briefed at and tour the:

- North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD),
- United States Air Force Space Command (SPACECOM),
- United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM),
- Bi-National Planning Group (BPG),

In preparation for the visit to Colorado Springs, the group also took part in briefings with the:

- United States Consulate General in Vancouver,
- and the Department of National Defence (DND) Pacific Region Public Affairs Office.

On the basis of the excursion, as well as briefings in Vancouver prior to departing for Colorado and internal discussions within the group, we recorded observations and developed policy recommendations.

The report has been divided into two substantive sections: one describing the observations and reactions of the group members and another distilling those experiences, through discussion and consideration, into policy recommendations. Both sections integrate varied responses, with an eye to maintaining a high overall level of coherence and comprehensibility.

i) Observations:

**NORAD's New Roles**

NORAD can correctly be seen as the keystone of our expedition, just as it has been a keystone of North American security cooperation since its creation in the 1950s. Despite its long operational life, NORAD has not lost its importance in a world where both Canada and the United States face threats which it has evolved to address. In particular, the group recognized the importance of considering and defending against emerging threats to North American security.

Throughout the trip, the NASCA team maintained a profound concern about the dangers posed by nuclear weapons: both those already in the possession of states and those which could potentially be acquired by additional states or non-state actors. In the event of a nuclear attack, it is of enormous importance to make a fast and accurate judgment about the origin and, if possible, the extent to which the attack was intentional and authorized. As an institution with an essential role to play in detection and verification, NORAD maintains a critical importance.

NORAD's new role in tracking civilian aviation within North America is a clear demonstration of the kind of integration which has been necessary to develop between different branches of both North American governments and militaries. While responding effectively to threats that have manifested themselves in the past is an important defence role, it must be done alongside the consideration of what manner of threat is likely to arise in the future. In that context, forward-thinking defence planning is welcome.

**NORAD and Ballistic Missile Defence**

One surprising feature of the trip was the contrast between the level of drama accorded to Canada's rejection of BMD by the media and the reactions of the individuals most closely associated with the project. While there was certainly a general sense that Canada should take part – and a specific sense that it should have expressed its determination not to do so in a more appropriate way – military officers from both nations stressed the extent to which the political decision has not impeded their ability to work together.

Canada's participation, such as it exists, consists of NORAD passing telemetric data to the BMD command at USNORTHCOM, under the terms of the amended NORAD agreement. The sense within the group is that this is an acceptable role for NORAD and in keeping with its ongoing defensive character. Providing such information is also an important mechanism for perpetuating the importance of NORAD as a hub of bi-national planning and understanding.

The group was surprised by the apparent lack of political agreements with regards to the operation of a BMD system in a way that would directly impact and involve Canada. Specifically, the issues of missile intercepts in Canadian airspace and planned responses to an attack on Canada should be discussed and jointly decided upon. The group was also concerned about the long-term strategic implications of BMD: particularly the danger of arms races inherent to the development of new and potentially destabilizing technologies.

**Military Culture**

One of the most enlightening aspects of the NASCA trip was the opportunity to engage in direct and candid conversation with members of both armed forces. Their comments and way of thinking were reflective of military cultures that are, in many ways, more similar to one another than either is to the respective national political discourses. In particular, a general sense of soldierly camaraderie and respect was pervasive and served to partly negate worries about political decision making souring military-to-military relations between the United States and Canada. The openness
and helpfulness of officers from both nations contributed in an invaluable way to our understanding of the matters under discussion and our ability to make suggestions about them. Likewise, the group applauds the commitment of both militaries to the highest ideals of our respective societies, and their willingness to bear such incredible personal risk in order to uphold those values.

While some aspects of the military culture were anticipated, such as the prominence of military industry in Colorado Springs, others, such as the surprisingly religious character of the Air Force Academy tour, were unexpected. One area that, while largely expected, was still worrisome relates to the secondary importance that was sometimes given to the political and legal ramifications of tactical and strategic decisions. While the military is not an organization that is generally focused upon developing and maintaining a rules-based international order, the development and maintenance of such systems is a crucial component of security, not just for North America, but for the world. The relationship between projects like BMD and international regimes such as that focused around non-proliferation are important and deserving of thorough consideration at the highest levels of decision making.

**Bi-National Planning: USNORTHCOM, CANCOM, and the BPG**

The NASCA team was impressed by the extensive progress that has been made by the BPG since its inception in 2002. The group felt that the BPG could be a profitable model for other initiatives seeking to develop effective bi-national policies. Also, the group appreciates the multi-dimensional character of the Terms of Reference of the BPG and the manner in which they have been met.

The group saw particular value in investments made in response capabilities that can be employed both in the event of an attack and in the event of natural disasters. Given the irrelevance of the border to the broad impacts of both of those types of events, bilateral coordination on the matter is likely a prudent and effective use of resources. Dealing with all probable forms of potential catastrophe is the most efficient means of using available resources.

**Unexamined Areas of Interest**

While a comprehensive survey of Canada - United States defence cooperation clearly far exceeds the capabilities of the NASCA expedition, there were several areas of interest which IRSA will seek to incorporate into future assessments. Among those would have been briefings and discussions with the United States Strategic Command - which is charged with the American nuclear arsenal - as well as the relevant intelligence services and border personnel. Also valuable would have
been discussions with personnel from the Department of Homeland Security, as well as law enforcement emergency preparedness organizations. Having a greater opportunity to examine the command areas of NORAD would also have been ideal.

ii) Policy Proposals

General Concepts

The NASCA group felt that there is an over-arching importance in maintaining a proper level of perspective when engaging in security decision making. Threats must be accurately assessed and the broad consequences of steps taken to mitigate them should be impartially examined in keeping with national values and ethics. There was a broad feeling within the group that Canada's policies with regards to things like information sharing and extradition should reflect our longstanding commitment to human rights and international norms of conduct. NASCA appreciates the leading role that the Unites States has played internationally in developing such norms. The NASCA group encourages efforts to maintain discussion about such matters between the two nations.

The group recognized the importance of Canada's enormous level of trade with the United States with regards to security policy. Clearly, it is of critical importance to prevent any terrorist attack from taking place in the United States through Canada: an occurrence that would risk seriously jeopardizing good political and trade relations between the states. At the same time, the group recognized the importance of avoiding security policies that are simply meant to provide bureaucratic or political cover, particularly when such policies deflect funding and attention from more effective alternatives. Public dialogue is an important mechanism for distinguishing sound security investments from hastily assessed threats.

Lastly, while the North American continent has long been an area that it has made sense to defend as a collective, Canada should not lose sight of its broader commitments, nor the importance of overall global security to Canadian prosperity and stability. At the same time as our physical isolation is no longer a guarantee of physical safety, it must be recalled that other threats, such as poverty and disease, continue to inflict upon the world suffering orders of magnitude worse than the grim costs of terrorism.

