The environment – Page 157 – a sibilant intake of breath

The sex life of corn

Corn, the key species in modern industrial agriculture, is completely incapable of reproducing itself in nature. The cobs that concentrate the seeds so nicely for us are not conducive to reproduction because, if planted, the corn grows so densely it dies. As such, the continued existence of Zea mays depends upon people continuing to divide the cobs and plant a portion of the seeds.

Corn is apparently a descendant of an earless grass called Teosinte. It is hard to overstate the consequences of a heavily mutated strain of Teosinte finding a species capable of closing a reproductive loop that would otherwise be open, leading to swift extinction.

The actual mechanics of corn reproduction are similarly odd. Male gametes are produced at the top of the plant, inside the flower-like tassel. At a certain time of year, these release the pollen that fertilizes the female gametes located in the cobs. It reaches them through single strands of silk (called styles) that run through the husk. When a grain of pollen comes into contact with one of these threads it divides into two identical cells. One of them tunnels through the strand into the kernel, a six to eight inch distance crossed in several hours. The other fuses with an egg to form an embryo, while the digger grows into the endosperm.

Another curious aspect of corn reproduction is that, because of seed hybridization (not genetic modification), every stalk of corn in a field is a clone of every other stalk. This is because the seeds came from inbred lines: each made to self-pollinate for several generations, eventually yielding batches of genetically identical seeds that farmers buy every year. They do this because the yield from the identical seeds is higher than that from the mixed generation that would follow it by a degree sufficient to justify the cost of buying seeds.

Such hybrid corn pushed yields from twenty bushels an acre – the amount managed by both Native Americans and farmers in the 1920s – to about two hundred bushels an acre. Given the degree to which we are all constructed more from corn than from any other source of materials (most of the meat, milk, and cheese we eat is ultimately made from corn, as are tons of processed foods), these remarkable processes of reproduction and agriculture deserve further study. For my part, I am reading Michael Pollan’s The Omnivore’s Dilemma. I am only 10% into it, but it has been quite fascinating so far.

Per capita emissions and fairness

As mentioned before, the Stern Review cites a figure of five gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent as the quantity that can be sustainably absorbed by the planet each year. Given the present population of 6.6 billion people, that means our fair share is about 750kg of emissions each, per year. Right now, Canadian emissions are about 23 tonnes per person per year. They are highest in Alberta – 71 tonnes – and lowest in Quebec – 12 tonnes. Even in hydro-blessed Quebec, emissions are fifteen times too high.

Everybody knows that emissions in the developed world are too high. The average Australian emits 25.9 tonnes. For Americans it is 22.9; the nuclear-powered French emit 8.7 tonnes each. The European average is 10.6 tonnes per person, while North America weighs in at 23.1. One round-trip flight from New York to London produces the amount of greenhouse gas that one person can sustainably emit in three and a half years. These are not the kind of numbers that can be brought down with a few more wind turbines and hybrid cars; the energy basis of all states needs to be fundamentally altered, replacing a system where energy production and use are associated with greenhouse gas emissions with one where that is no longer the case.

What is less often acknowledged is that emissions in the developing world are already too high. Chinese per capita emissions are 3.9 tonnes, while those in India are 1.8. The list of countries by per-capita greenhouse gas emissions on Wikipedia shows three states where per-capita emissions are below 750kg: Comoros, Kiribati, and Uruguay. Even the average level of emissions for sub-Saharan Africa is almost six times above the sustainable level for our current world population.

And our world population is growing.

All this raises serious questions of fairness. Obviously, people in North America and Europe have been overshooting our sustainable level of emissions for a long time. Do developing countries have a similar right to overshoot? How are their rights affected by what we now know about climate change? If they do have a right to emit more than 750kg per person, does that mean people in developed states have a corresponding duty to emit less than that? Even if we emitted nothing at all, we couldn’t provide enough space within the sustainable carbon budget for them to emit as much as we are now.

The only option is for everyone to decarbonize. The developed world needs to lead the way, in order to show that it can be done. The developing world needs to acknowledge that the right to develop does not trump other forms of legal and ethical obligation: both to those alive now and to future generations. People in both developed and developing states may also want to reconsider their assumptions about the desirability of population growth. Spending a few centuries with people voluntarily restricting their fertility below the natural rate of replacement could do a lot to limit the magnitude of the ecological challenges we will face as a species.

Carbon constrained travel

Pondering the era of post-air travel tourism, I have been thinking about places to visit by train. There are actually quite a lot of appealing prospects:

Halifax: see the Maritimes for the first time, and perhaps Caity Sackeroff as well
Boston: visit Iason, Sheena, Loretta, and perhaps Claire
New York: re-visit the city five years after my first foray
Bennington, Vermont: visit family

Have any readers undertaken the exploration of North America’s east coast using ground-based means? Are trains generally much more expensive than buses? How do they compare, in terms of speed?

