Politics – Page 195 – a sibilant intake of breath

Taskforce calls for $2 billion for CCS

In March 2007, the Canadian federal government and the Government of Alberta formed a task force to investigate carbon capture and storage (CCS) as a climate mitigation technology. Now, the report of that task force has been released: Canada’s Fossil Energy Future: The Way Forward on Carbon Capture and Storage. The report for $2 billion to be spent by federal and provincial governments in order to get five CCS facilities online by 2015. These five facilities would collectively sequester 5 Mt of CO2 per year. This is equivalent to about 0.6% of Canadian emissions.

Supporters of the plan argue that initial governmental support is essential for learning how to scale up the technology, making much larger (and presumably unsubsidized) reductions possible in the future. The report projects that as many as 600 megatonnes (Mt) of CO2 could be sequestered by 2050: a figure equivalent to about 85% of current Canadian emissions. Sequestration at this kind of scale is a key element of the climate plan recently announced by the Government of Alberta.

The announcement raises both practical and ethical questions. The first centre around the overall expense of the plan, the second around who is paying it. The report acknowledges that building CCS into facilities increases the cost substantially:

The financial gap associated with most commercial-scale CCS projects (ones with one megatonne or more of CO2 emission reductions per year) is on the order of hundreds of millions of dollars.

Businesses will only do this when either (a) the cost of emitting carbon justifies mitigation efforts of this expense or (b) they can convince someone else to foot the bill. The idea that federal and provincial governments should spend $2 billion to help the oil sector continue behaving as usual can be seen as objectionable. It certainly contradicts the Polluter Pays Principle. If carbon capture and storage is to rescue certain industries from the climate change externalities they are creating, it will have to be possible for them to pay for it themselves and remain profitable; otherwise, either public finances or the global environment will need to suffer to sustain their profits.

The fight for the nominations

The utter implosion of Rudy Guliani is probably the biggest surprise so far in the American presidential race. WIth ‘Super Tuesday‘ five days away, a person has to wonder whether clear winners will emerge on the Democratic side, Republican side, or both. If not, the fights in the last few states might get rather ugly.

A Romney-Obama fight would obviously be rather different from a McCain-Clinton fight. It is way too soon to project who would win either. This election certainly continues to be most interesting.

People hoping for a good climate plan from the next administration are especially torn. Both Clinton and Obama have fairly credible plans. McCain is a lot better than Romney, but worse than either Democrat. As such, there is a tension between damage limitation (hoping the Republican with the best climate plan is nominated) and a competing hope that the least electable Republican is nominated, increasing the probability of a Democratic victory.

FutureGen and the cost of CCS

The American Department of Energy (DOE) has announced that it is cancelling funding for the $1.8 billion FutureGen project: a demonstration ‘clean coal‘ power plant to be built in Illinois. The reason cited for the change of position is “ballooning costs.” This makes it pretty unlikely the 275 megawatt plant will be built. Previously, the utilities involved would have been paying less than the cost of an ordinary coal plant, with the DOE paying the rest. Now, they would be paying more than three times as much for a carbon capture ready plant that would not, from the outset, actually capture any carbon.

This raises some serious questions about carbon capture and storage (CCS). A lot of climate plans depend on it, including those as diverse as George Monbiot’s and that of the Government of Alberta. The big question is whether this is evidence that all CCS is ruinously expensive, or simply evidence that this particular project was badly planned.

Some environmentalists are cheering this development, which might make sense if it’s just an example of a big taxpayer handout to industry being averted. Others, however, seem keen to see CCS undermined completely. It is true that it is an untested technology; only four installations in the world use anything like it. It is also true that it could perpetuate fossil fuel usage and slow the development of renewables. At the same time, it must be recognized that building renewables isn’t a purpose in its own right. It is a means to low-carbon and reliable energy. If that can be achieved through a combination of coal and CCS, we should probably be happy – especially given the strong likelihood that many coal rich countries (the United States, China, etc) are likely to burn as much of the stuff as they can get out of the ground for the foreseable future, with potentially ruinous climatic effects.

[Update: 12 June 2009] It seems that the Obama administration has decided to revive the project.

