Category: Bombs and rockets

Military matters and state security: the hard-edged kind of international relations

Security of Pakistani nuclear weapons

Nevertheless, the exact nature of launch authorization procedures is ambiguous. Several sources refer to a system of two separate codes—one civilian and the other military—amounting to a “dual key” system. However, several authoritative accounts mention a three-man rule. In particular, the code to arm a weapon can only be inserted in the presence of three persons. It is possible that a two-man rule is adopted for movement of warheads and a three-man rule is adopted for employment authorization. According to Pakistani planners, the number of persons involved varies “for technical reasons”—three at some points in the chain of command, two at other points.

Pakistan is not explicit about its arrangements for weapons security, but it has developed physical safety mechanisms and firewalls both in the weapon systems themselves, as well as in the chain of command. No single individual can operate a weapon system, nor can one individual issue the command for nuclear weapons use. The NCA command and control system ensures that weapons can be operationally ready on short notice, yet unauthorized arming and/or use never takes place.

Pakistan does not keep its nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert. The nuclear weapons are few in number and probably kept in disassembled form; their components are reportedly stored separately, at dispersed sites. Keeping the weapons in a disassembled form, along with the use of authorization codes, reduces the risk of capture or unauthorized use. Naturally, there is considerable uncertainty about the location of Pakistani nuclear weapons and about procedures for actual use. After September 11, Pakistan ordered a redeployment of the country’s nuclear arsenal to at least six secret new locations, according to one account. Fissile materials are obviously stored in secret locations; probably in initial stages they are near installations such as Kahuta or Khushab, or close to Rawalpindi. Additionally, from a security standpoint sensitive material sites are carefully chosen, in safe areas and within quick reach of designated rapid reaction forces, which are specially trained and operate under command of the security division of SPD. Although Pakistan’s system is not as sophisticated as the U.S. permissive action links (PALs), it is deemed reliable enough to preclude unauthorized arming or launching of its nuclear weapons.

Dummy locations are also reportedly employed to minimize the risks of destruction or capture. SPD Head Lieutenant-General Khalid Kidwai, in a lecture at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in October 2006, clarified that “no delegation of authority concerning nuclear weapons is planned.” The conclusion, therefore, is that centralized control is retained by the NCA at the Joint Services Headquarters. Beyond this clarification, operational control plans cannot be made public by any nuclear state and thus remain a national security secret, as was the case with the United States and other nuclear powers during the Cold War.

Khan, Feroz Hassan. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. Stanford University Press; Stanford. 2012. p. 331–2

Chinese aid to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program

Western sources claim that China had provided Pakistan with fissile material in exchange for centrifuge technology assistance. Zia-ul-Haq hoped to exploit the close relationship with the Chinese further in order to protect Pakistan from potential preventative attacks… [T]he impact of Israeli attack on Osirak and the crash of the centrifuges in 1981 forced Zia-ul- Haq to realize that the nuclear program was vulnerable not just to preventive strikes but also to natural calamities. Zia-ul- Haq then dispatched Lieutenant-General Syed Zamin Naqvi and A.Q. Khan to request bomb-grade fissile materials and bomb designs. Their visit bore fruit as Pakistan then received the Chinese CHIC-4 weapon design along with 50 kilograms of HEU in 1981, material sufficient for two bombs. A.Q. Khan confirmed in a purported 2004 letter to his wife, “The Chinese gave us drawings of the nuclear weapon, gave us 50 kg of enriched uranium, gave us 10 tons of UF6 (natural) and 5 tons of UF6(3%).”

According to A.Q. Khan’s accounts, the Chinese nuclear material was kept in storage until 1985. When Pakistan acquired its own uranium enrichment capability and wanted to return the fissile material, China responded that “the HEU loaned earlier was now considered as a gift … in gratitude” for Pakistan’s help with Chinese centrifuges. It was then that KRL “promptly fabricated hemispheres for two weapons and added them to Pakistan’s arsenal.”

