The examiners for February 2013 will be Rod Haddow, Peter Loewen, and Graham White. The main tasks for the viva are to define key terms and the boundaries within which I will discuss each question, demonstrate a knowledge of more sources within each question area, respond to any questions about specific sources that challenge my arguments, and to ‘stay on topic’ as interpreted by the examiners.

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1 What is gained and what is lost if Canadian political scientists fully embrace ‘the comparative turn’?

1.1 Outline from pre-comp preparation document

The tension between comparativism and a national focus is in many ways akin to the tension between specialization and generalism in scholarship generally. Being comparative grants you perspective, revealing which features of a phenomenon are rare and which are ubiquitous or near-ubiquitous among all entities of the same type. Being focused on a single subject reduces the danger of importing misleading analogies or theories (assuming, for instance, that the Canadian Prime Minister is necessarily much like the American president). Part of the controversy about the approaches is probably tied to the pride and prestige of academics who, in some cases, measure success by international citation and being exporters of theoretical perspectives or, in other cases, take pride in creating custom-fitted analyses of Canadian politics with more subtlety than comparative accounts incorporate easily, and which represents a kind of national scholarly project. Scholars have rightly asked whether it is not worthwhile to “cultivate theoretical gardens”, and whether there are dangers in Canadian political science being a “miniature replica” of the American sort.

Fully embracing “the comparative turn” — if it were possible to do so — would presumably mean totally discounting any analysis that draws only on data from Canada. Almost all political scientists would likely agree that such a doctrinaire approach may be going too far. It makes more sense, then, to consider the advantages and disadvantages of embracing comparativism to a greater or lesser degree.

1.2 Outline from the day of the test

Introduction

• Define ‘the comparative turn’

• The turn won’t be fully embraced, since doing so would presumably mean abandoning all non-comparative scholarship
• Still, we can consider what would be gained and lost by pushing it as far as possible

Gains
• The biggest gains are context (especially beyond the US and UK), detachment, and generalizability
• We still cannot isolate variables in political science, but we can test some causal claims: if someone says B follows inescapably from A, we can look for cases with A and not B
• The world provides a rich field for comparison: other Westminster states, other resource-dependent economies, other welfare states, etc
• With larger datasets, we can have more confidence in statistical analyses
• Canada also has considerable scope for internal comparativism: provinces, cities, regions

Losses
• Specificity and the benefits of specialization
• There is a danger that things that are only superficially similar will end up being coded in the same way
• There is a risk of applying inappropriate theories and generalizations
• Canadian political science may end up as a ‘miniature replica’ of the US version, with scholars spread too thinly among research questions to accomplish in-depth work

Conclusions
• Comparativism is a health part of the ecosystem of Canadian politics
• There are dangers to be cognizent of, and methodologies should be adapted to anticipate and mitigate them
• There is still a place for Canada-specific scholarship

1.3 Outline for viva

Definitions and scope of question:

The comparative turn The integration of the study of Canadian politics into the field of comparative politics and steps taken to encourage comparativists elsewhere to use Canada to test their theories — building Canadian politics out and inviting comparativists in
Scope  In answering this question, I will consider the likely consequences of the further entrenchment of the comparative turn in Canadian political science, both in terms of the benefits likely to accompany such a continued shift and in terms of the risks associated.

As described by White et al. the comparative project isn’t something Canadians can achieve alone - also, depends on getting comparativists elsewhere to use Canada as a case. To a degree, this project is like intellectual mercantilism, better to be a ‘maker’ of comparative theory than a ‘taker’.

A further advantage likely to arise from adopting a comparative methodology is more rapid theoretical evolution. This is a likely consequence of greater exposure to methodological developments used elsewhere, as well as to new empirical findings. A comparative focus also provides scholars with more ongoing developments to consider, and a chance to look at the impacts of trends in other jurisdictions.

An additional challenge associated with the comparative turn is deciding how to treat highly disparate cases. Should Monaco and India both be treated as a single data point?

