Politics – Page 138 – a sibilant intake of breath

India’s voluntary climate actions

In international climate negotiations, India has been one of the states asserting most forcefully that developing countries should not have mandatory emissions caps applied to them. It argues, quite rightly, that states that are now rich largely became that way on the basis of fossil fuel use, and that it still has high levels of extreme poverty to address. That being said, all global emissions will eventually need to be cut. Approaches like contraction and convergence seek to address these practical and ethical issues, by giving states like India and China a bit of space in which to keep increasing emissions, before theirs peak at a level far below where rich states are now, and eventually fall to zero.

While India isn’t signing on to such schemes now, they are taking some voluntary actions unilaterally: “a proposed $20 billion investment in solar energy; a plan to return a third of its area to forest; and many energy-efficiency measures.” These are the sorts of win-win measures that generate positive secondary effects. Solar power doesn’t cause air pollution, and can help countries reduce their dependence on imported fuels. Reforestation protects watersheds and decreases erosion. Energy efficiency might be the single area where it is most possible to actually save money while reducing emissions.

Eventually, India will need to be brought into a binding global emissions reduction regime. For now, whatever actions that can be taken to drive their development process towards a low-carbon course should be undertaken.

Gas by gas, or all together?

The various chemicals that cause the climate system to warm vary considerably in their characteristics:

How strong a warming effect they have
How long they remain in the atmosphere
What processes produce them
Whether they have other positive or negative effects
Etc

For instance, methane is a much more potent greenhouse gas (GHG) than carbon dioxide (CO2), but it stays around a lot less time. CFCs and HCFCs are very powerful greenhouse gasses that are produced by a relatively small number of companies for specific applications; CO2, by contrast, is produced by most forms of economic activity everywhere.

Faced with these sorts of variation, some people have argued that having one regime for all GHGs is not the best approach. Because of the damage they cause to the Earth’s stratospheric ozone layer, CFCs are covered by the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention. That limited agreement has produced about 175 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent in emission reductions, compared to just a handful from the partially implemented Kyoto Protocol.

The advantage of putting all GHGs into the same legal instrument is that it could allow for mitigation to be balanced in the most efficient way. If Gas X is five times more problematic than Gas Y, the value of the carbon tax paid or auctioned permits purchased would also be five times greater. That way, people would focus on cutting emissions where it is cheapest and easiest to do so. The major disadvantage of bundling the GHGs together is that doing so can distort markets. One gas – HFC-23 – is so powerful and so cheap to get rid of that it has seriously skewed prices in global carbon markets. Rather than paying people huge sums of HFC-23, we should just be sharply limiting how much of the stuff people are permitted to make in the first place.

In an ideal world, it should be possible to have a well designed system that incorporates all GHGs. It should also be possible to have a series of overlapping agreements that do so. In practical terms, what the latter possibility allows is an alternative route that might be taken, if efforts to produce one big treaty continue to prove unsuccessful.

The IEA on peak oil and climate policy

The International Energy Agency (IEA) has recently charged its public position on peak oil. It now claims that output of conventional oil will peak in 2020, if demand continues to grow in a business-as-usual way:

After analysing the historical production trends of 800 individual oilfields in 2008, the IEA came to the conclusion that the decline in annual output from fields that are past their prime could average 8.6% in 2030. “Even if oil demand were to remain flat, the world would need to find more than 40m barrels per day of gross new capacity—equal to four new Saudi Arabias—just to offset this decline,” says Mr Birol.

A daunting task. Peak-oil proponents point out that the average size of new discoveries has been declining since the mid-1960s. Between 1960 and 1989 the world discovered more than twice the oil it produced. But between 1990 and 2006 cumulative oil discoveries have been about half of production. Their opponents argue that long periods of relatively low oil prices blunted the incentives for exploration. A sustained period of higher prices, they argue, should increase discoveries. They point out that the first half of 2009 saw 10 billion barrels of new discoveries, an annual rate higher than any year since 2000. The pessimists retort that recent discoveries are still not enough.

Insofar as climate change mitigation policies could help control demand growth, they could thus extend the timeframe during which humanity will address fossil fuel depletion.

The IEA argues that coordinated action to prevent more than 2°C of climate change would reduce global demand for oil in 2030 from 105 million barrels per day to 89 million.

Climate economics and the discount rate

Perhaps the most long-running debate in climate change economics concerns what discount rate ought to be used, when working out what the probable costs of future climate change mean in the present. The basic idea of a discount rate is that things are often worth more acquired immediately than they are delivered at some future time. This is reflected in the existence of positive interest rates, which compensate people for waiting.

