Between 1990 and the present, a significant reduction in European greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions took place because coal based electricity generation was replaced by natural gas plants. Here’s the big question: should that switch be considered an act of climatic virtue on the part of the European states, and thus be taken into account when identifying their fair share of remaining necessary emissions reductions, or should it be ignored? This is in some ways akin to the matter of additionality, as mentioned here before
There are naturally arguments on both sides. It seems fair to say that at least some of the motivation for the switch came from concern about climate change and a desire to meet Kyoto Protocol targets for emission reductions. At the same time, it is very difficult to determine how much was driven by other considerations: from the state of gas production in the North Sea to concern about non-GHG pollutants to long-term estimates of the relative price of coal and gas.
Another issue to consider is long-term energy use. If the European states had chosen to stick with coal, but they had switched to natural gas at some point in the relatively near future, the impact would largely have been the same, in terms of climate. The same additionality problem that applies in the present exists for the recent past. Using the gas in the distant future would have less of an effect (assuming successful climate change mitigation does occur) since the timing of emissions is important for climate stabilization pathways.
Pragmatically, giving some credit to the Europeans for the transition may be a necessary step in negotiations. That being said, the conundrum is enough to make one wonder whether a metric ignoring ‘additionality’ would be more manageable in practice. Ignoring the question of whether emissions reductions were motivated by concerns over climate change or not, and instead focusing only on the magnitude of reductions, would probably be a more efficient form of calculation. That being said, it would arguably be less equitable. Also, it might be incompatible with the notion that different states or sectors should spend ‘comparable’ amounts on climate change mitigation.
Thoughts? Does it make the most sense to give the European states full, partial, or no credit? Secondly, is ‘additionality’ sufficiently ethically important to justify the headaches it produces?
{ 11 comments… read them below or add one }
Additionality
The issue of what qualifies as a bona fide offset and why largely boils down to a concept called “additionality.” Usually phrased as the question “is the project reducing emissions in a way that is business as usual, or is it beyond business as usual,” the concept of additionality reflects people’s gut feeling that if a project was or is reducing emissions regardless of the prospect of offset revenues, we shouldn’t be giving it offset revenues. Instead, we should give offsets revenues only to those projects that really need them. Where people begin to disagree is on how to put that concept into practice – how high and in what manner should we set the additionality bar.
I think you may be confusing two different issues here: firstly, was the coal to gas switch a good thing, from a climate change perspective (sounds like the answer is a qualified yes), and secondly, why did they do it.
I’m not at all convinced the latter matters unless you’re talking about offsets, otherwise you disregard the good things done for non-climate change related reasons. Whether the result is good re. climate change is independent of whether that was their reason for choosing it.
For instance, if Germans are sensible enough to know that well insulated houses save them money, and/or prefer that insulation, then should we ignore their lower domestic energy use because it wasn’t driven by Kyoto commitments? Should predominantly vegetarian countries be told that their lower resource usage per head is irrelevant if it is motivated by religious or moral reasons instead of a desire to be green?
I think applying an additionality test is a huge gamble, since we have yet to see whether significant change can be driven largely by a desire to reduce CO2 emissions (or otherwise to mitigate climate change). Further, it risks alienating some of the ‘good guys’ who are driving international efforts, & it’s difficult to see how things can progress without such leadership.
firstly, was the coal to gas switch a good thing, from a climate change perspective
In terms of climate change, moving from coal to gas is almost unambiguously a positive step. The only reason I can think of for disagreeing is that the gas plants will last a long time and you could have installed something even greener instead.
Regarding additionality, I basically agree with you.
One area where this is sure to come up is in relation to base years for future agreements. In whatever treaty succeeds Kyoto, countries will probably commit to reduce emissions to X% below year Y levels by year Z. Including the span from 1990 to 2000 (or 2005) flatters countries that cut emissions during than span, with the opposite effect for states where they rose.