Aerospace Defence

The specific issues of potential ICBM intercepts in Canadian airspace should be publicly discussed and clear policies put in place with respect to them. Otherwise, uncertainty could lead to problematic decision making in the event of a crisis. In spite of the level of controversy that will
likely attach itself to such discussions, the importance of having a policy openly in place justifies
overcoming the associated obstacles.

More generally, the group felt an aversion to the development of new nuclear-related
weapons systems that risk undermining the international non-proliferation regime founded upon
international norms and law. The group felt that the differing skills and perspectives of the United
States and Canada could be fortuitously combined in the search for functional solutions to the
worrisome trend towards further nuclear weaponization.

Maritime Security

The group approved of efforts being made by NORAD, the BPG, and other organizations
to catalog and address maritime threats to North American security. In particular, the group felt that
the effective integration of maritime security into NORAD is a worthwhile objective. It is important
that such integration be done in a way that does not detract from NORAD’s current effectiveness at
filling its traditional roles. The group felt that, given the capabilities of terrorist groups, the
probability of attacks against North America being delivered by a maritime route is greater than the
threat of such attacks taking place by means of ballistic missiles.

Oversight

When operating domestically, the superior resources and capabilities of the military must be
accompanied by a high level of transparency and civilian oversight. This is particularly important
given the gradual introduction of military operations within North America, as a means of
addressing contemporary threats. If the armed forces are to take over roles from law enforcement,
or complement law enforcement agencies within those roles, they must be subject to the same
expectations of accountability as civilian agencies would be. Without openness, it is impossible for
citizens to assess the desirability or justifiability of measures being put in place for their benefit: a
serious erosion of the democratic system and a situation would risk making poor trade-offs between
increased security and other values.

In particular, the group viewed with suspicion the increasing trend towards using secrecy as
an automatic security tactic. While secrecy clearly has an important role to play in some aspects of
security, it cannot be relied upon as a robust strategy in a world where information flows ever more
freely. Nor can it be unhesitatingly tolerated within free and democratic societies subject to civilian
oversight and the rule of law. The abandonment of such principles would represent a concerning
retreat in the face of terrorism.
Further Study

Both formal and informal links between the military, academic, policy, and other communities within the United States and Canada have a value in introducing new perspectives and ideas into ongoing policy discussions. Wherever possible, such groups should have access to the information that is necessary for prudent decision making: an accurate conception of the threats being contended with and the responses being contemplated. Such a culture of disclosure has the virtue of strengthening the democratic system, as well as offering the chance for greater imagination to be injected into a planning system that has dangerously lacked such a facility in the recent past. While terrorist organizations have shown themselves able to exploit the freedoms of open societies, the fear of terrorism should not drive us to undermine them. The strength of nations based on open discourse and public accountability can likewise serve as a great asset in the search for greater security, rather than the liability that it can sometimes appear to be, *prima facie*. 
2. Introduction

Regardless of specialization, students of international relations will always find themselves debating and evaluating matters of security – a situation extended and reinforced in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. For Canadians, such as the NASCA team, such questions generally revolve around our relationship with our great southern neighbour. It was therefore for the purpose of deepening understanding through direct experience that this trip was undertaken.

a) Assessment Summary

The North American Security Cooperation Assessment (NASCA) Student Tour took place during July and August of 2005 and was largely made possible through funding from the Security and Defence Forum (SDF) of the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND). The NASCA team consisted of nine current students or recent graduates of the University of British Columbia (UBC): all present or former members of the UBC International Relations Students’ Association (IRSA). The purpose of the assessment was to increase understanding about the present character of Canadian-American security and defence cooperation and to develop policy prescriptions.

To that end, the group initially participated in a pair of briefings in Vancouver, British Columbia on the 21st of July 2005. The first was with Marissa Maurer: Political and Economic Officer for the United States Consulate-General in Vancouver. On the same day, the group also met with Lt. Navy Andria Ink, Public Affairs Officer for DND. The meetings helped to establish the purpose and structure of the expedition and gain a better understanding of the background of the issues to be examined.

The main familiarization portion of the assessment took place between August 13th and 17th, during which the group drove from Vancouver to Colorado Springs and took part in a series of briefings and tours of both bi-national and American facilities and commands. On August 15th, the group attended a briefing at the United States Air Force Space Command (SPACECOM), followed closely by another at the neighbouring North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) / United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) headquarters. The group attended a briefing on the Bi-National Planning Group (BPG) presented by Dr. Biff Baker, followed by a lunch with Majors Brook Bangsball and Daniel Daly of the Canadian Forces. That afternoon, the group visited the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Centre (CMOC): receiving a briefing prior to entry and a second inside the facility, as well as a tour. The following day, the group toured the
United States Air Force Academy, in the company of Canadian Forces Majors Mike Audette and Brook Bangsboll.

Along with the prior research and the internal discussions of the group, these tours and briefings form the basis of our recommendations.

b) Purpose

Sharing a vast continent, the United States and Canada have a bilateral relationship of unrivaled comprehensiveness and importance. Illustrating that fact, when the Bi-National Planning Group (BPG) began its work in the aftermath of September 11th, they found it necessary to create an electronic database of the hundreds of existing bi-national security agreements. Among those, some relevant to contemporary security issues are over one hundred years old. As security concerns continue to dominate policy making on both sides of the border, the many facets of that relationship remain critically in need of understanding and examination. It was with an eye to accomplishing a small part of that project that our group traveled to Colorado Springs, where some of the most concrete manifestations of bi-national military planning are on display.

Rather than existing as an issue area itself, the Canada-US border is more appropriately seen as the very foundation of our unique political and defence position. Neither natural disasters nor the broad effects of an attack respect the international boundary, and yet its existence is the product of neighbouring sovereignties and political systems that may not always perceive threats identically, nor select identical means of avoiding and responding to them. The dynamics of that duality continue to define North American defence relations. The modern structure of bi-national defence relations dates back to critical agreements of the second world war, strengthened and changed in focus by the long anxiousness of the cold war, and granted renewed vigour and visibility with the rise of mass terrorism in the developed world. Understanding how each nation perceives threats, on a governmental as well as a societal level, as well as the institutional structures that exist to combat them, is a necessary precursor to effective cooperation.

The observations and conclusions of this report derive directly from the on-the-ground experiences that the team members had during August of 2005. To attempt a comprehensive review of the history of bi-national relations or even the current literature on the subject far exceeds the
scope of this initiative. Instead, our intention was to gain insight through immersion into an environment quite different in atmosphere and perspective from the academic world. Indeed, one of the major lessons of the trip relates to the differing thinking and argumentative strategies employed respectively by academics, military personnel, and politicians. For example, the perspectives offered on the weaponization of space by the United States Consulate in Vancouver and the Air Force Space Command in Colorado Springs differed considerably in tone and approach. Each of the above three perspectives clearly has an importance for the practical and theoretical characteristics of the Canada-US relationship and each has a role to play in the development of that relationship.