The moral unacceptability of air travel has also left me thinking more seriously about the kind of grand backpacking tours that were more common when long-haul flights were ruinously expensive. The most ambitious possibility – flitting around at the edges of imagination – is to travel by ground all the way from London to Hong Kong, seeing as much as possible between the two. Emitting a couple of tonnes of carbon, in the form of flights across the Atlantic, would be a lot more ethically acceptable than undertaking multiple hops. Of course, a truly conscientous traveler would emulate a friend of a friend of mine and book passage across on a container ship.

Advertising over-fishing

This evening, I was surprised to happen across a billboard advertisement condemning fisheries subsidies. It declared that: “Subsidies are fishing the world’s oceans to death” and “It’s time to cut the bait.” The sentiment is an accurate one, particularly when it comes to the operation of the subsidized fleets of the developed world in the waters of developing states. Still, it was interesting to see a public display about a subject that is of considerable interest to me, but seemingly ignored by most of the population. You do see a bit of lobbying through advertising in Ottawa; for instance, there are piles of backlit signs personally thanking Prime Minister Harper for supporting ethanol and biodiesel. It was good to see something advocating the protection of a common resource, rather than seeking rents for private enterprises.

I was curious who would be behind such an advertising campaign, but then I noticed the logo of the Sea Around Us Project at the bottom. They have been mentioned here fairly frequently before and do good work. Shifting Baselines – a favourite blog of mine – is run by a doctoral student associated with the project.

[Update: 13 January 2007] I finally got around to uploading the low quality photo of the ad I took on my phone.

The implied right to pollute

In today’s news, there is some talk about the new report from the National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy. Much of it has surrounded the possibility of a carbon tax as a vehicle for assisting the with reduction of Canadian greenhouse gas emissions. One comment from the CBC struck me as especially wrong-headed. In relation to a carbon tax, a person being interviewed said that it “would specifically impact western oil producers who might have to carry the brunt of such attacks.”

The fallacy here is that western oil producers have the right to emit as many greenhouse gasses as they like, for free. If your neighbour was running a pulp mill in his back yard, allowing toxic chemicals to ooze throughout the neighbourhood, nobody would call it an ‘attack’ when he was made to stop. Arguments implying that industry or private individuals have the right to impose ecological harms upon others need to be challenged in terms of fairness and ethics. Otherwise, they obscure the true character of the situation and help to perpetuate the status quo.

HVDC transmission for renewable energy

One limitation of renewable sources of energy is that they are often best captured in places far from where energy is used: remote bays with large tides, desert areas with bright and constant sun, and windswept ridges. In these cases, losses associated with transmitting the power over standard alternating current (AC) power lines can lead to very significant losses.

This is where high voltage direct current (HVDC) transmission lines come in. Originally developed in the 1930s, HVDC technology is only really suited to long-range transmission. This is because of the static inverters that must be used to convert the energy to DC for transmission. These are expensive devices, both in terms of capital cost and energy losses. With contemporary HVDC technology, energy losses can be kept to about 3% per 1000km. This makes the connection of remote generating centres much more feasible.

HVDC has another advantage: it can be used as a link between AC systems that are out of sync with each other. This could be different national grids running on different frequencies; it could be different grids on the same frequency with different timing; finally, it could be the multiple unsynchronized AC currents produced by something like a field of wind turbines.

Building national and international HVDC backbones is probably necessary to achieve the full potential of renewable energy. Because of their ability to stem losses, they can play a vital role in load balancing. With truly comprehensive systems, wind power from the west coast of Vancouver Island could compensate when the sun in Arizona isn’t shining. Likewise, offshore turbines in Scotland could complement solar panels in Italy and hydroelectric dams in Norway. With some storage capacity and a sufficient diversity of sources, renewables could provide all the electricity we use – including quantities sufficient for electric vehicles, which could be charged at times when demand for other things is low.

With further technological improvements, the cost of static inverters can probably be reduced. So too, perhaps, the per-kilometre energy losses. All told, investing in research on such renewable-facilitating technologies seems a lot more sensible than gambling on the eventual existence of ‘clean’ coal.

A grand solar plan for the United States

The latest issue of Scientific American features an article about a ‘grand solar plan.’ The idea is to install massive solar arrays in the American southwest, then use high voltage direct current transmission lines to transfer the energy to populated areas. The intention is to build 3,000 gigawatts of generating capacity by 2050 – a quantity that would require 30,000 square miles of photovoltaic arrays. This would cost about $400 billion and produce 69% of all American electricity and 35% of all energy used in transport (including electric cars and plug-in hybrids). The plan depends upon storing pressurized air in caverns to balance electricity supply and demand. The authors anticipate that full implementation of the plan would cut American greenhouse gas emissions to 62% below 2005 levels by 2050, even assuming a 1% annual increase in total energy usage.

The authors stress that the plan requires only modest and incremental improvements in solar technology. For instance, the efficiency of solar cells must be increased from the present level of about 10% to 14%. The pressurized cavern approach must also be tested and developed, and a very extensive new system of long-distance transmission lines would need to be built. While the infrastructure requirements are daunting, the total cost anticipated by the authors seems manageable. As they stress, it would cost less per year than existing agricultural subsidy programs.