Hurricanes, insurance, and the Everglades

After being endorsed by Charlie Crist – the governor of Florida – John McCain said something rather unintelligent today:

We’ve got to provide home insurance for every person who lives in the path of a hurricane. We are going to have to work together to save the Everglades and other great environmental treasures of this state.

The first huge problem with this is the transfer of wealth that is being proposed here. People who live on the coast in hurricane territory have every expectation of getting hit by hurricanes again and again. Having the taxes of people sensible enough to live elsewhere used to subsidize insurance for those in the risky area is quite unfair. It is also rather imprudent, as it encourages the continued occupation of hurricane-prone areas, with all the implications for death and property destruction that implies.

I could see some justification for a one-off relocation fee for people living in hurricane areas – especially if weather patterns have changed and made a previously safe area dangerous. I cannot see the logic behind using taxes to encourage people to live in dangerous areas, at a time when extreme weather seems to be getting ever-more-potent.

As for saving the Everglades, it is not at all clear that the people living nearby are helping them. The oil companies are most certainly not doing so. Indeed, the canals cut through the Everglades to allow ships passage to the oil rigs in the Gulf of Mexico may well have exacerbated the storm surges that breached the levees in New Orleans.

European expansion and energy policy

The European Union is in the midst of a big internal fight about how to divide climate change mitigation obligations between members. The poorer states that joined recently say they should have easier targets so their economies will be able to grow more rapidly. States that have already made big investments in renewable technology think they should be called upon to improve by a lesser margin. France wants credit for its determined use of nuclear power. In many ways, the arguments are global disagreements writ small – an excellent illustration of which is Poland.

Poland has by far the biggest coal reserves in the EU – about fourteen billion tonnes worth. Germany is in second place with about six billion. The German GDP per capita is also US$39,650 at market exchange rates, compared to US$10,858 for Poland. Thankfully, the European Union has much more robust mechanisms for dealing with these distributional questions than exist in the world at large. There are European courts and European laws; there are also funds for regional development. Perhaps equally important is the recognition that interaction between EU states will be relatively intense for the indefinite future. This creates a stronger incentive to come to an acceptable settlement.

As such, the EU is an interesting test case for broader ideas. Given the lack of global institutions with similar strength, it is far from certain whether EU approaches could be applied worldwide. What does seem fair to say is that if Europe – with its relative wealth and strong institutions – cannot devise a system of burden-sharing for climate change mitigation, it will probably prove impossibly difficult on a global scale.

You must do the heaviest / So many shall do none

When it comes to reducing personal environmental impact in any sphere (pollution, climate change, resource depletion, etc), there comes a point where each individual says: “That is too great a sacrifice.” Some people would refuse to give up incandescent bulbs; some, eating meat; some, driving their cars; some, flying in jets. The question arises of what to do when there is a fundamental conflict between an ethical requirement and a person’s will. In the modern world, this applies perhaps most harshly to air travel.

We know that very substantial emissions are associated with flying. We also know that substantial emissions will definitely cause human suffering and death in the future. One flight emits significantly more than a single person can sustainably emit in a year. Every year emissions are above sustainable levels, the concentration of greenhouse gases rises; each year in which that happens, the mean energy absorbed by the planet increases. At some point in the future, it is inevitable that this process would cause massive harm to human beings and non-human living things. It is also plausible that positive feedbacks could create abrupt or runaway climate change, either of which could cause human extinction or the end of humanity as a species with civilization. In the face of that, it is difficult to say that flying isn’t morally wrong.

At the same time, it is impossible for most people to say it is. Partly, this is because of a failure of imagination. They cannot imagine a world where people don’t fly. Mostly, though, it is reflective of the powerful kind of denial that lets people continue to live as they do, even when convincing evidence of the wrongness of their behaviour is revealed. Rationalizations are myriad: (a) Why should I stop when others will just continue? (b) There has to be a balance between acting ethically and getting what I want. Neither of these has any ethical strength in the face of a known and significant wrong. At the same time, it is implausible that people will abandon their self-deception or that external forces will constrain their behaviour effectively. If that is true, our future really isn’t in our hands. We are slaves to fate, in terms of what technological innovation might bring and in terms of how sensitive the climate really is to greenhouse gasses.