The major topics that the group examined and discussed include the changing mission and relevance of NORAD after the end of the cold war and the attacks of September 11th. They also include the ongoing efforts to expand NORAD to address maritime threats, as well as the more general focus that is emerging in both countries upon maritime security. The group examined similarities and differences in military culture between members of the Canadian and American forces, as well as the differences that exist between military thinking generally and that of the academic and policy communities. The issue of bi-national planning was extensively examined and areas deserving of further study were identified. Within each issue area, policy suggestions were made and debated.

One topic - ballistic missile defence - has received extensive media and political coverage in the context of US-Canada relations. As such, it can be both a useful barometer for understanding the respective characters of American and Canadian thinking and a potentially deceiving magnification of those same national personalities. Learning about the efforts of planners on both sides of the border, one cannot help being overwhelmed by the amount of work that gets done largely unannounced and unnoticed; an excessive focus on contentious or inflammatory matters therefore risks distorting the overall picture. Still, the NASCA team felt compelled to report upon several important elements of the BMD debate, particularly as Canada’s national interests and the broad strategic ramifications of missile defence are concerned.

One’s position with regards to the United States is very much an identity issue in Canada. In many ways, that reflects the disproportionate levels of world influence in Canada and its southern neighbour. Particularly for students of world politics, who are under greater pressure than most to adopt a comprehensive stance with regards to bilateral relations, there is a considerable value in direct exposure to the people and institutions that are actually shaping the living relationship between these two states. The empathy that can be derived from such contact has the potential to
serve as the basis for future cooperation and mutual respect. While it can be easy to caricature and over-simplify an issue from a distance - an academic distance, particularly - immersion into the heart of it has revealed unexpected subtleties and commonalities.

3. Observations

Arranged thematically, the following section details the elements of the defence relationship examined and discussed by the group members. Each area has long-term relevance to Canadian policy making.

a) NORAD's New Roles

A long-standing pillar of the Canadian-US defence relationship, NORAD maintains its traditional importance while simultaneously expanding into new roles. While the potential of NORAD to address the threat of terrorism, examine maritime security issues, and participate in the international fight against illegal drugs was recognized, there was agreement within the group that its traditional role of aerospace tracking and warning has not been eclipsed by recent developments in the international political and strategic climate. NORAD therefore has opportunities to continue serving both its operational and supplemental roles (such as encouraging the interchange of personnel and dialogue between Canada and the United States) while simultaneously developing into new and pressing defence areas.

The point was made many times that, while NORAD has worked extensively to increase the security of North American domestic airspace after September 11th, there is a persistent danger in security planning of ‘re-fighting the last war’ or re-preparing for the last attack. While there is clearly great importance attached to protecting domestic air traffic and averting terrorist scenarios similar to that of September 11th, it must be done with the awareness that terrorists are likely to strike where we are weakest, and in ways that have not been anticipated. Given the enormous variety of targets that exist for terrorists,
intelligent planning must operate on the belief that attackers will exploit the weak-points in a system. As such, there is a limited usefulness in fortifying one potential target while ignoring others. The increasing focus at NORAD and within the BPG towards maritime defence cooperation represents an important effort to respond to threats that have not yet manifested themselves. As students of international relations, we applaud this forward-thinking method for addressing terrorist threats.

As was acknowledged by Major-General Sullivan during the NORAD / USNORTHCOM briefing, between the proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and the decline in Russian military capability since the end of the cold war, there is a tangible and deeply concerning danger of accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch either by or against the United States. That danger has, for instance, been highlighted recently by former Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, through his writing in *Foreign Policy*. In such a climate, the detection and authentication role of NORAD remains a crucial part of the decision making process. Considerable attention was paid by the various commands to the importance of proper verification techniques: particularly the ‘dual phenomenology’ approach of confirming launches using both infrared satellites and RADAR. While such an approach greatly diminishes the danger of a computer error in one system leading to decision making based on faulty data, it does not offer a mechanism for distinguishing intentional, authorized launches from other varieties. The difficulty of making that distinction was acknowledged and emphasized at the briefing. In the group’s opinion, a broad system of threat assessment should also include consideration for the dangers posed by the maintenance of 4500 nuclear warheads on fifteen minute alert by the United States, with 3800 comparable weapons in Russia. That such a stance persists so long after the end of the cold war represents a dangerous anachronism and a threat to Canada and the world which ought not be discounted.

Clearly, a major component of the rearrangement of NORAD after September 11th has been the new focus on monitoring civilian air traffic, as well as the new computer links with the Federal Air Administration (FAA) and Navigation Canada (NAVCAN) tracking systems. Equally important, clear operational procedures now exist with regard to actions that should be taken in the event of suspected and confirmed hijackings, including the potential use of force. Given the likelihood that such situations would require immediate decisions, or could take place during chaotic circumstances, the importance of a clearly delineated chain of command is critical. The enormity of the institutional changes that followed September 11th were highlighted for the group through the experience of walking through NORAD / USNORTHCOM Headquarters, which has exhibits throughout that highlight the continuing relevance of the September 11th attacks to their current operational focus.
b) NORAD and Ballistic Missile Defence

From the beginning, Canada’s choice to reject participation in the American BMD system formed an important backdrop to NASCA. The group was concerned about the effect that choice would have upon military-to-military relations, the relevance of NORAD, and North American security cooperation more broadly. The issue for us was less about the wisdom or lack thereof in making the choice and more about the ultimate ramifications the choice will have for Canadian security and sovereignty. The group’s experiences, over the course of NASCA, both reduced our concerns in some areas and introduced new ones in others: a demonstration of how even a thorough examination of media coverage and recent academic discussion cannot confer an entirely comprehensive understanding of a subject.

Several members of the group were initially surprised to learn, during the course of preliminary research, that while Canada has very publicly declared its non-participation in the American ballistic missile defence (BMD) system, the NORAD agreement has been amended so that telemetric data on missiles which would be targeted by that system will be automatically passed to the BMD command that is part of USNORTHCOM and located inside the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Centre (CMOC). While it may be politically inexpedient to say so, Canada is – in an important sense – taking part in the emerging American missile defence system. The group recognizes that this participation is happening in the context of Canada’s traditional roles within NORAD of detection and defence. The consensus within the group was that such information sharing is an acceptable role for NORAD and an important means of maintaining the relevance of the bi-national military command. There was concern that if such information sharing had not been permitted, there would have been a need on the American side to duplicate many of the functions of NORAD within a structure linked to BMD at the exclusion of Canada. By averting the need for such a step, the amendment to the NORAD agreement can therefore be seen as a prudent mechanism for maintaining Canadian relevance and input in a crucial North American defence forum.