1.4 Sources for viva

Chapters within White et al’s Comparative Turn:

Robert Vipond - introduction  Historically, Canadian politics has been dominated by institutional approaches. There are two parts to the comparative turn: having Canadianists do more work from a comparative approach, and encouraging comparativists elsewhere to use Canada as a case. In part because of national unity challenges, the study of federalism has dominated Canadian politics. Anti-Americanism (including Grant and Horowitz) was a reason for resisting comparativism. Canadians have looked elsewhere, but not yet attracted much attention from outsiders.

Eric Montpetit - quantitative analysis of the CT  After 1995, Canadians became more likely to publish in foreign journals. Some subfields are published more in international journals, and scholars at research universities are more likely to publish there. Foreign journals where Canadians publish have higher impact scores than domestic journals. Work on federalism, elections, and multiculturalism is especially likely to be published internationally.

Andrew Robinson - multiculturalism  Canadian philosophers are both givers and takers. Work like Kymlicka’s has received attention abroad. Interest in Canada is driven in part by the status of Quebec as a national minority. The Canadian model involves
accommodating various groups without accepting a relativist conception of justice. Lessons from Canadian scholars do generalize.

**Keith Banting - multiculturalism, recognition, redistribution** There is concern that embracing multiculturalism erodes a sense of community, may reduce support for the welfare state. Banting’s analysis shows no tendency for multiculturalism to weaken the welfare state.

**Ran Hirschl - rights and judicial review** Canada’s potential as a ‘living laboratory’ hasn’t been extensively realized, for instance in terms of the ‘dialog view’ of relations between legislatures and the Supreme Court, trends in aboriginal jurisprudence, and Quebec’s status in Canada.

**Will Kymlicka - marketing Canadian pluralism** Scholars of federalism may sometimes have been too focused on current events. Canadians have contributed to the study of comparative federalism, especially through cross-fertilization between normative theory and the study of institutions. Canada’s success in multiculturalism depends on many historical particularities such as the timing with which multiculturalism policy was introduced, Canada’s geopolitical stability and the lack of large numbers of unapproved migrants, and the absence of a danger that the Quebecois will ally with a hostile neighbour. These factors explain why multiculturalism has worked well, and limit the degree to which it can be successfully exported to states that lack these conditions.

**Martin Papillon - federalism in divided societies** Motivated by domestic events, Canadians have driven international thinking on multinational federalism. Conflicts over the definition of political community are standard in multinational federations - federalism can be a means of managing frictions. Federalism with aboriginals is more complicated, since aboriginals are not like a province or other minorities.

**Jennifer Wallner - comparative federalism** Some see federalism as establishing weak or ineffective governments, lower common denominator policies. In some circumstances, it enhances the quality of governance and the capacity of governments.

**James Farney and Renan Levine - voting behaviour** Canadian voting behaviour includes some unusual features such as federalism, a persistent importance for religion, and low levels of strategic voting. Canadian voters are not strongly split across class lines. Most voters are ‘flexible partisans’ who have some party loyalty over time but shift who they vote for both provincially and federally. Canadian scholarship on voting is deeply indebted to the comparative literature, but work on Canada has also contributed to general scholarly understanding. Canadians should do more analyses
that incorporate rationality, emotions, and cognitive shortcuts.

**Grace Skogstad - policy networks** Historically, policy-making was more insulated from external forces. Now, ‘policy networks’ have grown in importance. States are now dependent on non-state actors to achieve their policy objectives, particularly given globalization.

**Rod Haddow - political economy** Scholars have developed typologies of forms of economic organization and forms of welfare states. Canada’s falls broadly in the ‘liberal’ category, but deviates in some important ways such as including universal components. Forms of welfare state organization show path dependency. Theorists disagree on whether capitalism is all essentially the same, or comes in multiple distinctive varieties. Institutions are objects of ongoing political contestation. Interest-based politics unfold more in terms of the party system than in terms of the welfare state. Canada hasn’t experienced the retrenchment of the welfare state that political economists predict for liberal welfare states. Canada’s politics requires constant renegotiation between regions, provinces, language groups, etc. Confederation was an economic project, meant to create an internal market for central Canadian business interests.