Khan, Feroz Hassan. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. Stanford University Press; Stanford. 2012. p. 188 (typographical inconsistencies in original)

Basics of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment

[U]ranium enrichment is the process that separates U-235 from U-238 in order to increase the proportion of the former isotope. Separation is measured by the kilogram separative work unit (SWU), representing the amount of uranium processed and the degree to which it is enriched. The gas centrifuge exploits the mass difference between these two isotopes (three neutrons) by spinning uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) at extraordinarily high speeds (twice the speed of sound), forcing the lighter U-235 to the center, where it can be “scooped off” at the top. These centrifuges must be arranged in cascades, or groups of centrifuges, as each cascade enriches the material only slightly before feeding it into the next. Although this process may sound fairly simple, the specialized materials and precision engineering necessary are very difficult to achieve.

The necessary ingredient for the enrichment process, UF6, must be free of any impurities, as impurities may condense and trigger blockages in the valves and piping of the cascades, causing the centrifuges to crash. Once this gas is produced with the highest degree of purity, it is then ready to be fed into the centrifuge, a machine made of many complex parts. The main components are (1) rotor and end caps; (2) bearing and suspension systems; (3) electric motor and power supplies; (4) center post, scoops, and baffles; (5) the vacuum system; and (6) the casing. The first challenge is to acquire the specialized materials for these parts. High-strength, corrosion-resistant materials, such as maraging steel, aluminium alloys, titanium, glass-fiber resins, or carbon fiber, are essential for most of the aforementioned components. Maraging steel specifically provides not only protection but also the capacity for faster rotor speed.

The second challenge is to construct a perfectly balanced centrifuge rotor (an almost impossible task) that can rotate at supercritical speeds (about 100,000 rpm). In addition to the complex engineering necessary for the construction of other centrifuge parts, a method must be devised to control the temperature and convection in the vacuum. Now imagine replicating this precision engineering in cascades of about three thousand centrifuges.

Khan, Feroz Hassan. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. Stanford University Press; Stanford. 2012. p. 142

Diplomacy by toast

In another attempt to dissuade Pakistan from its nuclear path, Kissinger visited Pakistan in August 1976. At the same time, U.S. elections were sparking debates, and Democrat Jimmy Carter’s agenda specifically targeted Kissinger and his relaxed response to India’s nuclear test. As Dennis Kux writes, “Kissinger and Ford were under pressure to demonstrate that they were doing everything possible to prevent Pakistan from continuing its efforts to match India’s nuclear capability.”

Thus Kissinger’s second trip to Pakistan was an attempt to remedy his mistakes. He arrived with an offer of 110 A-7 attack bombers for the Pakistani Air force in exchange for canceling the reprocessing plant purchase [from France], indicating that Congress would most likely approve such a deal. And as a stick, he brandished a possible Democratic victory, hinting that when in power, Carter would certainly make an example of Pakistan. Since that meeting, the popular myth in Pakistan has been that Kissinger threatened Bhutto with “a horrible example,” meant as an ultimatum.

At an official dinner in the city of Lahore, Kissinger and Bhutto engaged in nuclear banter in the midst of toasts. Raising his glass, Bhutto declared, “[Lahore] is our reprocessing center and we cannot in any way curb the reprocessing center of Pakistan.” When Kissinger’s turn for the toast came, he replied, “All governments must constantly ‘reprocess’ themselves and decide what is worth reprocessing.”

Khan, Feroz Hassan. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. Stanford University Press; Stanford. 2012. p. 136-7

The makings of a nuclear program

The prerequisite for any state embarking on a nuclear weapons program is a complex base of material and people with a diverse set of skills and experience. A 1968 UN study estimates that a full-fledged nuclear weapons program requires some five hundred scientists and thirteen hundred engineers—physicists, chemists, and metallurgists; civil, military, mechanical, and electrical engineers; machine-tool operators with precision engineering experience; and instrument-makers and fabricators. The history of the nuclear age has shown that secrecy surrounds all nuclear weapons endeavors. Skilled workers of this nature are not publicly acknowledged, and their employment is often disguised. Further, the state needs to have a certain industrial base within its territory or access to one, and considerable experience in engineering, mining, and explosives. In addition, for a program to remain clandestine, sufficient foreign exchange and covert business deals with foreign partners willing to do business must generally be held as a state secret.*