Another major surprise for the group came in the form of hesitant and contradictory responses about what action would be taken by BMD command in the case of an impending missile attack upon Canada. Members of the group realize that this is a contentious topic area that is rarely addressed. Different American officers questioned on the matter responded by saying, respectively, that the United States would probably attempt to shoot down such a missile, without consulting Canada, and that they probably would not. When questioned on the matter, Major-General Sullivan
Chief of Staff for both NORAD and USNORTHCOM – aptly represented that there are no political agreements in place on which to base a clear tactical response. In the view of the group, this is a troubling ambiguity and a matter that ought to be clarified. Given that many of the people consulted on this matter were operationally involved with NORAD and/or BMD, it is particularly important that they did not seem to have a clear policy on the matter in place. Potentially of relevance to Canadian policy makers is the position expressed at the US Consulate General that the lack of political and diplomatic dialogue on this matter has contributed to the extent to which it is seen as a military decision.

There was concern within the group about the medium and long-term strategic ramifications of the United States deploying a BMD system in addition to its already overwhelming conventional and nuclear military capacity. As Major-General Sullivan stressed at the NORAD / USNORTHCOM briefing, the United States is already in possession of all the offensive military capability it requires. While the many individuals approached about the matter by members of NASCA stressed the defensive nature of the system, there was a general sense within the group that adequate attention had not been paid to the perceptions of other nations, especially China, about the nature and importance of the system. Several individuals acknowledged the danger of an arms race developing in the area of ballistic missiles and space weaponry, but there was not an overall sense that such concerns were informing policy to a significant extent. While strategic considerations may not directly affect the planning of the people with whom we spoke, there was clearly a geo-strategic perspective that formed the basis of their thinking. It’s telling, for instance, that every hypothetical missile attack mentioned originated in North Korea – a state which has been described to American officers for the past 25 years as dangerous and likely to attack at any time, according to what we were told during the NORAD / USNORTHCOM briefing.

Members of both militaries expressed a vague and suppressed frustration with regards to the manner in which Canada made known its decision not to participate in BMD. After discussing a common defence system in 2003 and exchanging letters of intent on the matter in 2004, the declaration in early 2005 that Canada would not participate may represent a disjoint between military forums where cooperation is being advanced in a more automatic way and political forums where such developments are more subject to public and media pressure, and where decisions are likely to have electoral consequences. In general, however, there was recognition among military staff on both sides that the Canadian Forces are ultimately bound by civilian decision making and that
mutual respect and camaraderie between the armed forces of both nations has diminished any potential negative operational impact of the choice.

c) Military Culture

To a group of students, the thinking and deliberation processes of the military have an unfamiliar character. There was widespread appreciation within the group of the high level of candour and disclosure that was displayed by forces from both nations. Their comments and insights have been invaluable in our increased understanding of the matters at hand and our ability to advise the Canadian government on that basis. The group frequently identified the benefits of observing official statements in the briefings alongside comments made by individuals in their private capacity. Often, personal conversations between NASCA members and the officers we met provided important background and insights. Such communication represents one reason why the kind of direct investigation that this trip represented has a value in fostering greater bi-national understanding.

In several instances, the approach taken by military personnel in discussing matters of concern and means for responding to them was highly unfamiliar. In particular, the group found that the strident declarations and heavy technological focus of the Space Command briefing to be alienating and difficult to comprehend. It alluded strongly to the connections that exist between the American military and large corporations that play an increasingly crucial and extensive role in its operations: particularly in the areas of weapons development, testing, and assessment. It is worth noting, for instance, how the security guards at NORAD headquarters (distinct from CMOC) are members of a private firm. Staying in a hotel literally surrounded by buildings owned by companies like Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman was a reminder of the huge contribution such firms make to the economies of Colorado Springs and similar American cities. As Major Bangsboll explained, more than 20% of the population of Colorado Springs is employed either in the military directly or in military firms. Likewise, in response to a question during the group's tour of the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Centre, the close operational relationship between that facility and the firms that provide it with equipment and myriad technical serviced was confirmed.

In a related observation, the overtly religious character of the Air Force Academy tour was unexpected and represented, to many group members, one of the important general differences that exists between an American populace and political structure increasingly informed by religious values and a Canadian equivalent that is arguably more secular in its outlook and politics. The video introduction to the Academy included a heavy focus on the multi-denominational chapel that
dominated the image that the Academy presented to us. Likewise, the tour did not include any instructional or student areas, but included visits to the three major portions of that building, which was also pictured extensively on the goods available in the Academy’s gift shop. One group member’s recollection of the character of the West Point Military Academy, as it was in the winter of 2004, established that some of the more unexpected features of the Air Force Academy are not universal among American officer training systems. The prominence of the chapel, as part of the tour, underscored the centrality of religion that can exist at times of war. It also demonstrated that culture reflects what may be diverging values within the bi-national relationship.

Both Canadians and Americans expressed a view that, in military to military relations, a sense of soldierly camaraderie often supercedes any tensions that may arise as the consequence of political decision making. Dr. Baker, for instance, expressed how his respect for the Canadian officer present at the BPG briefing was best expressed in terms of being willing to go to war with him. Such a perspective could be said to serve Canada well in an era when the Canadian lack of capability (especially in such crucial areas as strategic lift) is widely known and criticized in the United States. Both Canadian and American officers claimed that their working relations were not damaged as the consequence of Canada’s choice not to participate in the American ballistic missile defence system. As Major-General Sullivan stressed during the USNORTHCOM briefing, the role of the military is necessarily and properly subsidiary to civilian government. As such, there is a kind of insulation that exists between political and diplomatic choices and the direct relationships that exist between the respective armed forces.

Another important aspect of military thinking relates to the secondary importance that was often given to the political and legal ramifications of tactical and strategic choices. The group noted with interest that the Space Command briefing included passing references to international law (attributing the lack of over-flight restrictions on satellites to America not protesting Sputnik passing through its airspace in 1957). Nevertheless, the position established with regards to interceptors passing through the airspace of other countries and the possibility of debris from an intercepted
missile falling into them was that such occurrences would be the expected but unintentional consequences of a successful ‘kinetic kill’ intercept. In both Canada and the United States, there can be a disjoint between operational logic on the tactical level and the demands of political and legal reality. The group in general thought this perspective was reflective of the relative importance attributed to international law in the United States and Canada. Overall, the American choice to rely upon technological solutions to the problem of proliferation reflects a lack of confidence in legal instruments like the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). There was concern within the group that such a shift in focus could have undesirable consequences, particularly in the form of geo-strategic tensions and the possible undermining of the non-proliferation regime through potential arms races.

In conclusion, the entire NASCA group was grateful for the hospitality and openness displayed by members of both militaries: a situation that demonstrates the extent of shared values and goodwill between Canada and the United States. In particular, the group appreciated the number and caliber of personnel who attended the NORAD / USNORTHCOM briefing and their interest in providing the best possible answers to our questions. The clock on the wall of that briefing room showing Iraqi time was an unambiguous reminder of how pressing the other commitments of American officers at the moment are. The group is also grateful for the resources provided by both the Canadian Department of National Defence and the United States Department of Defense, without which the trip would not have been possible. Finally, the company and information provided by Majors Audette, Bangsboll, and Daly of the Canadian Forces was invaluable for deepening our overall perspective.