In the context of climate, the discount rate is basically a measure of how much we care about future generations, and what burdens we are willing to accept in order to improve their lives. If a 1% sacrifice in our generation will avert catastrophe for people a few generations off, it is probably something we should do. By contrast, if a massive sacrifice now only creates incremental improvements later, we may want to hold off. The Stern Review of climate change economics attracted both praise and criticism for choosing a very low discount rate. This choice was made on the basis of the moral argument that we should be equally concerned about the welfare of all generations. Even if climate change won’t become a disaster for a hundred years, or more, we should still be willing to consider the costs imposed by our emissions as meaningful. If you choose the sort of high discount rates used for business decisions, you basically shrink the importance of anyone living more than a few decades away down to almost zero. William Nordhaus is one economist who advocates such a rate, despite how using the 3% rate he prefers makes costs in 25 years half as significant as costs now.

One problem with using formal discount rates is that they can produce strange results when applied mathematically:

Paul Klemperer, an economics professor at Oxford University, points out that very long-term securities carry very low interest rates. When the British government recently issued 40-year index-linked bonds, for instance, it did so at a 0.5% real rate. And over the very long term standard discount rates lead to strange conclusions. At a modest 2% rate, for instance, a single cent rendered unto Caesar in Jesus’s time is the equivalent of about $1.5 quadrillion (or 30 times the value of the entire world economy) today.

Another major reason for which people advocate high discount rates is because they believe that people in future generations will almost inevitably be richer than those alive now, and thus able to deal with any particular physical problem using a smaller fraction of their wealth. While building coastal defences for low-lying cities might use up a lot of our wealth now, the argument goes, people in the future will be better able to cope. Personally, I don’t think we can assume any longer that people decades from now will be richer than us. Firstly, the costs associated with climate change are going nowhere but up. Secondly, the bonanza of cheap fossil fuel energy is ending. Future generations are going to have some big hurdles to jump.

The choice of discount rate has a massive effect on whether your economic modeling tells you that mitigating climate change is a better deal than trying to adapt to it. If you have discounted away the welfare of people in 50 or 100 years, the fact that they could be put into an intolerable situation is largely unimportant. Personally, I think climate economics is given too much credibility due to the false precision it seems to offer. Rather than abstracting down to a single number and then giving it so much importance, perhaps we should think about risk management in a more qualitative way. Rather than using math to investigate the question of whether we should take the lives and welfare of those in the future seriously, we should acknowledge the strong moral case that we should not seriously damage the planet for all those who will follow us.

The cost of avoiding loss

Ken Caldiera has come up with a nice reversal of the “does it make sense to spend money fighting climate change” question:

“If we already had energy and transportation systems that met our needs without using the atmosphere as a waste dump for our carbon- dioxide pollution, and I told you that you could be 2% richer, but all you had to do was acidify the oceans and risk killing off coral reefs and other marine ecosystems, risk melting the ice caps with rapid sea-level rise, shifting weather patterns so that food-growing regions might not be able to produce adequate amounts of food, and so on, would you take all of that environmental risk, just to be 2% richer?”

You would have to be mad to say ‘yes.’

Spoofing Canada on climate

Earlier today, pranksters impersonating Environment Canada issued a phony press release which contained new targets for greenhouse gas mitigation in Canada. While Canada’s actual targets are 20% below 2006 levels by 2020 (equivalent to about 3% below 1990 levels) and 60-70% below 2006 levels by 2050, the press release included the much more ambitious figures of 40% below 1990 levels by 2020 and over 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. The release also made reference to a major transfer of funds to the developing world, as compensation for past harm and to encourage both mitigation and adaptation actions.

Compared to Canada’s real targets, the phony tougher targets are much more in line with an emissions pathway set up to reduce the risk of more than 2°C of warming. The stunt also draws attention to how Canada isn’t really negotiating in Copenhagen. We came in with a pair of targets that we say we will reach, regardless of what anyone else does, though we also frequently say that we won’t do anything until the US acts. Indeed, our environment minister was saying less than a month ago that Canada won’t take meaningful action for years. It should also be recalled that the government once promised that their intensity-based approach would lead to emissions peaking by 2012. Nobody mentions that pledge anymore.

The identities of those behind the stunt remain unknown. Hopefully, it will draw attention to Canada’s evasion and lack of ambition, prompting a genuine change of targets and approach soon.

