The efficiency of solar

Robert Rapier, petroleum expert, and Steve Heckeroth, writing for Mother Earth News, agree that solar power is the future.

Based on their calculations, the overall efficiency of biomass “from sun to wheel” is between 0.01% and 0.05%. By contrast, charging electric vehicles using solar power can produce efficiencies of 3% to 20% on the same metric. Electric drivetrains are also “5 to 10 times more efficient than internal combustion engines.” Even if power from conventional fuels is charging the vehicles, overall emissions are likely to be lower. It is also much easier to sequester greenhouse gas emissions from big power plants than to do the same thing with car exhaust.

If you insist on maintaining a car-based society, basing it around electric vehicles charged using renewable energy or fossil fuel generation with sequestration seems to be the way to go. Hybrids are only a minor improvement and hydrogen fuel cells are a non-starter.

Bali talks beginning

Starting tomorrow morning, there will be twelve days of talks in Bali, Indonesia intended to begin the process of drafting a replacement for the Kyoto Protocol, when the period it covers ends in 2012. This particular meeting is mostly about choosing the structure for the real negotiations. Three possibilities are likely:

  1. The parties agree to extend the Kyoto Protocol, keeping in place many of its institutional structures
  2. The parties decide to create a whole new instrument
  3. The talks collapse in acrimony, with no agreement

Which of these takes place will largely depend on the stances adopted by the great powers and major emitters, especially the United States, Russia, China, Japan, Brazil, and the European Union.

Some questions of succession hang over the proceedings. The new Rudd government in Australia has only been in power for a week, and may not have a well developed negotiating position. More importantly, everyone knows the Bush administration will soon be out of power. Leading Congressional Democrats are attending the summit themselves. It remains to be seen what effect that will have.

McKinsey climate change study

Chrismukkah decorations

McKinsey – a major consultancy – has released a report (PDF) on the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. The general conclusion is a familiar one: that existing technologies and emerging technologies with a high probability of success can collectively reduce emissions by a very considerable degree at modest cost. Specifically, the study argues that 3.0 to 4.5 gigatonnes of CO2 equivalent can be averted by 2030, at marginal costs of under US$50 per tonne. Business as usual would see present emissions of 7.2 gigatonnes grow to 9.7 gigatonnes by 2030: almost twice what the whole planet can handle.

The executive summary linked above is well worth reading, as it is rich with detail. It stresses how abatement will not happen through a few big changes: many thousands of emitting activities must be incrementally reformed. That said, 40% of the abatement they describe would actually save money in the long term (for instance, by replacing existing systems with more energy efficient varieties).

Perhaps the most interesting element in the whole report is the abatement curve on the fifth page of the executive summary. It ranks a collection of mitigation activities from those that produce the highest level of economic benefit per tonne to those that are most costly. For instance, increasing the efficiency of commercial electronics could save $90 per tonne of CO2 equivalent. Other win-win options include residential electronics, building lighting, fuel economy standards for cars and trucks, and improvements to residential and commercial buildings. Cellulosic biofuels are net winners, though of a lesser magnitude, as is changes to soil tillage to boost the strength of carbon sinks. The most expensive abatement options include carbon capture and storage, the use of solar electric power, and the use of hybrid cars (the single most expensive option listed).

This is quite an encouraging view. Achieving substantial reductions within a developed economy for under $50 a tonne is promising in itself. It also suggests that international abatement prices could be even lower, given how insane things like tropical deforestation are from an economic perspective, once climate change is taken into account.

Ecosystems in a changing climate

Ashley Thorvaldson in party mode

As climate changes, many species are moving. Sometimes, it is from lower to higher altitudes, in order to live in familiar temperatures. Sometimes, it is from south to north for the same reason. Such natural adaptation is inevitable and, while it is a coping mechanism for individual species, it invariably changes the composition of ecosystem. Birds and flying insects may be able to relocate more easily, leaving slower-moving or less adaptable species behind. Suddenly, the structure of food webs start to change as predator-prey relations are redefined.

Some people have argued that allowing ecosystems to respond to climate change on their own is the best course of action. Others have argued that vulnerable species should be relocated to areas where they will be able to continue living. Some have even argued that polar bears should be relocated to Antarctica to make them less vulnerable to global warming. Others have argued that elephants and rhinos should be introduced to North America as a hedge against the danger of poaching. Finally, there are those who argue that we should actively manage ecosystems to try to mitigate climate change effects: if pests have shifted into new areas and begun eating crops, import their predators. If coastal erosion is worsening, bring in species to stabilize beaches.

The human record of such interventions is definitely not stellar, but the debate is nonetheless increasingly energetic. The discussion is both pragmatic – asking what the probable costs and benefits of making a change would be – and philosophical – engaging with the question of what the ‘natural’ world is and how people should engage with it. Global climatic change will make both of these sets of questions more immediately relevant and pressing.

Climate change and the Inuit way of life

Random portrait from the National Archives

At several points in the past, Arctic native groups including the Inuit have been effectively involved in the development of international regimes for environmental protection. Perhaps most significant was the role of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference in the development of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs). Studies done on the human health impact of Arctic POPs on the Inuit provided a big part of the scientific basis for the agreement. Arctic native groups were also effective at pressing their moral claim: chemicals being manufactured elsewhere were poisoning their environment and threatening their way of life.