### d) Bi-National Planning: USNORTHCOM, CANCOM, and the BPG

There was a strong consensus within the group that in the time from its establishment in 2002 to the present, the Bi-National Planning Group (BPG) has accomplished an astonishing amount. Given the simultaneous re-organizations of related agencies (for instance, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, the United States Northern Command, and Canada Command), the impressiveness of that progress is highlighted even as its importance is demonstrated. The creation of the two military commands, in particular, marks the shift to seeing North America as a potential theatre of operations for military personnel. There was a sense within the group that while the BPG may have “worked itself out of a job” by accomplishing the objectives set out in its Terms of Reference, there is an ongoing need for such forums to deal with the complex questions that surround bi-national security planning. The
group felt that the BPG reflected the kind of collaboration that has formed the most positive part of our bi-national defence relationship since the second world war.

The creation of the United States Northern Command, with the mandate to coordinate military operation within territory including that of Canada, is understandably worrisome to many Canadians. The importance of having a Canadian liaison to USNORTHCOM is therefore considerable, as is general cooperation between USNORTHCOM and various Canadian institutions charged with security. The group welcomed the presence of a Canadian liaison at USNORTHCOM as well as plans for an American counterpart at CANCOM. In addition, the emergence of a Canada Command with the same operational area as USNORTHCOM provides a comforting symmetry within the defence relationship. Within societies maintained and operated by civil institutions backed by democratic mandates, the importance of keeping the armed forces in a subsidiary role, as an aid to the civil power rather than an unconstrained decision maker in its own right, was thankfully acknowledged by members of the armed forces from both nations. The group felt that the joint exercises which are planned, as well as those which have already taken place, demonstrate a laudably forward-looking approach to defence planning, as well as an important mechanism to test existing interoperability and communication, with a view to making improvements. The specific example of the Conceptual Operations Plan 2000 (CONPLAN 2000) demonstrates some of the important ramifications of that new way of responding to incidents. For instance, the inclusion of military forces and private sector actors in plans that would previously have been grounded exclusively in civilian institutions raises both new possibilities for improved security and new concerns, with regard to matters such as oversight and the chain of command.

Investment in capability for responding to terrorist attacks carries the significant benefit that it can also be used in response to other forms of calamity: such as the ice storms that caused such damage and suffering in Ontario and Quebec, the hurricanes which annually strike the American southeast coast, an outbreak of influenza, the unpredictable consequences of environmental degradation, or the long-anticipated major earthquake on the west coast of North America. A similar dynamic exists with regards to how NORAD’s tracking RADARs can also be used to monitor space debris and advise the Space Shuttle on course corrections to reduce the likelihood of impacts. In short, investment in response capabilities that have applicability in multiple areas has the potential to create greater value for any set level of investment. Given the aforementioned irrelevance of political boundaries to many kinds of disasters, the development of joint strategies for addressing these
dangers represents a prudent mechanism for avoiding confusion and delay should any such disaster take place.

e) Unexamined Areas of Interest

A number of critical facets of the Canadian-US defence relationship were not adequately observed by the group to develop specific policy prescriptions. There was a feeling among many group members that the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM), which is in charge of all American nuclear weapons and plays a crucial role in nuclear strategy, was a kind of ‘elephant in the room’ throughout the trip. While their name and logo appeared frequently in briefings, no direct reference was made and there was no opportunity for NASCA members to speak with STRATCOM personnel. In particular, they could probably have most adequately addressed the issue of the probable effect of the development and deployment of BMD on Sino-American relations. When asked about how China (with a ballistic missile force of less than forty missiles capable of reaching the United States, according to CIA estimates) would respond to the development of a BMD system meant to target rogue states, Major-General Sullivan indicated the issue to be the responsibility of another command. Given the extent to which the development of both offensive and defensive nuclear-related technologies has a major effect on the world strategic balance, the question of BMD must be approached in the context of the broader international ramifications of that decision: ramifications which the group was unable to get an adequate grounding in over the course of the trip to make adequate recommendations based on direct experience.

While NASCA had a heavily military focus, it is clear to all members of the group that bilateral security cooperation has many other dimensions. For instance, while reference was made in the BPG briefing, and in the materials provided there, to intelligence cooperation and information sharing between the United States and Canada, the issue was not sufficiently developed to be adequately addressed in this report. The general sense of group members is that Canada’s policies with regards to information sharing and especially the extradition of suspected terrorists should reflect our longstanding commitment to human rights and the rule of law. Another issue identified in group discussions is the distinction between intelligence sharing that takes place automatically, though pre-configured pathways, and the kind that is shared in discretionary fashion. Warning data from NORAD is an example of the former sort, while human intelligence acquired at an embassy would be an example of the latter. Dr. Baker mentioned, during the BPG briefing, how one task accomplished by that group was the development of a software bridge so that secret computers in Canada and the United States can interoperate. Also mentioned was a very recent Presidential order
calling for the sharing of relevant information with Canada. Clearly, this is an area where changes are being actively made. The group was generally of the opinion that Canada’s values and national interest should be kept in mind when deciding what sort of intelligence sharing systems to create with regards to different kinds of information and different organizations south of the border with whom Canada is cooperating.

While touring the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Centre (CMOC) was an unforgettable opportunity that certainly provided the group with a concrete example of the ramifications and importance of Canada-US security cooperation, the nature of that tour was restricted largely to the mechanical areas of the facility (generators, reservoirs, and the like). The group did not have the chance to see any of the command areas inside CMOC. Having the chance to do so would have given the group a much better grounding in the actual minute-to-minute operations of the centre. Likewise, while being accompanied by seventeen friends of a former NORAD commander offered a chance to observe their thinking upon issues relevant to NORAD security, a tour specifically tuned to the objectives of NASCA might have yielded greater understanding. Nevertheless, the group was satisfied to learn that the command center within CMOC was not open to them due to the classified level of information that is now displayed on the various screens within the facility. While the absence of a visit to the command center was disappointing to many, it did highlight the seriousness of CMOC’s role within North American security.

A full examination of Canada-US security relations requires understanding the issues surrounding the border: the character of immigration and other border related laws, the mechanisms of enforcement that exist for those laws, and the level of resources devoted to the issue. Particularly in areas where public and political sentiment differs on either side of the border (with regards to illegal drugs, for instance, or immigration) there is a need to balance respect for national values and sovereignty with the ever-present need for cooperation and mutual understanding. While there was initially a hope that the group would be able to meet with border personnel from both nations to expand upon these matters, it ultimately proved a logistical impossibility. There was consensus within the group that future studies would benefit from the inclusion of a specific examination of the border as a key area of United States-Canada security cooperation. Nonetheless, the focus on uniquely military aspects of the relationship provided the NASCA team with a great initial basis for the first tour by UBC students.
4. Policy Proposals

a) General Concepts

As Dr. Biff Baker highlighted in his briefing on the Bi-National Planning Group (BPG), the starting point for foreign and defence policy development must be the values and ethical standards of the nation. Particularly in the area of bilateral defence cooperation, there will be instances where the demands of greater security clash with our considered opinions about the nature of ethical conduct, both domestically and internationally. In areas where Canadian values differ from those espoused and acted upon by the United States, it is important that Canada not sacrifice key ethical positions simply to maintain good relations. Just as individuals under threat and stress can lose the ability to maintain perspective, so too can nations under attack default to extreme responses. The principled criticism of friends - coupled with genuine concern and support - can therefore serve as a mechanism to counterbalance the desire to strike back with the empathy to understand the reasoning of other decision makers and the broader context in which decisions are being made.