**Alan Cairns - conclusion** Canadians have become ‘givers’ of comparative theory, as well as a key case study. This is partly due to Quebec and constitutional drama, but also First Nations and immigration. In the 1970s there was an “Americanization” controversy. There are flaws in behaviourism. Canadian approaches are generally more historical and institutional than those in the US. Results of the turn have been mixed — Canada still ‘takes’ in many areas. Canada’s experience of multiculturalism is atypical and not generalizable.
2 | Does Canada have a democratic deficit? Is Canada becoming more democratic or less democratic?

2.1 Outline from pre-comp preparation document

General: three notions of democracy

Many Canadian political scientists and political theorists highlight the interpretative character of ‘democracy’. One perspective is that there are at least three views on what the ‘killer feature’ of democracy really is:

1. Implementing the public will: does the government make the decisions that opinion polls would suggest the greatest support for? (Note: this should ideally be more than simply implementing the immediate whim of the populace — it should involve a reasoned general discourse among the public and policy-makers)

2. Choice in representation: do people have a real choice between candidates, and the frequent ability to select from among them?

3. Protecting rights: are the rights of individuals being effectively protected, including from government itself? (This distinguishes liberal democracy, and can easily be in tension with the other views)

Our evaluation of how Canada is doing depends on the relative stress laid on these and other factors. In Political Choice in Canada, Clarke et al. argue that feelings about parties, party leaders, and local candidates all affect voting behaviour. (330) In 1974, 40% of voters saw the party as a whole as the most important factor, 33% the party leader, and 27% local candidates. This contributes to the ambiguity involved in determining exactly what gains legitimacy from electoral success: party leaders, individual candidates, policy proposals, etc.

One incident that highlights these divisions effectively is the FLQ crisis of October 1970. Polls at the time suggested a high degree of support for Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s invocation of the War Measures Act. Among other things, the War Measures Act gave police the power to arrest people without warrant. At the same time, the use of these powers sharply curtailed civil liberties, and the police and other state security forces abused the powers granted to them.
Regarding choice in representation:

“The motivation to change support is usually antipathy toward a party, rather than an affinity for another.”

— Clarke, Harold; LeDuc, Lawrence; Jenson, Jane; and Pammett, Jon H. Political Choice in Canada. 1979. p. 150

In The Parliament of Canada (1987) C.E.S. Franks describes how Canadian MPs serve for less time than British ones, giving them less independent influence. The weakness of individual MPs challenges their ability to represent the views and interests of their constituents. This dovetails with the analysis of David Docherty in Mr. Smith goes to Ottawa: Life in the House of Commons (1997) — which highlights how little influence individual MPs have in parliament, and how they get socialized into the existing system.

Proposed fixes:

Relax party discipline  Create more circumstances where individual MPs can vote according to their conscience or according to the will of their constituents. Would challenge the ability of party leadership to control the agenda.

Enhance the role of parliamentary committees  Enhance the power of the legislature compared to the executive, give opposition parties a chance to have an influence, bring in witnesses to consult with Canadian society.

Change the electoral system  Among parliamentary democracies, which form a plurality of all democracies, only Canada and the UK have retained FPTP (India also has a version). Some sort of proportional representation could create greater equivalence between vote share and share of seats in the legislature, as well as give smaller opposition parties a chance to be part of coalitions.

Reform the senate  Many possibilities exist — from abolishment, to moving to the election of senators, to replacing the senate with a chamber that more directly represents the provinces.

Change how party leaders are chosen  Various proposals purport to be more democratic than the present system of party conventions.

General: Surveillance and the democratic deficit

There are a number of ways in which the growth of the surveillance state, particularly after the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001, challenges Canada’s democratic traditions:

• Secret laws, secret court orders, court orders not to publicly disclose what private
individuals and firms have been ordered to do (we know more about this in the U.S.
than Canada)

• Potentially problematic cooperation with foreign governments with poor human
rights practices, including in cases concerning Canadian citizens

• The largely invisible erosion of Charter rights, including through secret ubiquitous
surveillance not publicly debated in Parliament or among Canadian citizens

• Lack of clarity about what the intelligence services are doing, including in relation
to peaceful groups that oppose important elements of the government’s agenda —
including First Nations and environmental groups

• Chilling effects: because Canadians can have no confidence that their communica-
tions are not being monitored and stored, they self-censor and refrain from engaging
in open political debate in ways that may be harmful to democracy

Technology has vastly multiplied what sort of surveillance is possible — from the storage
and analysis of internet traffic like web searches to automatic license plate reading for vehi-
cles and automated facial analysis — as well as the degree to which that data can be analyzed.
Recent disclosures from around the world suggest that oversight of the use of these tech-
nologies have often been poor, and that governments have often actively misled their citizens
about the capabilities in place and activities being undertaken. Vast amounts of information
are being recorded, to be used for unknown purposes in the future.