Fishing should never be subsidized

The economic case for government subsidies can be made in one of two ways. The first is the argument based on externalities: the idea being that one person’s behaviour creates benefits for others, but that those others do not compensate the actor. An example might be a landowner who refrains from cutting down trees uphill from rivers. All river users benefit from the flood control and lack of silt. In this case, it might make sense for the government to pay the landowner to save the trees – in providing the subsidy, the government encourages a more socially optimal behaviour. This justification doesn’t work for fisheries. Fisheries are a common property resource and, as such, tend towards over-exploitation. Having fishers catch more does not provide anyone else with benefits; indeed, it harms the ability of everyone else to use marine resources. Subsidizing fishing pushes fishers to continue catching fish even beyond the point where it would normally be unprofitable, leading to further depletion.

The second argument for subsidies is the ‘infant industries’ argument. The idea here is that it can take a while for a new business to reach the level of existing businesses in the field. A brand new textile industry in an African state may not initially be able to produce goods at a cost and level of quality competitive with existing industries in Asia. In such cases, you can justify a temporary program of subsidy, intended to get the industry running. Once again, this doesn’t apply to fisheries. If anything, there is too much fishing capacity in the states that subsidize heavily (North America, Europe, and Japan). Excess fishing capacity is being exported into developing states, depleting the resources there.

The one form of subsidy that can be justified in relation to the fishing industry is subsidized training to get out of it. We can recognize that fishers are having an increasingly difficult time making a living, while also recognizing that subsidizing their fuel or equipment will just batter fish stocks further. The solution is to help people to transition into other industries where they can sustain themselves without depleting pools of resources common to everyone. It is always hard for politicians to say that an industry should be smaller, or should not exist at all, but, in the case of fisheries, that is probably the only position that makes economic and ecological sense.

A partial defence of carbon offsets

Everybody compares carbon offsets with the indulgences of the medieval Catholic Church. Indeed, a good number of people seem to treat the comparison as the decisive point against them. Offsets allow one person to ‘sin’ by flying or driving a big car, then pay for it by having someone else reduce emissions by a similar amount. While there is certainly potential for abuse, the real issue here is about the intuitive sense of fairness people possess.

Obviously, if someone buys an offset that produces no real reduction in emissions, they have been bilked and the climate has suffered. There are plenty of cases of dubious offsets, including all those based around planting trees. Furthermore, it is necessary not only for the sale of the offset to lead to reduced emissions: it must lead to a reduction of emissions equivalent to the face value of the offset and, crucially, these must consist entirely of reductions that would not otherwise occur. The perfect offset is something like this: (a) a farm releases large amounts of methane, a powerful greenhouse gas (b) in the normal run of things, the farm would have no incentive to stop doing so (c) the sale of offsets changes the economics of the situation, making it most economically efficient to capture the methane, perhaps using it to generate electricity (d) this produces a quantity of real and verifiable reductions that can be sold at the marginal cost of capturing the methane.

In this situation, the argument of ineffectiveness does not apply. What we are left with is the offence against fairness – allowing one person to ‘take more than their share.’ While there is intuitive force behind this position, I don’t think it is very convincing. While it would be better to both moderate one’s consumption and help others to do so, it does seem less objectionable to emit and purchase credible offsets than to emit and simply ignore the consequences of your actions. The critical difference between offsets and indulgences is that offsets (when used properly) actually have a mitigating effect on total greenhouse gas emissions; indulgences never did anything at all, except raise money for those selling them and the ire of those opposed.

Carbon tariffs

It is only a matter of time before the first state imposes an import tariff on goods from countries that are not taking action on climate change. On one level, that is fair enough. If domestic manufacturers are paying for their CO2 emissions through a cap-and-trade scheme or carbon tax, they have some legitimate objections against imports from foreign competitors who are not doing so. That said, the actual experience with the first such tariffs is likely to be a huge legal and political mess.

Membership in the World Trade Organization – something common to most big emitters – carries a number of obligations of varying levels of obscurity and enforcement. You can bet that countries that have such tariffs applied to them will protest such treatment aggressively. It would also be fair to bet that the winner of the contest will be determined on the basis of economic power, rather than the rightness or wrongness of arguments. It is even possible that the resulting compromise will be worse from a greenhouse gas mitigation standpoint than if the argument had never begun.