Many of the decisions made by diplomatic and intelligence services must be made under conditions of secrecy, which do not allow public or media oversight. As such, the group felt that it is very important for the policy guidelines that drive those decisions to be generated in keeping with Canada’s national values, laws, and international legal obligations. One specific example of potentially differing values arose many times within the group's internal discussions: the policy Canada should adopt with regards to transferring those suspected of links to terrorism to nations where there is good reason to believe that their human rights will be violated, or from which they are likely to be transferred to a third country where that is to take place. The point of the example is not for the group to endorse one policy or another with regards to that specific case, but rather that it underscores how national values must play a central role in policy making - values that may not always be given equal weighting and attention on either side of the border.

- Canada’s policy with regards to intelligence sharing should reflect the importance placed by Canadians and Canadian law upon human rights and international norms.
- Policy makers should maintain an awareness of the human rights policy and practice of nations that Canada is working with and keep such considerations in mind when making choices with regards to information sharing, extradition, and related matters.
Given the enormous dependence of Canada upon the United States as an export market, and given the increased and worrisome trend of American politicians and legislators seeing Canada as 'weak on terrorism,' the potential commercial and political consequences of an attack on the United States taking place through Canada are enormous. The Canadian government must operate in preemptive fashion to make plain that Canada stands behind our long-standing commitment - dating back to the second world war - to never allow an attack on the United States through our territory. In the event of such an attack taking place, the strongest defence for Canada would be the well-supported assertion that we had been acting in good faith and taking all justified steps to address the security concerns of our American allies. At the same time as such a strategy may seem self-evident, it is worth recalling the danger that exists of decision makers creating and enforcing security measures intended more to deflect criticism of themselves, in the event of an attack, than to actually avert or minimize the tangible impact of the attack itself. To institute security measures with the intention of merely creating the sense that greater security exists, or to provide bureaucratic cover, is not a legitimate use of resources and may well be a distraction from more effective alternatives. Maintaining openness about the measures being put in place, as well as allowing independent examination and discussion of both threats and responses, is a crucial mechanism for ensuring that an appropriate balance is being struck on matters of security. It is worth recalling that security is always a trade-off: with costs of various kinds rising to greater or lesser degrees as safeguards are created. For those safeguards to be a justified and legitimate part of a democratic society, they must be subject to public awareness and scrutiny.

- Canada should carry on with security cooperation with the United States in consideration of its capabilities and in consultation with domestic stakeholders.
  - Care should be taken to avoid measures that provide bureaucratic or political, rather than effective, security.
  - Such planning must be conducted with public awareness and civilian oversight.
  - Security must be viewed as a process of making trade-offs, which should be exposed in a transparent way.
- Dialogue on these matters should take place between as well as within Canada and the United States, within both public and private spheres.

In the aftermath of September 11th, Canadian defence thinking shifted markedly towards a continental approach to security. Even as NORAD was modifying its equipment and procedures so that it would look inward as well as out, political and military attention got redirected towards threats
facing the North American landmass and collective means for deterring, averting, and responding to them. While that shift is in many ways a rational response to a new appreciation of existing threats, it is important for a nation like Canada - with international interests, commitments, and responsibilities - not to withdraw behind coastlines. Contrasting the scale of casualties that has resulted from recent terrorist atrocities with the horrific toll of malaria and civil war in the developing world, the moral imperative to not abandon our broader obligations is clear. While homeland security is of vital importance for both nations, the long-term maintenance of that security is dependent upon an energetic strategy of promoting peace and security around the world. That strategy should rely upon the many tools that are open to policy makers in both nations: including military, commercial, development, policing, intelligence, diplomacy, and inter-cultural understanding. Within the military context, the Canadian Forces should therefore bear in mind how continental defence must rest alongside such other traditional roles as peacekeeping and peace-building in working to forge an international environment where Canadians can be secure and prosperous.

b) **Aerospace Defence**

In the group’s assessment, there are elements of the aerospace defence relationship that are in need of clarification and review. It is worrisome to the group that no policy exists operationally with regards to the scenario in which a ballistic missile attack against Canada takes place. While Canada is choosing not to participate in the missile defence system, it retains the sovereign right to control military operations taking place in its airspace. Particularly given the real danger of radioactive material from an intercepted ICBM blanketing the area beneath the intercept site, the importance of consultation with governments where such intercepts could theoretically take place seems necessary.

The NASCA group felt that greater consideration should be made of the spirit behind the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): specifically, the importance of existing nuclear states working
towards reduced arsenals. Many of the briefings in Colorado Springs demonstrated a tendency to seek technical solutions to potential problems. Canada has made the laudable decision to voluntarily forego the possession of nuclear weapons: a stance that should be the model for other states with the technological means to construct them. It is also a position in keeping with the opinion of the International Court of Justice upon the legality of nuclear weapons. The group feels that it is important to both consider the political and legal implications of new systems and technologies, particularly those involving nuclear weapons. In particular, the development of new generations of nuclear warheads is worrisome, because it demonstrates an unwillingness to reduce nuclear arsenals, in keeping with the spirit of the NPT. Likewise, it demonstrates a perceived need for ever-greater nuclear capability, at the same time as the United States and many others are trying to deny such capability to other states that occupy parts of the world far more volatile than North America.

The relationship of the United States and Canada – representing, as it does, differing strengths and approaches to international relations – could serve as an effective engine for the development of broad and effective multilateral means for addressing the questions of proliferation and working towards a safer world. For such a dynamic to emerge, consideration must be given by those on both sides of the border to the positions and thinking strategies of their neighbours, within an atmosphere of tolerance and respect. While the NASCA group recognizes the continuing strategic importance of nuclear weapons, there was a general feeling that progress should be made towards reducing, rather than enhancing, the centrality of nuclear weapons to North American defence policy. Depending upon nuclear deterrence, a strategy with very little effectiveness against non-state actors, is a non-ideal and inappropriate security paradigm for the 21st century.

