The environment – Page 126 – a sibilant intake of breath

Dealing with the oil sands is not enough

An intelligent article in The Calgary Herald makes the case that dealing with the oil sands is not a sufficient Canadian contribution to climate change mitigation. Firstly, this is because they represent a small fraction of total Canadian emissions and, even in the worst-case projections, are still a minority of emissions in a few decades. Secondly, it is because technologies developed to de-carbonize the oil sands are likely to be less generally applicable than those created for more widespread industrial activities. Thirdly, it is because many of the emissions associated with the oil sands occur wherever the fuels being produced are burned, rather than at the point of production, where they might be captured.The second point is an interesting one, and the overall case is strong:

The oilsands now produce about four per cent of Canada’s emissions; if production were to triple with no change in technology and all other emissions stopped growing, they could be as high as 10 to 15 per cent around 2025.

This is a big number, and it’s going in the wrong direction since if we want to avoid dangerous climate change, we should be driving our emissions to zero sometime soon after 2050. However, even if we shut down all oilsands operations tomorrow, Canada would still be one of the top greenhouse gas emitters’ per capita in the world. Fixing the oilsands will not get us off the hook.

While I think the authors are somewhat overconfident in the applicability of carbon capture and storage (CCS), they are right to say that dealing with the oil sands must be only one part of Canada’s overall climate change strategy.

In addition, we need to prevent the construction of new coal power plants (at the very least, those without effective CCS) and phase out those that already exist. We need to seek and exploit mitigation opportunities in all sectors – from agriculture to transport to heavy industry – with the ultimate goal of carbon neutrality. One important mechanism for creating the right incentives for lowest-cost across-the-board reductions is putting a price on carbon. That is not, however, sufficient to address all the externalities relating to climate change. Government also needs to work to improve standards and build intelligent infrastructure, supporting the choices that will lead to the emergence of a low-carbon society.

Alcoholic analogies to climate change

Two critical aspects of the problem of climate change can be well understood by means of alcohol-based analogy: the time lag between emissions and climatic consequences and the one-off nature of our decisions.

The last few decades have seen a surge in global greenhouse gas emissions. Due to lags in the climate system, the effects of those gasses are not yet felt, whether in terms of temperature or other climatic phenomena. It is as though we have started doing shots of vodka every thirty seconds. Even after the tenth shot, it is entirely possible that you are feeling lucid. You can talk, walk around, and drink more vodka. If you keep drinking at such a rapid pace until the point where you really feel the effects of the first shots, you have a whole mass of additional (and probably rather unpleasant) impacts still to come.

The reason this is so dangerous is that we only get one chance to decide when to stop drinking. Most people probably have a few experiences of youthful exuberance and realize they need to take into account the anticipated consequences of drinks, rather than just keep drinking until they cannot do so any longer. There is scope to learn from experience. As with global thermonuclear war, climate change offers no opportunities to learn by experience. We have one planet and, by extension, one timeline for greenhouse gas emissions and their atmospheric concentrations. If we are going to stop before we go too far, we are going to need the wisdom to anticipate consequences (as the IPCC and other scientific bodies have already done) as well as the will and good judgment to heed that advice.

The final issue to bear in mind is that of where the costs fall. The danger of drinking yourself to death is one that each individual engages with directly. By contrast, most of the dangers associated with climate change are inadvertently borne by those in future generations. Continuing to emit greenhouse gasses is thus somewhat equivalent to drinking while pregnant. While some of the health consequences might be borne by the drinker, most will be borne by the next generation and, in turn, by those who follow.

There are actually a couple of additional valid ways in which this analogy can be extended. One is to appreciating the difference between stocks and flows. Cutting annual emissions is like reducing how much vodka is in each shot. When emissions are rising, each shot is bigger. When emissions are falling, successive shots are smaller. Nonetheless, even small shots still increase your blood alcohol level. Right now, rising global emissions mean the planet is downing a bigger shot of greenhouse gasses every year. Stopping that growth is the first step, but it is no more of an adequate response in the long term than capping the size of the shots being taken at regular intervals.

A related extension has to do with carbon sinks. In this analogy, they are akin to your liver. They can absorb a certain quantity of greenhouse gasses before they fail. After that point, the further climatic effects of emissions are unmitigated. In the period when your liver is still functional, you can still drink small shots every thirty seconds. Eventually, however, you need to cut your intake/emissions to zero, before your liver/sinks fail.