Surveillance and the security state threaten many Charter-protected rights, including “free-
dom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other
media of communication”, “freedom of peaceful assembly”, “freedom of association”, “Ev-
everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure”, and the right “to
be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal”.

“Mass surveillance has the potential to erode privacy. As privacy is an essential pre-requisite
to the exercise of individual freedom, its erosion weakens the constitutional foundations on
which democracy and good governance have traditionally been based in this country.”

General: Comments on the democratic deficit

“But what was the state of Canadian democracy in 1921? Women (other than those with
relations in the military) were only permitted to vote in federal elections that very year,
and in Quebec would not get the vote for another generation. Aboriginal Canadians were
only allowed to vote if they legally renounced their Aboriginal status; within a few years,
Parliament would make it illegal for ‘Indians’ to raise money or to hire lawyers to pursue legal cases against the Crown. Candidates and parties were free to raise and spend money in any amounts and in any ways they wished, with no public scrutiny and subject only to the legal prohibitions in the Criminal Code of Canada against bribery and corruption. Freedom of information legislation was unknown. The public and organized groups, save the well-heeled and well-connected, had few opportunities to put their views on policy issues before decision makers through mechanisms such as public hearings. The country did have far more newspapers than today and all were independently owned, but many if not most were closely tied to political parties and offered their readers highly partisan and parochial slants on the news. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was scarcely imaginable and no human rights codes existed: factories in Toronto and elsewhere could with impunity post signs saying “Men wanted. No Irish or Jews need apply.” Moreover... well, let us not belabour the point: by current standards, many aspects of Canadian democracy were deeply flawed, making for a huge democratic deficit.”


Tips from profs:

Russell: Pay attention to whether the question is asking about the democratic deficit generally, or about the ways in which it is changing.

Loewen: Would exclude talking about federal-provincial diplomacy and executive federalism. There is enough material without it, and the examiners may see it as outside the scope of the question.

Thesis:

Democracy is probably an ‘essentially contested concept’, subject to a variety of possible definitions that cannot be authoritatively chosen between.

In a number of ways, the democratic deficit in Canada has probably worsened in recent decades: party loyalty is now very strong, reducing the ability of MPs to represent their constituents, provinces, and regions; government is highly centralized, with a dominant prime minister; the consolidation of the political right has led to a party system where First Past the Post returned a majority government with under 40% of the vote; and the post-9/11 security state and surveillance threaten many democratic values and institutions. Against that, one area where there has arguably been a reduction in the democratic deficit is through the more effective protection of some rights through the Charter — notably, reduced discrimination against homosexuals — and the attainment of greater political in-
fluence for aboriginal groups, largely through the courts.

**Party loyalty, centralization, and the power of the Prime Minister**

One manifestation of the growth of the power of the government of the day compared with Parliament as an institution can be seen in recent determinations by the Speaker of the House that the government has been in contempt of Parliament. In addition, there is at least one recent example of the government using the prorogation of Parliament as a means of escaping the scrutiny of Parliamentary committees, raising doubts about the strength of Parliamentary supremacy and even the responsible government convention. Peter Russell argues that prorogation as a political manoeuvre unrelated to the natural end of a parliamentary session shows contempt for Parliament and the principle of responsible government, dating back to the 1840s.

Since Trudeau, the PMO has expanded from about 25 people to about 80. Many Ottawa-watchers consider it the most powerful institution in government: more than parliament, the cabinet, or the civil service. Service at the PMO is all about loyalty to the PM. On key files, perhaps better informed and more influential than cabinet ministers. Described at length by Savoie: not subject to ATIP or much outside scrutiny. In the television age, must be able to use advertising tactics to spin issues. Peter Russell considers it a “threat to democracy”.