That said, it is at least logically possible for the global trading system to help in the development of an effective global regime of rules, norms, and decision-making procedures around the issue of climate change. It obviously won’t have an effect on countries that don’t do a lot of trading, but they are probably not the most essential ones to get on board anyhow. What will matter most is which of the two biggest economic blocs will triumph: the United States, still in denial about what solving climate change will require, or Europe, where at least some leading states are starting to get serious.

The Omnivore’s Dilemma

Michael Pollan‘s superb book tells the stories of four meals and the processes through which they came to exist. At one extreme is a meal of McDonald’s cheeseburgers, eaten in a moving car; at the other, a cooked wild boar he hunted, accompanied by things grown or gathered. Pollan also considers two types of pastoral food systems: one on a mass scale intended to serve the consumer market for organic foods and a truly pastoral farm centred around grass feeding, healthy animal interactions, and sustainability. His descriptions of the four, and comparisons between them, provide lots of interesting new information, and fodder for political and ethical consideration.

Among these, the industrial food chain and the grass-fed pastoral are the most interesting. Each is a demonstration of human ingenuity, with the former representing the sheer efficiency that can be achieved through aggressive specialization and disregard for animal welfare and environmental effects and the latter demonstrating how people, animals, and plants can interact in a much more ethical and sustainable way, albeit only on a relatively small scale. The account of Polyface Farm – the small-scale pastoral operation run by Joel Salatin – is genuinely touching at times, as well as startling in contrast to the industrial cattle feeding and killing operations Pollan describes. While the book heaps praise on the operation, it also recognizes the limitations inherent: we cannot live in cities like New York and get our food from such establishments, nor can the big stores most people shop at manage to deal with thousands of such small suppliers. Unless you are willing to go back to a pre-urban phase for humanity, the industrial organic chain may be the best that is possible.

Pollan’s book is packed with fascinating information on everything from the chemistry of producing processed foods from corn to some unusual theories he learned from mushroom gatherers. Regardless of your present position on food, reading it will make you better informed and leave you with a lot to contemplate.

Arguably, the book is at its weakest when it comes to ethics. Pollan rightly heaps criticism on factory farms, but seems to pre-judge the overall rightness of eating meat. Some of his arguments against vegetarianism and veganism – such as that more animals are killed in fields growing vegetables than in slaughterhouses – are simply silly. No sensible system of ethics considers it equivalent to kill a grasshopper and to kill a pig. I also think that he places too much emphasis on the relevance of whether an animal anticipates death or not. I don’t see how the inability of animals to “see is coming” makes their deaths qualitatively different from those of human beings.

That said, his arguments are generally coherent and certainly bear consideration. He never explicitly spells out the wrongness of eating industrial meat, though it is clear that his implicit argument is based around the conditions under which the animals live, rather than the fact of killing them. This is a sensible position and he is right to contrast Polyface farm with industrial farms on the basis of how they allow or do not allow animals to express their “characteristic forms of life.” Rather than press his argument to a conclusion, he abandons his consideration in a bout of fantasy: talking about how much better the treatment and slaughter of animals would be if farms and slaughterhouses had glass walls.

I highly recommend this book to almost everyone. Modern life is very effective at concealing the nature and origin of what we are eating. This book helps to pull back the veil to some extent. It is also a reflection of the ever-increasing politicization of food. What you choose to eat is an important signal of your ethical and political views, to be judged accordingly by others. Whatever position you end up taking, it will be better informed and illustrated if you take the time to consider Pollan’s thoughts and experiences.

For my part, the book has convinced me that I should strictly limit or abandon the consumption of eggs. His description of egg operations is especially chilling and supports his assertion that: “What you see when you look is the cruelty – and the blindness to cruelty – required to produce eggs that can be sold for seventy-nine cents a dozen.” Other resolutions stemming from reading this book include to try eating more types of mushrooms, improve my cooking generally, and remember that under no circumstances should one accept an invitation to collect abalone in California.