In situations where emissions fell for environmentally motivated reasons, it seems unambiguous that credit should be given. It is a bit more dubious whether changes made for non-climatic but voluntary reasons should be counted. The biggest controversy surrounds big involuntary cuts - particularly those that arose from the collapse of communism. Europe has basically been treating that drop in emissions as equivalent to improvements in British power plants or Norwegian houses.
Why does it matter if the cuts are ‘involuntary’ (and involuntary for whom)? From the perspective of an ex-Soviet, you’ve already seen hugely increasing poverty, falling living standards, food shortages etc due to the fall of the Soviet Union, and now some imperialist bastard Westerners are telling you that your living standards need to fall further because the involuntary nature of your CO2 emission cuts doesn’t meet their moral standards.
The Eastern European states themselves are unlikely to adopt binding targets. At issue is whether other states that do have emissions reduction commitments will be able to ‘buy’ the cuts that resulted from the failure of the USSR, rather than make domestic cuts.]
For example, an energy company in Germany or France could buy credits from Bulgaria (which had emissions fall by 49% after 1998) and count them the same as cutting emissions domestically.
Given that the cuts in Eastern Europe have already happened, all keeping those credits on the market permits is cheaper compliance for firms in Annex I states.
The pavement there looks pretty artificial. I think you over-sharpened it.
I’m not sure of the numbers, but from my first hand experience, methane (i.e. “natural gas”, a nice name for what’s left over after all the valuable propane is taken out) is a pretty shit fuel with an extremely low energy content. I’m sure it’s better than coal, if the numbers say so, but it’s just as un-renewable. Also, it’s much scarcer than coal (it’s not really possible to ramp up production of it, as it is with coal).
Emissions reductions should be made through the reduction of energy consumed, not the “increased efficiency” of energy production and consumption. The real solutions to climate change all involve social change - working from home, different style of personal dwellings, taking transit, (many of these things imply a reduction of emphasis on personal safety), and probably most importantly less emphasis on gaining individual wealth. It’s not as if the “me comes first” mentality of late capitalism (specifically, the capitalism of psycho-analytically informed advertising) needs to be permanent.
Natural gas burns cleaner than other fossil fuels, such as oil and coal, and produces less carbon dioxide per unit energy released. For an equivalent amount of heat, burning natural gas produces about 30% less carbon dioxide than burning petroleum and about 45% less than burning coal. Combined cycle power generation using natural gas is thus the cleanest source of power available using fossil fuels, and this technology is widely used wherever gas can be obtained at a reasonable cost.
Emissions reductions should be made through the reduction of energy consumed, not the “increased efficiency” of energy production and consumption.
Both tactically and strategically, it makes sense to focus on all three links in the emissions chain: pushing conservation, energy efficiency, and the decarbonization of energy production. That last may be especially important, given the difficulty involved in getting people to actually reduce energy use.
The real solutions to climate change all involve social change - working from home, different style of personal dwellings, taking transit, (many of these things imply a reduction of emphasis on personal safety), and probably most importantly less emphasis on gaining individual wealth. It’s not as if the “me comes first” mentality of late capitalism (specifically, the capitalism of psycho-analytically informed advertising) needs to be permanent.
Climate change could be solved in many ways, some of which might require very little change in individual behaviour. Hoping for a change in the basic philosophy of society may be the least realistic way to achieve a solution. Choosing successively better options (gas over coal, wind over gas) seems a lot more pragmatic.
Britain will fulfil its 2010 obligations under the Kyoto climate treaty—a 12.5% cut in emissions compared with 1990 levels—but largely because the energy-market liberalisation of the early 1990s caused a one-off switch from expensive coal-fired power stations to cheaper and, incidentally, cleaner gas-fired ones. Greenhouse-gas emissions overall have fallen only slightly since Labour came to power in 1997, and carbon emissions have risen slightly (see chart). Other pledges, such as the government’s promise to generate 15% of Britain’s energy from renewable sources by 2020, stand little chance of being met. Admittedly, all this amounts to a better record than many other countries can show, but it makes British aspirations to “global leadership” look a touch threadbare.