**The party system and First Past the Post**

Of the world’s parliamentary democracies, only Canada and the UK retain FPTP (India has a version).

**Party financing**

**A mixed bag: intergovernmental relations**

Intergovernmental relations are a mixed bag, from the perspective of the ostensive democratic deficit. Richard Simeon articulates both views. One the one hand, the power of the provinces under Canada’s system of federalism provides dual representation to all citizens, who have representatives in both provincial legislatures and the federal parliament. Arguably, ‘federal-provincial diplomacy’ has been a much more effective mechanism for the representation of provincial and regional interests than the senate, which was designed to play that role. At the same time, intergovernmental relations are largely an executive process, with no direct parliamentary oversight. Particularly in cases where the agreement of Quebec was hard-won, the federal parliament often finds itself with only the choice of accepting what has already been negotiated or of rejecting it outright.

**The security state and surveillance**
The 2001 *Anti-Terrorism Act* gave CSE its first enabling legislation and mandate, and this legislation has subsequently been called ‘inadequate’ by the CSEC Commissioner.

On the basis of the insights gained into intelligence practices through leaks — and the numerous times when governments have been caught lying to their citizens in assuring that surveillance is not taking place — Canadians now live with the realistic fear that all their communications, movements, and financial transactions are being tracked by government authorities. Beyond fostering distrust toward the state among many, this has chilling effects which are important to the state of Canadian democracy. Every citizen now expects to leave a broad and enduring digital trail, accessible for legitimate or illegitimate purposes by officials in the present government, possibly open to unauthorized access by other states or technologically sophisticated organizations, and retained for the use of future governments, which may be less respectful of democratic practices than those that exist now.

**The Charter and social progress**

**Aboriginals**

Canada is doing better: Supreme Court precedents, consultation and accommodation, an end to many assimilationist policies (residential schools), self-government

### 2.2 Outline from the day of the test

**Introduction**

- Define the ‘democratic deficit’
- Graham White is right to say that it’s more a ‘democratic debt’ and that Canada was more illiberal in 1921
- Democracy is an essentially contested concept (Walter Bryce Gallie), and can be conceptualized in at least three distinctly different ways
- Canada is open to criticism in terms of all three, and specific ways in which each has been weakened recently can be identified

**Party loyalty, centralization, the power of the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister’s Office**

- Party loyalty and cabinet dominance mean there is no effective provincial representation in parliament
- The role of civil servants is changing: at the top, require more political skills and media savvy
The electoral system

- First Past the Post means there is little point in voting for parties with minority support and no geographic concentration of votes
- FPTP also produces majorities from a minority vote share
- The distribution of seats in the legislature can bear little resemblance to the distribution of votes case
- Of Westminster-style states, only Canada and the UK still use FPTP (India has a version)

The post-2001 security state

The Charter and liberal democracy

The First Nations

Conclusions

2.3 Outline for viva

Definitions and scope of question:

The democratic deficit. A term for various criticisms of Canada’s democratic system, including the electoral system, the growing centralization of power, elite decision-making in matters like federal-provincial relations, the status of the senate, and declining citizen (especially youth) engagement in politics.

Scope. I will define what is meant by the term, then go through a thematic discussion of some of the areas in which it is most widely seen to be a real problem, followed by a few areas in which Canada has arguably been progressing toward greater democracy. My analysis will focus on the period after the patriation of the constitution in 1982.

The senate is another frequently-identified dimension of Canada’s democratic deficit. In fairness, though, it was never meant to be a body for the representation of the general public: rather, it was meant to reflect the provinces and provide the famous ‘sober second thought’. Schemes for remedying the democratic deficit may incorporate senate reform, whether by turning it into an elected body, taking steps to make it more effectively represent the provinces, abolishing it to empower the elected House of Commons, or using it as a way to give representation to groups like aboriginals.