A similar claim can be made about climate change, though the probable outcome is a lot more negative for Arctic native groups. Relatively few states and companies manufactured the bulk of POPs and, in most cases, less harmful chemicals can be used in their place. The economic costs of phasing out POPs were relatively modest. While the costs of dealing with climate change are a lot lower than the costs that will be incurred through inaction, they are nonetheless many orders of magnitude greater than the costs associated with abatement of POP use.

The threat posed to the Inuit by climate change is also quite a bit more far-reaching. It is entirely possible that the whole Arctic icecap will be gone within twenty years, or even sooner. 2007 was by far the worst year ever recorded for Arctic sea ice. Without summer sea ice, the Arctic ecosystem seems certain to change profoundly. Given the reliance of traditional Inuit lifestyles upon hunting terrestrial and marine mammals, it seems like such conditions would make it impossible to live as the Inuit have lived for millenia. This isn’t even a matter of worst-case scenarios. Even without significant new feedback effects, summer Arctic sea ice is likely to vanish by mid century. Increasing recognition of this partly explains the ongoing scramble to claim Arctic sub-sea mineral rights.

As with small island states, there doesn’t seem to be enormously much hope for avoiding fundamental and perhaps irreversible change in the Arctic.

Clean coal isn’t cheap

The point is increasingly well made by numerous sources: once you add carbon sequestration, coal is no longer an economically attractive option. In Indiana, a 630 megawatt coal plant is being built for $2 billion. That’s $3,174 per kilowatt. If we expect investors to seek a an 11% return on investment over a 20 year span, the capital cost of the plant is about 5.7 cents per kilowatt hour. On top of that, you need to pay for transmission, fuel, staff, and maintenance. On average, electricity in Indiana sells for about 6.79 cents per kilowatt hour.

The nominal price of the plant and the power it generates also doesn’t consider other coal externalities: like how mining it is dangerous and environmentally destructive. While this plant uses Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle technology and is capable of being attached to carbon sequestration infrastructure, it will not actually sequester the carbon it emits. As such, it will be only incrementally better than a standard coal plant with the same electrical output.

The only possible justification for this is that this is a demonstration plant that will help to make the technology much cheaper. Of course, when it is considered in that way, it seems at least equally sensible to spend $2 billion on experimental renewable power plants, in hopes of reducing their capital costs. The more you think about it, the more it seems like coal is densely packed carbon that is conveniently already in the ground. It should probably remain there.

Observing global oceans

Canadian Parliament

A number of severe problems are facing the world’s oceans and the living things that dwell within them. There is the exchange of invasive species through shipping, worldwide overexploitation of fish stocks, the acidification of the ocean from increased atmospheric carbon dioxide, changes in salinity that threaten major ocean currents, and pollution (including eutrophication from chemical runoff). As such, calls for more extensive study seem quite justified. One group that has been making such demands is the Partnership for Observation of the Global Oceans (POGO). They have called for an expanded global monitoring system involving research ships, buoys, satellites, and animal tagging. Such a system should both help scientists to understand the operation of existing systems better and predict the future consequences of ongoing human activities.

One of the more interesting satellites in the process of deployment is Jason-2. It will provide data on sea level changes with unprecedented accuracy and coverage. Using a RADAR altimeter, it will determine sea levels to centimetre precision, measuring the 95% of all ice-free ocean areas every ten days. This is helpful because sea level is not constant or globally consistent: observing how it changes can improve the quality of weather predictions and climate models. The level of radiation in the zone where Jason-2 will orbit is intense. As a consequence, the projected lifetime of the craft is only about five years. If all goes well, it should be launched in February 2008 to replace the Jason-1 system, already suffering from multiple failures.

Understanding climate absolutely requires understanding the nature of the oceans, as well as the interactions between the hydrosphere (liquid water), cryosphere (ice), and atmosphere. Hopefully, a few billion dollars spent on oceanic research will yield understanding that can help to guide more intelligent action. Of course, having that transpire requires more than scientific certainty – it requires the personal and political will that have really been the absent element in ocean management.

Methane clathrates and runaway warming

Terraces de la Chaudière

Essentially a form of ice infused with methane, clathrates may seem an obscure topic for discussion. They exist only under extreme conditions: such as underneath oceanic sediment. What makes them significant is the sheer volume of methane they contain. While it is unclear what degree of warming would be required to induce methane release from clathrates, there is a very real possibility that such release could be self-reinforcing. Given the global warming potential of methane and the volume of the gas in oceanic clathrates, such a self-sustaining release could induce abrupt and massive climatic change.

As a greenhouse gas, methane is potent. Averaged across a 100 year span, one tonne of methane produces as much warming as 25 tonnes of carbon dioxide. Even worse, when atmospheric methane breaks down, it generally oxidizes into carbon dioxide and water. Taking into account secondary effects, the warming potential of a tonne of methane is about equal to 72 tonnes of CO2 (according to the Fourth assessment report of the IPCC). This is one reason people are so concerned about the climatic effects of meat production, as well as the reason for which methane capture projects are one of the more credible kinds of carbon offset.