- The scenario in which an imminent missile attack on Canada is detected by a BMD-linked NORAD should be debated and a clear protocol for it should be developed and publicly acknowledged.
- Strategies for addressing radiological contamination in North America should be developed and evaluated by both military and civilian experts.
- Canada and the United States should work together to address common security concerns in a manner that strengthens the non-proliferation regime by renouncing the development of new nuclear weapons of any variety.
- Canada and the United States should promote the reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons possessed by current nuclear states, with the ultimate aim of multilateral, universal nuclear disarmament.
c) Maritime Security

The problem of maritime security is a daunting one. While aircraft fly according to registered paths, carry transponders, and can be relatively easily tracked by RADAR, ships represent a tracking problem of considerably greater scale and complexity. As has been widely recognized on both sides of the border, the enormous amount of maritime trade conducted with other countries by the United States and Canada represents a major vector through which attacks could be delivered. At the same time, maritime shipping represents an important means through which illegal drugs, weapons, and smuggled human beings enter North America. It was therefore with approval that the group learned about the efforts of the BPG and NORAD to incorporate an effective strategy for maritime security into their policies and day-to-day operations. The development of such policies with respect to Canadian national interests and values should be a priority of policy makers and the Department of National Defence. In particular, maritime security is likely to raise issues of immigration, drug policy, and environmental protection.

From a security perspective, one scenario that has been raised many times is that of an attack being conducted by means of a shipping container and a chemical, nuclear, or radiological weapon. Given the small fraction of such containers that are presently inspected, the possibility that container shipping would be seen as a ‘soft target’ by terrorist groups is reasonably high. The American Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a mechanism by which ships are to be boarded in search of weapons of mass destruction. Perhaps one appropriate role for the new maritime position at NORAD would be the monitoring of PSI operations and those of similar initiatives. There was concern in the group that, while NORAD represents an impressive concentration of expertise and equipment, it should not be over-burdened with additional tasks that might diminish its ability to carry out its present missions quickly and effectively.

- The Canadian government should consider mechanisms, such as the PSI, as a means by which the risks associated with such a scenario can be minimized.
- NORAD should be careful to ensure that, while diversifying into new roles, such capacity building does not interfere with existing missions and roles.
  - A realistic awareness of the connection between capability and adequate levels of funding should be maintained.


d) Oversight

The military has access to resources and capabilities unavailable to law enforcement and other agencies of the civil power. Accessing those resources as an aid to the civil power is a valuable
option in the event of attack or disaster, but it should be recalled and understood that the civil power has the fundamental authority and legitimacy to direct and control domestic security operations. That legitimacy derives from legal and electoral accountability, on the part of civil governments. A relationship has evolved during the entire history of Canada and the United States between government, law enforcement, laws, and the courts. That relationship exists to both maintain order and protect the rule of law and the rights of individuals. While that balance is affected by the danger that exists of terrorist attack, it must be understood that legitimate concerns about such an occurrence do not supercede the importance of maintaining a power structure that has protected the citizens of North America for more than a century.

Protection of the individual from unreasonable or arbitrary power – in the hands of government and its agents – is a crucial part of the individual security of all citizens in democratic states. While terrorists have shown themselves to be capable of causing enormous harm with modest resources, the very enormity state power means that it can do great harm through errors or by failing to create and maintain proper checks on authority. There has been a worrisome trend in North America of late to empower the armed forces to intervene in traditionally civilian areas of jurisdiction, where they have sometimes been able to operate with less legal and media oversight than would have been expected of law enforcement officials. If the superior resources of the military are to be put to use, it must take place within a framework that accepts the supremacy of law and democratically elected governments. Such military participation should also serve as a fallback to civilian mechanisms, rather than the default means for dealing with dangerous situations. Training with regards to the appropriateness of the use of force can vary considerably between law enforcement agencies and the military. Likewise, the rules of engagement that come to mind when threatened might vary between the minds of police officers and soldiers. Members of NASCA expressed concern about recent circumstances where force has been used excessively and with might be considered undue haste. The danger of terrorism should not diminish the abhorrence which we rightly feel regarding violence directed against civilians by police or military.

Another common response to real and perceived terrorist threats has been a greater tendency to fall back on secrecy as an automatic security tactic. While, in some cases, secrecy is a necessary part of an effective security framework, it should be kept in mind that practices which are classified cannot be subject to public scrutiny. A security strategy based on secrecy both risks being easily undermined, in a world where information flows increasingly broadly and easily, and risks concealing policies that are harmful or ineffective. For example, banning photography in public
settings, such as the New York subway, is unlikely to achieve any reasonable anti-terrorist aim, since anyone intent on carrying out a terrorist attack would be willing to bear any conceivable penalty for violating the ban. What it does achieve is a potentially dangerous restriction on liberty. It is instructive, for instance, that following the recent deadly subway bombings in London, there was a public appeal for photographs and videos that might have been used to determine what happened. Likewise, the many photos and video recordings that have documented abuses of police and military authority in North America in the past have served important roles in protecting the public and assisting government officials in delivering justice and producing appropriate reforms. The issue is less about the specific trade-offs associated with public photography and videotaping and more about the importance of requiring that steps taken in the name of security be justified on those grounds in a public and transparent manner. Citizens who are aware of the trade-offs being made for the sake of security will be better able to participate in policy making. It will also encourage a more reasonable understanding of the extent to which security cannot be absolutely and unfailingly achieved.

Such restrictions will not impinge upon the ability of governments to develop and deploy effective security strategies. Rather, they will ensure that such strategies are examined from multiple perspectives and that the justifications for them are publicly understood.

- Military capabilities utilized for domestic security purposes must be subject to legal civilian oversight at all times.
- Military resources should be employed as a fallback, rather than a first option.
- Security measures that are put in place should, wherever possible, require public justification and debate.
- The perspective of security as a trade-off should be pro-actively presented to the public through outreach that emphasizes transparency.
- With regards to domestic defence planning, military practice reliant upon secrecy should always be subsidiary to civil and legal oversight.

e) Further Study

The experience of the NASCA team demonstrates the value that can be derived from critical examination of existing organizations and future plans by individuals from varied backgrounds. As regards an issue of such lasting and central concern as Canada’s defence relationship with the United States, the maintenance of such links – both formally and informally and within both military and
civilian structures – is a prudent mechanism for ensuring the continued health and effectiveness of that relationship. While secrecy obviously plays a part in maintaining the security of both nations, the maintenance of secrets denies the opportunity for outside review, the value of which is reflected both in its potential to raise and discuss the important and complex questions at hand and its ability to counter the dangers that exist in terms of policy making becoming captured by the interests of individuals or narrow groups. Major-General Sullivan specifically mentioned the criticism in the 9/11 report that there had been a ‘failure of imagination’ with regards to potential terrorist tactics. Averting future such failings requires more thinking resources and perspectives than the military alone can offer. Open and effective security procedures have a robustness that is actually improved through the scrutiny of interested and knowledgeable outsiders. It also has the benefit of diminishing the anxieties that may otherwise exist in the minds of foreign leaders concerned about the extent to which weapons systems and military plans are being created in light of legitimate defence concerns or for more threatening reasons.

While such a culture of disclosure is at odds with the ordinary operating procedures of the military, it is a behaviour that ought to be learnt in situations where the military is taking up an increased role in operations that would previously have been managed by law enforcement or other civilian agencies. Just as transparency and accountability are expected of police forces, so too must there exist mechanisms for civilian inquiry into and oversight of domestic security operations being conducted either by or in cooperation with the armed forces. Initiatives like the educational consortium organized by the BPG, of which UBC is a member, could play an important role in these processes.