Party financing is arguably another area in which Canada’s democratic deficit is visible. Firstly, the influence of those who provide funding allows elites to maintain a high level
of influence within parties. The 2008 elimination of per-vote subsidies for political parties further weakens parties like the Greens — both because of the loss of income, and because of the removal of one reason to vote for candidates with little hope of winning. As an aside, the means through which the subsidies were eliminated, as one item within a fiscal update treated as a confidence motion, served to deny parliament the opportunity to consider the issue on its own merits and at adequate length.

Another source of concern for Canada’s democratic is weak youth participation, both in terms of voter turnout and in terms of other forms of political involvement. This doesn’t appear to be a matter that resolves itself as young people age, since they continue to be involved to a limited degree in the political system.

The current state of the media is a further cause for concern. Under financial pressure, in-depth and investigative reporting is arguably being disproportionately scaled back, reducing the watchdog role being played toward government and the amount of accurate information available to voters. Also, the emergence of more partisan media channels may produce a segmented political discussion within the general population, in which media channels largely serve to reinforce the existing views of their viewers.

A ‘democratic deficit’ was also perceived to be in operation during the negotiation of attempted constitutional reforms at Meech Lake and Charlottetown. Particularly in the case of Meech Lake, one notable cause of public opposition was the perception that the accord was an elite stitch-up negotiated in back rooms without transparency to the Canadian public. The attempt to be more open in Charlottetown led to a document seen by many as incoherent, built up from a large number of bargains and compromises.

2.4 Sources for viva

- Donald Savoie. “Governing from the centre: the concentration of power in Canadian politics.” 1999.
- David Docherty. Mr. Smith goes to Ottawa: life in the House of Commons. 1997. — Limited influence and independence of individual MPs, despite aspirations of the
Reform Party

• C.B. MacPherson. *Democracy in Alberta*. 1962. — Social Credit party gave up on individually empowered MPs when in office

• C.E.S. Franks. *The Parliament of Canada*. 1987. — Canada’s parliament largely comprised of amateur, short-term members who are dominated by party discipline
“Scholarship in the political economy tradition is now much less prominent in Canadian political science than it was a generation ago. This is because of the intrinsic limits of this approach.”

Comment.

3.1 Outline from pre-comp preparation document

Canadian theoretical contributions that have attracted attention internationally include:

- Harold Innis’ staples theory of political economy, elaborated upon by Mel Watkins and others — this has influenced analysis of the political development of export-based economies elsewhere in the world and influenced the development debate in the Caribbean, Africa, and parts of Asia. This has included analysis of the economic and political impact of large foreign export-oriented corporations.

There is work to be done internal to the theory, in linking insights from within the theory to the broader field of Canadian politics, and to applying theories and modes of analysis to new historical developments.

Staples theory

“At the heart of his Canadian political economy is the proposition that the export of staple products creates uncertainty, and havoc when markets turn against Canadian products. The work of Innis helped to understand how when the world economy collapsed, producing the great depression, it took the Canadian wheat-based economy with it.”

— Duncan Cameron. “The Staple Theory @ 50: Duncan Cameron”.

“As Harold Innis (1967) long ago highlighted, Canada’s economic origins were those of a raw materials purveyor to metropolitan Europe and, by means of the strong path formation this entailed, to the United States. The substantial infrastructure costs associated with ex-
ploting these commodities in a large and sparsely populated country required much more active state intervention than is typical in liberal milieus. Ottawa’s post-Confederation determination to foster indigenous manufacturing did not alter this but gave rise to an attenuated, tariff-protected, and technologically dependent industrial heartland, concentrated in southern Ontario. The unevenness of Canadian economic development, in sectoral composition and prosperity, meant that the regions developed antagonistic conceptions of their own and the nation’s economic interests. With the emergence of stronger provincial states after 1945, this unevenness contributed to distinctive political approaches to economic development. “

— Rodney Haddow, chapter in White et al. 2008

Haddow: He has his doubts about how widely the staples thesis has been adopted internationally. Furthermore, he draws attention to how Innis studied at the University of Chicago and saw the staples theory as applicable to a period of US history.

Loewen: Also doubts that the staples theory has had much international influence, especially compared with the ‘resource curse’ literature. If asked what Canadian political science can bring to the world, he would argue that there has been lots of internal innovation, but the main generalizable ideas relate to federalism and the management of diversity. In this field, there is both an empirical and a theoretical literature that can be generalized to other cases.