Walkout at Copenhagen

The latest from Copenhagen is that the climate talks are stalled due to a walkout by poorer nations. As distant as I am from all the manoeuvring, it is impossible to know how significant this is. Most news sources are suggesting that the move is a calculated negotiating tactic. Some of those reporting on the conference have been critical of the drama; others have focused attention on how the probable outcome remains uncertain, though it is very unlikely to be a finalized agreement.

Arguably, the toughest thing will not be to hammer out a new global agreement of some sort, but rather to produce a document that will significantly change outcomes for major emitters in both the developed and the rapidly developing world. Canada’s record of signing on to a reduction target, then never developing and deploying a plan to reach it, is certainly not encouraging in this regard.

Copenhagen global editorial

Along with 56 other newspapers in 20 languages, The Guardian recently printed a front page editorial about the Copenhagen climate change conference. Apparently, the tactic of having many papers print it simultaneously has not been used previously. It seems fitting that this happen on an issue of such universal importance.

The editorial highlights the risks associated with climate change, and the inadequacy of actions taken so far. It also includes a brief response to the CRU emails issue:

The science is complex but the facts are clear. The world needs to take steps to limit temperature rises to 2C, an aim that will require global emissions to peak and begin falling within the next 5-10 years. A bigger rise of 3-4C — the smallest increase we can prudently expect to follow inaction — would parch continents, turning farmland into desert. Half of all species could become extinct, untold millions of people would be displaced, whole nations drowned by the sea. The controversy over emails by British researchers that suggest they tried to suppress inconvenient data has muddied the waters but failed to dent the mass of evidence on which these predictions are based.

They acknowledge that a comprehensive deal is unlikely in Copenhagen, but propose that one be adopted in next year’s June meeting in Bonn.

The whole piece is worth reading.

A page for waverers

[Image removed at the request of a subject (2019-10-01)]

This page is intended for those who (a) don’t believe that climate change is happening, (b) don’t think human beings are causing it, or (c) don’t think it’s something we need to take action on. You may believe that nothing is changing at all, or that the problems associated with adapting to climate change would be a lot more manageable than those associated with stopping it in the first place.

Those in your position should consider a few things. First, there is the matter raised by Greg Craven. In the face of something potentially threatening, we cannot always wait indefinitely to make a decision. Indeed, we are making a decision implicitly in every day when we fail to take action. What we need to do is make the most intelligent choice based on the information we have, not decide definitively who is right: those who think climate change is an enormous problem, or those who think it is a manageable or non-existent one.

Consider the decision to take some precautionary action. While that does leave us facing the risk of taking more action than eventually proves to be justified, we also need to be aware of the risk that climate change is just as serious a problem as those who are most concerned about it have been claiming. If they are right and we do nothing, the future of civilization could be at risk. Precautionary climate policies may also produce other benefits, such as less dependence on imported fossil fuels and reduced emissions of air pollutants.

I recommend that you have a look at some of the high-quality sources of information linked on my climate change briefing page. I also recommend that you give some serious thought to risk management, the credibility of various sources, and the potential consequences of making the wrong choice.

It may be worth noting that, when I first started reading about climate change seriously back in 2005 or so, I was sympathetic to the argument that it might not be all that serious a problem, and perhaps we should aim to adapt to it rather than stop it. The understanding of climate science I have accumulated since then has left me deeply concerned that climate change is an enormous problem, about which we need to take decisive action quickly. I think many fair-minded people who take the time to look through the credible information available will read the same conclusion.

If you take a fair shot at that and still want to argue against climate action, at least you will be doing so from a more nuanced and well-informed perspective.

Last updated: 10 December 2009

Open thread: Canada and Afghan detainees

As anyone who reads the news knows, it has been alleged that many detainees passed on by Canadian troops to elements of the government of Afghanistan were subsequently tortured, and that the government of Canada was aware of this likelihood. If true, that could represent a violation of Canadian and/or international law on the part of both those who gave the orders to continue making the transfers and those who actually carried them out. Knowingly passing along a prisoner to an authority that will torture and abuse them is a violation of the Geneva Conventions, but it is not yet fully known what Canadian troops and officials knew or believed prior to making these transfers.

The latest development is a reversal of position by Walter Natynczyk, Canada’s Chief of the Defence Staff. He now accepts that a man was taken into custody by Canadian soldiers in 2006 and subsequently severely beaten by Afghan interrogators.

Given that Canada cannot single-handedly reform the Afghan government and security services, this raises the question of how Canadian troops should be dealing with anyone who they capture during the course of Canada’s ongoing involvement in that country. Given that Afghanistan won’t be turning into a liberal-democratic state governed by the rule of law anytime soon, how should Canadian forces deployed there behave in the future?