Meeting in Poland, while the Amazon burns

Satellite images show that 11,968 square kilometres of the Amazon rainforest have been destroyed this year, 4% more than last year. The amount of carbon dioxide released when these forests are cut and burned is colossal. Indeed, reducing the destruction of tropical forest is probably the single cheapest way to reduce the rate at which greenhouse gasses are accumulating in the environment.

Hopefully, the delegates at the ongoing United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meeting in Poznan, Poland will be able to make some progress on reducing deforestation. While higher cost mitigation will certainly need to take place, picking the low-hanging fruit could be a good way to make a difference relatively rapidly. That is especially important given the importance of the timing of emissions. The more steeply concentrations rise, the less time there is for any adaptation measures to be put in place. The risks of crossing critical climatic thresholds are also increased.

Talkin’ ’bout a coalition

The prospect of an NDP/Liberal coalition is certainly an intriguing one. For one thing, there is a lot of history to be made in parliamentary procedure. What can the Conservative government do to resist falling? How should, must, and will the Governor General act in different scenarios? If a coalition did come into being, how would it govern and how long-lasting could it be?

Given the NDP’s opposition to Stephane Dion’s ‘Green Shift’ carbon tax, it is especially unclear what sort of climate policies would emerge from a coalition government. They would be in a doubly weak position to create rules that would govern industry for years. Firstly, well-founded questions about the longevity of the coalition would make regulated industries wonder whether spending to meet new requirements makes commercial sense. In the absence of certainty about long-term climate policies, intelligent investments cannot be made. Secondly, there is uncertainty about what will happen to climate policy in the United States. How much of a priority will it be for the new Obama administration? Will Congress press forward or hold back on the issue? Will the US seek a national system, or will they try to come up with an integrated North American system as proposed by the Harper government? What will happen to the regional climate change organizations, such as the Western Climate Initiative?

These are certainly interesting times. Hopefully, the uncertainty will not serve to perpetuate inaction.

[Update: 28 January 2009] As of today’s Liberal response to yesterday’s Conservative budget, it seems the possibility of a coalition is dead, at least for now.

Emissions from the Poznan talks

This AFP story strikes me as both misleading and misguided: “UN climate talks to create 13,000 tonnes of carbon.” I suppose that might seem like a lot, if you aren’t used to thinking about tonnes of carbon dioxide.

Firstly, the headline is expressed incorrectly. The real estimate is 13,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide, not 13,000 tonnes of carbon, which would mean 47,710 tonnes of carbon dioxide. That is because adding the oxygen molecules increases the mass of a single atom of carbon by a factor of 3.67.

Secondly, 12 kilotonnes is a pretty trifling number, in the grand scheme of things. Canada emits about 1,917,808 tonnes of carbon dioxide per day. The world as a whole emits about fifty times that. If a few fifteen kilotonne meetings can help cut those figures substantially in the near to medium-term, they will have paid for themselves many times over.

There are certainly plenty of valid criticisms of the international efforts to stabilize the climate. The emissions associated with the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) are probably among the weakest.

Climate change mitigation cost-benefit analysis on different timescales

Peter Lilley, a British Member of Parliament, seems to have rather missed the point of climate change legislation. He is kicking up a fuss about how the UK’s Climate Change Bill might have costs larger than benefits in the period between now and 2050. Of course, the whole point of climate change mitigation is to avoid the worst effects of climate change and not leave future generations with a severely damaged planet. Almost by definition, the majority of the benefits associated with such an approach will accrue in the distant future.

Even if mitigating climate change has serious net costs between now and 2050, we still need to do it, at least if we care at all about the welfare of future generations and the integrity of the planet. That being said, we can certainly hope to mitigate effectively at a relatively low cost (taking advantage of mechanisms like carbon pricing to secure the lowest cost emission reductions first). We can also work to maximize the co-benefits of climate change mitigation, such an enhancing energy security and reducing other types of air pollution.

It is also entirely possible that we will end up spending more money on climate change than we should have, or than would have been possible if we had taken the best possible approach from the outset. To use an analogy, it is possible for a speeding car to brake too sharply to avoid hitting a pedestrian. Doing so jostles the driver and may damage the car, but it is a less undesirable outcome than braking too hesitantly and ploughing right into the person. When you are making a decision with important consequences and lots of uncertainty, erring on the side of caution and expense is the prudent and ethical approach.

Two scenarios for Canada’s 2020 electricity situation

This previous post on Canada’s new commitment to generate 90% of its electricity from sources that do not emit greenhouse gasses by 2020 was a bit too wide-ranging, since it sought to consider all possible mixes that satisfied the 90% criterion. A more reasonable approach is to consider two plausible scenarios.