3.2 Outline from the day of the test

“Like the builders of the Tower of Babel, scholars interested in political economy have been scattered. Their contributions no longer appear as the growth of a single edifice, but as contributions to a variety of structures in other subfields.”

Introduction

• At U of T, politics split from economics in 1986

• Political economy has become less prominent, but this is not because it has reached its intrinsic limits. Rather, this is a product of the growth in academic specialization. Scholarship in the political economy tradition has the potential to help fill some gaps in the current Canadian politics literature

Tiny history

• Largely begins with Harold Innis, expanded upon by Mel Watkins

• The staples thesis doesn’t speak to the same issues as the ‘resource curse’ - about
patterns of economic development, rather than the corrupting influence of resources on governments.

One cause of the decline of PE may be the rise of post-materialist values, identity politics, and a focus on the social aspects of globalization.

The economic dimensions of globalization are still a key area of study:

- Relationship between government and industry
- The economic basis of national and territorial ‘interests’ — enriches theories that take interests for granted
- Institutional embodiments of globalization: NAFTA, the WTO, etc

The PE approach can be applied to gaps in Canadian politics:

- Urban politics — special circumstances of megacities, public policy impacts on mobility of individuals
- Demography — aging population, pensions, healthcare, labour
- Immigration — economics and politics, social consequences)

Conclusions

3.3 Outline for viva

Definitions and scope of question:

The political economy tradition A branch of social science that considers the relationships between economic phenomena like markets, production, resources, and employment and political phenomena like parties, electoral outcomes, and policy choices. The discipline employs methods from political science, economics, sociology, and other fields.¹

Scope

There are several distinctly identifiable periods in the Canadian study of political economy, with an especially marked split around 1960. Classic texts include:

¹OED: “the branch of economics dealing with the economic problems of government”. Britannica: “branch of social science that studies the relationships between individuals and society and between markets and the state, using a diverse set of tools and methods drawn largely from economics, political science, and sociology”.

19
Harold Innis  Analyzed Canada’s earliest export industries, including fur and cod — established the staples thesis to describe Canada’s unusual pattern of economic development. The 1840 Act of Union was driven in part by the need to manage debts and the expense of building canals.

William Archibald Mackintosh  Contemporary of Innis who helped develop the staples thesis

Clare Pentland  1961 doctoral thesis: “Labour and the Development of Industrial Capitalism in Canada” — emphasizes class and industrialization, skeptical about foreign ownership

C.B. Macpherson  Described emergence of the Social Credit party in Alberta

John Porter’s *Vertical Mosaic* (1965) described how Canada relies extensively on elite decision-making, that Canadians are generally deferential, and that Canada is bicultural and organized by class. Political economy also links to political culture; Neil Nevitte saw the ‘decline of deference’ happening in all major advanced economies and saw it at least partly as a product of changing economic circumstances.

‘New’ Canadian political economy can be dated to the 1968 report on foreign ownership in Canadian industry (Watkins Report) and Kari Levitt’s *Silent Surrender: The Multinational Corporation in Canada* (1970). Predicts domination of the Canadian economy by the U.S., and the splitting up of Canadian regions to deal one-on-one with the U.S.. The school also discusses whether cultural integration with the U.S. is diminishing Canada’s national community (like Grant’s lament). The ‘new’ movement also included the launch of the journal *Studies in Political Economy: A Socialist Review* out of Carleton. Jane Jenson argues that the ‘new’ movement was shaped by nationalism and largely concerned with Canada’s place in the international economy. Jenson argues that “permeable Fordism” (Fordist — based on mass production and consumption) arose in Canada in the 1930s and 40s and that it was distinct from what was happening elsewhere because of dependence on unprocessed natural resources, high import rates for capital and goods, and a state that spent little on social programs and which stayed out of labour-management relations, leaving them to private collective bargaining. This system had a basis more in federal-provincial negotiations than in class compromise through the party system, and was based on a perspective that saw Canada’s national resources rather than its workers as the country’s source of greatness.