- The United States and Canada should increase the transparency of the process by which they engage in bi-lateral defence negotiations, policy development, and operations.
  - This process should include a focus on public understanding and involvement.
- Projects undertaken by academic institutions, and other civilian research organizations should be supported, particularly as means of generating transparency in, and awareness about, the defence planning process.
5. Conclusions

Spending five days being constantly exposed to questions of bi-national security has demonstrated the enormity of the issue area. At the same time, the quality and intensity of that exposure served both to catalyze the development of specific policy directives and to encourage a general contemplation and comprehension of the broad themes involved. One behaviour that has shown itself to be critical throughout is the importance of maintaining perspective. Serious vulnerabilities need to be distinguished from fanciful ones and dealt with; limited resources must be allocated to their most productive use. Security within the North American continent must be understood as a subset of security within the world as a whole just as security considerations worldwide must be understood as a subset of the full spectrum of international involvement maintained by Canada and the United States. Fine-tuning those balances requires a great deal of mutual understanding and collaborative work: work of the kind the NASCA group saw being accomplished in Colorado Springs.

NORAD is rightly regarded as one of the key pillars of the United States – Canada security relationship. As a bi-national command operated by nations with a long history of friendship and cooperation, it is a unique and valuable institution. Members of the group found it impressive, for instance, to learn that on the morning of the September 11th attacks, it was the Canadian Lieutenant-General Rick Findley who was in command of NORAD. Working alongside Americans and Canadians, he coordinated the shutting down of American airspace and the safe landings of thousands of redirected aircraft. For such a crucial role to be played by a non-national, during a time of national crisis, would be inconceivable almost anywhere in the world. It powerfully underscores the level of mutual trust that exists between our two nations: a trust that allows us to engage in frank and comprehensive discussions and debates about the joint security initiatives we should introduce. The bi-national nature of NORAD offers an unmatched opportunity for Canadians and Americans to
work side-by-side on security matters, while simultaneously developing personal relationships and improved mutual understanding.

While the NASCA group appreciated the seriousness of American and Canadian thinking with regards to maintaining the security of North America, there as an important sense that the security dimension of policy making, both foreign and domestic, sometimes threatens to distract attention and resources from other vital concerns and obligations. While terrorism has shown itself to be a very serious threat, there is a pressing need for policy makers throughout the developed world to develop and maintain perspective. To allow terrorism to distract us from scourges such as war, poverty, and disease – which inflict an enormously larger toll upon humanity at large – is to give in to the psychological power of terror-based attacks. Likewise, to allow the fear of such attacks to erode essential protections of civil liberties and human rights is to undermine an essential part of the free societies we are trying to defend. Ultimately, the defence of citizens must include the defence of their basic rights and liberties, as well as their physical bodies. During the NORAD / USNORTHCOM briefing, Major-General Sullivan made the critical point that security always exists as a trade-off, with diminished freedom, privacy, and resources to devote to other causes being obvious costs of increased physical security. To continue to strike that balance properly requires vigorous examination of the facts, the willingness to empathize with those who are seen as threats, and the willingness to reconsider our assumptions.

Through the commitment and ingenuity of policy makers on both sides of the border, impressive progress is being made on all manner of security issues. Specific initiatives, such as increasing the involvement of NORAD in maritime security, provide concrete examples of that trend. At the same time, there must be vigilance in both nations to ensure that, in our quest for increased security, we neither forget our other obligations nor involuntarily forego the values and freedoms which we rightly treasure. Understanding the subtleties involved in that dynamic requires the kind of inquisitive and critical attention that initiatives like NASCA can provide. All members of the group are exceedingly grateful for the extent that support from both governments has assisted us in making a small contribution to that effort.
Appendix A: Biographies of Group Members

Fernando de la Mora: Trip Coordinator
Fernando de la Mora is President of the UBC International Relations Students Association and a 4th year International Relations Student. His research interests are primarily in the realm of diplomatic agenda-setting and implementation, particularly as they relate to human security, although he maintains a strong interest in other areas of international peace and security as well. He intends to pursue a diplomatic career in the Mexican Foreign Service.

Kristine Randall: Logistics Coordinator
Kristine Randall recently completed her Bachelor of Arts at the University of British Columbia with a double major in International Relations and French Linguistics. Her primary interests lie in the fields of international education and development. Kristine is currently working with Western Economic Diversification Canada as a Policy Officer assisting the department with preparations for the 2006 United Nations World Urban Forum to be held in Vancouver. Eventually, Kristine plans to pursue a career in the Canadian Foreign Service.

Milan Ilnyckyj: Report Coordinator
Milan Ilnyckyj is an alumnus of the University of British Columbia, where he completed a double major in International Relations and Political Science. His research of late has focused primarily upon issues in environmental politics, particularly fisheries, but he maintains an interest in the hard security side of world politics. He will be starting an MPhil at Oxford University in October of 2005 with an eye to subsequently completing a PhD.

Jamie Burniston:
Jamie Burniston graduated from the University of British Columbia in 2004 after completing a Bachelor of Arts with a double major in International Relations and History. His studies also incorporated a significant amount of Anthropology and Classical Studies, including participation in an archaeological excavation of a Roman fort in Britain. His future plans involve traveling though Central and South America before returning to university for a post-graduate program.

Katie Magel:
Katie Magel is currently in fourth year at UBC, majoring in Political Science, with a minor in International Relations. Her primary interests are in social and political thought and policy. Upon
Katie's completion of her degree she intends to pursue further education in Public Policy, with the ultimate goal to work abroad.

**Jennifer Schofield:**
Jennifer Schofield will be graduating in April 2006 with a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science. Her areas of interest are in Canadian defence policies and South Asian studies. Jennifer's previous work experience is as a litigation assistant for Parlee McLaws in Calgary, Alberta for several years and she is currently the Vice-President, External for the International Relations Students Association.

**Erik Steffen:**
Erik Steffen was born in Chilliwack B.C on December 14, 1983. He is currently attending the University of British Columbia and is working to complete a major in History. In his spare time Erik enjoys hiking in the Fraser Valley. As well he is involved in intramural programs at the University of British Columbia; this year he will be the Director of Football.

**Charmaine Sue:**
Charmaine Sue is a recent graduate of the University of British Columbia with a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science. Her interests lie primarily in 3rd world security and internal conflict, as well as the economics of such. She currently splits her time evenly as a criminal legal assistant, wholesale employee and music instructor, with an objective to joining the Foreign Service in the near future.

**Elsa Wyllie:**
Elsa Wyllie is an alumna of the University of British Columbia where she completed a degree in Political Science and International Relations. This fall, Elsa will be traveling abroad to work on reintegration projects in Africa. Elsa hopes to pursue a Masters program focused on integrating the political and practical components of peace building and peacekeeping operations into a more efficient and effective system.