* Zia Mian, “How to Build the Bomb,” in Mian ed., Pakistan’s Atomic Bomb and Search for Security (Lahore: Gautam Publishers, 1995), 135–6

Khan, Feroz Hassan. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. Stanford University Press; Stanford. 2012. p. 49

The strategy behind Pakistani nuclear development

Today, there are three important strategic beliefs [in Pakistan] regarding nuclear weapons that were largely absent when [Zulfiqar Ali] Bhutto took power in 1971 but have since become dominant in Pakistani strategic thought. First, nuclear weapons are the only guarantee of Pakistan’s national survival in the face of both an inveterately hostile India that cannot be deterred conventionally and unreliable external allies that fail to deliver in extremis. Second, Pakistan’s nuclear program is unfairly singled out for international opposition because of its Muslim population. This feeling of victimization is accentuated by a belief that India consistently “gets away with” violating global nonproliferation norms. Third is the belief that India, Israel, or the United States might use military force to stop Pakistan’s nuclear program. Today, these three beliefs—nuclear necessity for survival, international discrimination against Pakistan, and danger of disarming attacks—form the center of Pakistani strategic thinking about nuclear weapons. Collectively, these convictions have served to reinforce the determination of Pakistan’s military, bureaucratic, and scientific establishment to pay any political, economic, or technical cost to reach their objective of a nuclear-armed Pakistan.

Khan, Feroz Hassan. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. Stanford University Press; Stanford. 2012. p. 6

Saudi Arabia and the political economy of oil

The fact that oil money helped develop the power of the muwahhidun in Arabia after 1930 and made possible the resurgence of Islamic political movements in the 1970s has often been noted. But it is equally important to understand that, by the same token, it was an Islamic movement that made possible the profits of the oil industry. The political economy of oil did not happen, in some incidental way, to relied on a government in Saudi Arabia that owed its own power to the force of an Islamic political movement. Given the features of the political economy of oil – the enormous rents available, the difficulty in securing those rents due to the overabundance of supply, the pivotal role of Saudi Arabia in maintaining scarcity, the collapse of older colonial methods of imposing anti-market corporate control of the Saudi oilfields – oil profits depended on working with those forces that could guarantee the political control of Arabia: the House of Saud in alliance with the muwahhidun. The latter were not incidental, but became an internal element in the political economy of oil. ‘Jihad’ was not simply a local force antithetical to the development of ‘McWorld’; McWorld, it turns out, was really McJihad, a necessary combination of social logics and forces.

Mitchell, Timothy. Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil. Verso; London. 2013. p. 213 (italics in original)

Mitchell on “Carbon Democracy”

A surprising oversight in Timothy Mitchell’s generally-insightful Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil is how he gives relatively little consideration to static versus mobile forms of fossil fuel consumption. He strongly emphasizes the production and transportation logistics of coal versus oil, but gives little consideration to special needs for fuels with high energy density (and sometimes low freezing points) in transport applications from cars and trucks to aircraft and rockets. People sometimes assume that oil demand and electricity production are more related than they really are, especially in jurisdictions where oil is mostly used as transport fuel and for heating (both areas where little electricity is generally used).

At a minimum, I think it’s important to give some special consideration to the needs of the aerospace and aviation industries, especially when pondering biofuel alternatives. Also, we need to try to project things like the deployment rate of electric ground vehicles in various applications, when trying to project how the forms of energy production and use in the future affect politics and low-carbon policy choices.

Supergrade

The technical term “supergrade” has had a pair of distinctly American meanings:

(a) A supergrade was the civilian equivalent of an Army general

(b) Supergrade is industry parlance for plutonium alloy bearing an exceptionally high fraction of Pu-239 (>95%), leaving a very low amount of Pu-240 which is a gamma emitter in addition to being a high spontaneous fission isotope