Quebec’s Quiet Revolution is another suitable topic for analysis through the perspective of political economy. Michael Mandel explains how Quebec’s economic modernization required the emergence of a university-educated local elite, which in turn helped drive political change. The Quebec nationalist project has been tightly bound up with efforts to build
provincial industries, such as the dam building discussed by Boyce Richardson in *Strangers Devour the Land*. Quebec’s determination to maintain its own welfare state is another case to consider, including in terms of the parallel creation of the Canada Pension Plan and Quebec Pension Plan in 1965.

Political economy is also important for understanding the result of the Quebec secession referendums. The first was explicitly aimed at creating a mandate to negotiate sovereignty-association, in which close economic links would be maintained between Quebec and Canada. Concerns about trade and economic competitiveness were a major argument for the ‘no’ side in both referendums, and may be a major factor discouraging separatism now. Even concern about the danger of separation drove economic changes — notably, the relocation of the headquarters of a number of corporations from Montreal to Toronto.

Internal immigration is another phenomenon that can be considered from a PE perspective. Variations in labour demand may encourage people to relocate between provinces temporarily or permanently. This can create challenges for the communities and provinces they left, including in terms of tax revenues and social services. There is therefore an effect on equalization and Canada’s social union.

Political economy also pertains to the emergence and evolution of Canada’s welfare state, the earlier stages of which are described in Keith Banting’s *The welfare state and Canadian federalism*, which argues that Canada’s welfare state emerged earlier in its process of economic development than those of other advanced industrial democracies. One illustration of the complex linkages between politics and economics can be seen in the political response to the creation of RRSPs. Keith Banting explains that they very disproportionately benefitted the rich, but that this was widely tolerated because people don’t perceive tax breaks in the same way as they do spending. Later, Sylvia Bashevkin’s *Welfare Hot Buttons* considered how the neoliberal ideology of the Thatcher, Mulroney, and Reagan governments affected public perceptions of those on public assistance, and how their left-wing successors in Blair, Chretien, and Clinton largely adopted their critical attitudes toward welfare recipients and their emphasis on paid work. In the present, rising income inequality also threatens to have political consequences.

If the potential of the political economy approach has not been exhausted, what explains the general lack of attention-drawing work arising from it? In part, it’s a consequence of academic specialization. University departments, journals, grant-providing bodies, and others have reinforced a disciplinary distinction between political science and economics, and individual scholars have little incentive to straddle the divide. There may nonetheless be opportunities for synergistic work incorporating more qualitative and formal methods from economics and more qualitative and normative contributions from political science. By it-
self, economic analysis cannot tell us what changes are politically feasible to implement or what is desirable normatively.

**General: Outline from The Canadian Encyclopedia “Political Economy”**

“Political Economy is the study of the relationship between POLITICS and ECONOMICS. Economists study the workings of the economic system, while political scientists study the workings of political systems, the nature of government and the STATE, the functioning of political parties and the participation of citizens in decision making. To political economists, the notion that a phenomenon can be “purely political” or “purely economic” is wrong-headed. For example, it is difficult to analyse the role of the corporation in the economy without understanding the political system in which it functions. Political science and economics must also be studied together to understand how income and wealth are distributed, how economic priorities are established, etc. A political economist examines the cultural, constitutional and political context within which economic developments occur, but also analyses the nature of the productive system in a given society and the social relationships that interact with it. Political economy as a discipline predates the separate study of economics and POLITICAL SCIENCE. Today the special area of study of political economists is the meeting point of the 2 newer disciplines.

Most Canadian scholars in the field agree that the pre-eminent Canadian political economist was Harold INNIS. He studied the FUR TRADE, the building of the railways, the relationship between the extraction of staple products and the nature of the Canadian state, and theorized about the interaction between the means of communications and systems of government. Contemporary Canadian political economists have built on the work of Innis. They have concentrated on the relationship of the Canadian economy and the Canadian state with the economies and states of other more powerful countries, principally Britain and the US, but have also examined subjects such as the formation of the bourgeoisie and working class, the “national question” in Québec, industrialization and natural resources.”


**General: ongoing study of political economy in Canada**

3.4 Sources for viva

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