Recent estimates hold that ocean clathrates contain 500-2500 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent: akin to 100-500 years worth of sustainable emissions. About 400 Gt of carbon dioxide equivalent is in the Arctic permafrost. If a substantial proportion of this methane were to be released, it would take the world into completely unknown climatic territory. As such, it is highly likely that the adaptive capacity of both humanity and existing ecosystems would be overwhelmed, perhaps to a degree akin to the Permian-Triassic extinction event. This is truly the nightmare scenario for climate change, though its probability cannot be accurately assessed in relation to any combination of human behaviours and natural variations.

The existence of such exceedingly dire possibilities affects economic calculations about climate change. While it may not be sensible to spend 20% of global GDP to avoid an outcome with a 0.1% chance of occurring, a strong argument can be made that heavy expenditure is justified in the face of catastrophic risk. It is not as though we have another planet to fall back on if this one gets rendered unfit for human habitation.

[Update: 4 February 2009] Here is a post on the danger of self-amplifying, runaway climate change: Is runaway climate change possible? Hansen’s take.

[Update: 19 February 2010] See also: The threat from methane in the North.

Four Economist articles on climate change

Sorry to post a bunch of links from one source, but this week’s Economist is unusually dense with worthwhile articles about climate change:

There is one on federal legislative efforts in the United States – focusing on the Lieberman Warner bill that has been dominating attention in the Senate. It isn’t as tough as a superior proposal from Bernie Sanders and Barbara Boxer, but it stands a better change of thrashing its way through committee and onto the Senate floor. Of course, even a bill that gets through the Senate would need to be made compatible with a bill passed by the House of Representatives and avoid being vetoed by the President. Even so, the kind of cap-and-trade bills that are appearing in the Senate may well be indicative of the kind of legislation to expect from the next American administration.

American states have traditionally been ‘policy laboratories’ and have often developed environmental policies that were later adopted federally. Examples include rules on automobile emissions and sulphur dioxide emissions which cause acid rain. A second article briefly discusses the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI): one of the two most important regional initiatives in the US, along with the Western Climate Initiative. Again, this is more a sign of what may be to come than a hugely influential thing unto itself.

A less encouraging trend is demonstrated by an article on the increasing popularity of coal. What is especially distressing is that coal plants are even being built in Europe, which has gone further than anyone else in regulating carbon emissions. Clearly, prices are not yet high enough and regulatory certainty is not yet firm enough to effectively discourage the use of coal for electricity generation. The new plants aren’t even being built in a way that can be easily modified to incorporate carbon capture and storage.

One last story is more tangentially related to climate change: tomorrow’s federal election in Australia will partly turn on voters responses to the positions adopted on climate change by the Labor and Conservative candidates, respectively.

In general, I don’t think The Economist takes the problem of climate change seriously enough. They write good-sounding articles in situations where it is the focus, but often miss it completely or mention it only trivially in articles on energy trends, business, or economic growth. That said, their ever-increasing coverage of the issue is probably representative of its ever higher profile in the planning of the world’s most influential people.

Problems with carbon markets

Meaghan Beattie and tasty food

A recent article in Scientific American makes a lot of good points about carbon markets and emission trading. Perhaps most important among them is the recognition that the simple existence of a market cannot ensure good environmental outcomes: there must be strong and appropriately designed institutions backing it up. Otherwise, well-connected firms will be able to wriggle through loopholes, fraud will occur at an unacceptable level, and cheating will be endemic.

The article points out some of the big failures in carbon markets so far. Within the European Union Emission Trading Scheme, far too many permits to emit were distributed for free. As a result, their price collapsed in April 2006. Even worse, coal companies in Germany and elsewhere were given free permits to pollute, able to sell some of those permits for cash, and willing to charge their customers for carbon costs that never existed. Also problematic has been the prominence of HFC-23 (trifluoromethane) projects within the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. Getting rid of HFC-23 entirely should have only cost about $136 million. It has an absurdly high global warming potential (12,000 times worse than CO2), and is easy to destroy and replace with less problematic chemicals. So far, firms have been able to earn $12.7 billion for partial elimination. The authors of the article suggest that simply paying for the $136 million worth of equipment would be far more sensible than allowing firms to exploit the price difference between the value of emission reduction credits and the cost of eliminating HFC-23.

Other problems with markets include the difficulty of working out what emissions would have been in the absence of some change (the approach used for many carbon offsetting systems) and the way markets can encourage incremental approaches to emission reduction rather than the fundamental overhaul of industrial sectors and energy infrastructures.

None of this is to say that markets are not important. Indeed, carbon pricing is an essential component in the fight against climate change. What it shows is that participants in markets cannot be implicitly trusted, and neither can the governments operating them. There must be mechanisms for oversight and enforcing compliance and a constant awareness about possibilities for cheating or gaming the system. Insofar as it has helped people to develop a better sense of these things, the Emission Trading System of the EU has been a valuable front-runner.