In the first scenario, electricity demand rises by 10%. Assuming that means 10% more generating capacity is required, that means increasing Canada’s electrical capacity to 132 gigawatts. Doing so while achieving the 90% target would mean scrapping 20.4 gigawatts of emitting capacity (about three times the capacity of all of Ontario’s coal plants) and building 32.4 gigawatts of non-emitting capacity (six giant dams or about thirty five nuclear reactors).

In the second scenario, energetic conservation efforts cause demand to fall by 10%. As such, we would be able to cut our total generating capacity to 99 gigawatts. Producing that while reaching the 90% target would mean scrapping 23.1 gigawatts of emitting capacity (3.5 times Ontario’s coal plants) and building 23.1 gigawatts of non-emitting capacity (under five giant dams, or about twenty five nuclear reactors).

The numbers might work out a bit differently if you did the calculations based on terawatt-hours of electricity use, rather than gigawatts of installed capacity.

Modes of transport and distances travelled

Adding once again to our ever-present debate about the ethics of air travel, a study from the University of California, Berkeley concludes that the major reason planes are more problematic than trains or buses is that people simply travel farther in them. This has two major implications.

For one, it suggests that efforts to curtain short-haul air travel may have limited benefits. If a high-speed rail corridor between Toronto and Montreal would only lead to incremental improvements in emissions reductions, the better course may be to try to discourage as much travel as possible. This may be especially true given another major conclusion of the study: that a very significant share of the environmental impacts of travel arises from the infrastructure (roads, rails, airports), rather than the emissions of vehicles themselves.

For another, it suggests that investing the time and money to travel by bus or train may likewise be less green than would be ideal. The problem may not be choosing to go from Ottawa to Vancouver by air; it may be an inescapable problem of making the trip in the first place.

It is well worth having a look at the webpage for the study, as it contains a lot of additional information. The study’s conclusions were also described on Slate.

The atmospheric longevity of carbon dioxide

How long does carbon dioxide emitted by human beings remain in the atmosphere? It turns out, it is a tricky question. Different mechanisms remove carbon at different rates, and the responses of each system to higher concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere differ.

Probably the most important distinction is between sinks that have a capacity that can be exhausted and those that are effectively limitless. Oceans the biosphere are of the first kind, and they respond to carbon dioxide in the atmosphere relatively quickly. That being said, there is a limit to how much carbon dioxide the ocean can absorb (and the fact that it becomes more acidic while doing so is problematic) and there is only so much biomass the planet can sustain. Weathering rock that absorbs carbon and then subducts below the seafloor is an example of the second type of sink: though it operates very slowly and volcanic eruptions can return carbon that has been locked into the lithosphere back to the atmosphere. Even without such eruptions to worry about, natural weathering is not the route to a stable climate on a human timescale. As the Nature article linked above explains: “it would take hundreds of thousands of years for these processes to bring CO2 levels back to pre-industrial values.”

The article also comments on how long the temperature anomaly from anthropogenic emissions will persist: “whether we emit a lot or a little bit of CO2, temperatures will quickly rise and plateau, dropping by only about 1°C over 12,000 years.” We should make no mistake in understanding that our choices about how much carbon dioxide we emit will have a big impact on a huge number of future generations.

Treating carbon as a cost in government projections

A document from the British government defining their ‘shadow cost’ of carbon (PDF) also discusses an approach to government planning that has a lot of potential. Essentially, the document estimates what the maximum amount a rational actor concerned about both the present and the future should pay to reduce carbon emissions. It then calls for that price to be incorporated into government planning and assessments, just as any other cost would be. For instance, two different proposals for the design of a hospital could be compared in a way that treats the social cost of carbon just like any other expense. The result is a cost-benefit analysis that operates as though a socially optimal carbon tax exists, even when no such instrument exists in the wider economy.

In situations where carbon costs have already been partly or fully taken into account – for instance, if a government building is using electricity on which an upstream carbon tax has already been applied – then only the remaining portion of the shadow price of carbon would be applied.

The approach is exciting because it could spur carbon-rational government action, without the need to wait for an economy-wide price of carbon to emerge. That means earlier results. It also means opportunities to secure economies of scale. The government is a major purchaser of products and services, and a push to incorporate the social cost of carbon into government procurement would affect which products are available to the economy as a whole, and at what price. Another advantage is that each layer of government has the power to impose the requirement; provinces and municipalities that wish to move forward could do so without the need for cooperation from the layers of government above them.