Depending on solar exclusively is probably not socially or economically optimal. The authors implicitly acknowledge this when they advocate combining the solar system with wind, biomass, and geothermal sources in order to generate 100% of American electricity needs and 90% of total energy needs by 2100. Whether this particular grand plan is technically, economically, and politically viable or not, such publications do play a useful role in establishing the parameters of the debate. Given the ongoing American election – and the potential for the next administration to strike out boldly along a new course – such ideas are especially worthy of examination and debate. It is well worth reading the entire article.

Energy security and climate change

If you listen to the speeches being made by presidential candidates in the United States, you constantly hear two ideas equated that are really quite independent: ‘energy security’ and climate change mitigation. The former has to do with being able to access different kinds of energy (natural gas, transportation fuels, electricity) in a manner consistent with the national interest of a particular state. The latter is about reducing the amount of greenhouse gasses emitted in the course of generating and using that energy.

Some policies do achieve both goals: most notably, building renewable energy systems and the infrastructure that supports them. When the United Kingdom builds offshore wind farms, it serves both to reduce dependence on hydrocarbon imports from Russia and elsewhere and to reduce the link between British energy production and greenhouse gasses. Arguably, building new nuclear plants also serves both aims (though it has other associated problems).

There are plenty of policies that serve energy security without helping the problem of climate change at all. Indeed, many probably exacerbate it. A key example is Canada’s oil sands: they reduce North American dependence on oil imports, but at a very considerable climatic and ecological cost. Corn ethanol is probably an example of the same phenomenon, given all the emissions associated with intensive and mechanized modern farming. A third example can be found in efforts to convert coal to liquid fuel – a policy adopted during the Second World War by Germany and Japan when their access to imported oil was curtailed, but also an approach with huge associated greenhouse gas emissions.

Finally, it is possible to envision policies that help with climate change but do not serve energy security purposes. A key example is carbon capture and storage (CCS). Building power plants and factories that sequester emissions actually requires more energy, since it takes power to separate the greenhouse gasses from other emissions and pump them underground. If CCS technology allows the exploitation of domestic coal reserves without significant greenhouse gas emissions, both goals would be achieved, but CCS on its own contributes nothing to energy security.

The biggest danger in all of this is the unjustified muddling of two issues that are related but certainly not identical. It is simply not enough for developed states to ensure reliable and affordable access to fuels and power – they must do so in a way that helps to bring total global emissions in line with what the planet can absorb without suffering additional increases in mean temperature. Governments and private enterprises must not be allowed to pass off energy security policies with harmful climatic effects as ‘green.’

Three climatic binaries

One way to think about the issue of mitigating climate change is to consider three binary variables:

Cooperation
Expense
Disaster

By these I mean:

Is there a perception that all major emitters are making a fair contribution to addressing the problem?
Is mitigation to a sustainable level highly expensive?
Are obvious and unambiguous climatic disasters occurring?

These interact in a few different ways.

It is possible to imagine moderate levels of spending (1-5% of GDP) provided the first condition is satisfied. Especially important is the perception within industry that competitors elsewhere aren’t being given an advantage. Reduced opposition from business is probably necessary for a non-ideological all-party consensus to emerge about the need to stabilize greenhouse concentrations through greatly reduced emissions and the enhancement of carbon sinks.

It is likewise possible to imagine medium to high levels of spending in response to obvious climatically induced disasters. For instance, if we were to see 1m or more of sea level rise over the span of decades, causing serious disruption in developed and developing states alike. Such disasters would make the issue of climatic damage much more immediate: not something that may befall our descendants, but something violently inflicted upon the world in the present day.

Of course, if things get too bad, the prospects for cooperation are liable to collapse. Governments facing threats to their immediate security are unlikely to prioritize greenhouse gas emission reductions or cooperation to that end with other states.

We must hope that political leaders and populations will have the foresight to make cooperation work. It may also be hoped that the cost of mitigation will prove to be relatively modest. The issue of disasters is more ambiguous. It is probably better to have a relatively minor disaster obviously attributable to climate change, if it induces serious action, than the alternative of serious consequences being delayed until it is too late to stop abrupt or runaway change.

Drought subsidies

The Australian government is working on plans to revise drought payments to farmers. This is in response to the drought that has persisted for the last six years – long enough that people are wondering whether this is actually a ‘drought’ in the sense of a discrete and temporary event, or simply a reflection of the kind of future climate Australia can expect. Already, production of water-intensive cotton is down 66% from 2002 levels. The reduction in Australian agricultural productivity is also contributing to record increases in world food prices.

One question raised by all this is when governments should accept that an industry has become untenable. This has certainly occurred already in many fisheries, including the cod fishery in Canada’s Atlantic waters. Farming could become similarly untenable in many areas due to climate change or the increased need for water elsewhere. Politically, it is extremely difficult to tell people that their livelihood can no longer be sustained through public assistance. That said, such cutoffs are eventually required if public funds are to be spent efficiently on adaptation, rather than simply trying to perpetuate the status quo against worsening conditions.