Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy

John Le Carré’s Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy is a classic spy novel, written for those who enjoy the suggestion of authenticity. Rather than indulging in the over-the-top pyrotechnics found in some spy thrillers, Le Carré’s characters are cautious and meticulous. In particular, the protagonist George Smiley is a kind of antithesis to the James Bond stereotype: fat, clad in fogged spectacles, burdened with an unfaithful wife, but nonetheless at the top of the game when it comes to counterintelligence operations in the United Kingdom.

The setting – Britain during the Cold War – permeates the book. I will admit that it is a bit amusing to read about the high drama of spies speeding along obscure motorways connecting small British cities, rather than jetting around between glamorous national capitals. At the same time, Le Carré does capture what I would expect to be the key geopolitical dynamics of the time: the superpower competition between Russia and America, with the United Kingdom in the middle in a diminished post-imperial role. Le Carré talks about how British agents were: “Trained to Empire, trained to rule the waves. All gone. All taken away.” It makes you wonder who will be elevated and who will be lowered, forty years from now.

Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy includes some observations that border on the philosophical. Le Carré raises the question of oversight, and the difficulty of trusting spies (p. 74 paperback) ; he explains how the wily opponent seeks not perfection, but advantage from his actions (194) ; the ways in which the false identities a person maintains actually express the person they conceal (213); how intelligence services have an incentive to puff up the competence of their opponents, to get more support for themselves (316); how “survival” is “an infinite capacity for suspicion” (337); how the essence of betrayal is to “overtly pursue… one aim and secretly achieve its opposite” (354); how a state’s secret services provide a measure of its political health (365); and how treason becomes “a matter of habit” once initial motivations become fuzzy and continuing on the same course seems the simplest option (377). The comment about enemy capabilities is especially relevant today, as gigantic state security bureaucracies justify themselves on the basis of the threat from a few dangerous malcontents hanging around in caves and radical discussion forums online.

Le Carré’s writing is full of examples of clever observation, which both appeals to the reader’s curiosity and makes the characters themselves seem more interesting and authentic. The book is also peppered with authentic-seeming espionage tradecraft, in areas like following people, transmitting information securely, sending coded signals, and handling in-person meetings. Probably technology has changed some of that since 1974, but perhaps not all that much. The paranoid world of Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, in which it is unclear which of the authorities can be trusted, has many parallels with the world today.

Evil and non-evil Facebook buttons

Many websites now include Facebook buttons and widgets of various sorts. As a user, it is worth knowing that if you are logged into Facebook, many of those buttons and widgets can be used by Facebook to track your web use and  link it to your real identity. 

This site has a Facebook button, as well, but it is a graphic that loads from my own server. It does not allow Facebook to add to their trove of data.

That said, Google has its own massive data pile, which this site contributes to in obvious ways like content being indexed and less obvious ways like Google Analytics visitor tracking.

The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao

Ordinarily, the multi-generational family story is my least favourite kind of novel. I usually find them tedious and uncompelling. It speaks especially well of Junot Diaz’s book, then, that I found it engagingly written and worthwhile, though a rather darker read than I was expecting.

Diaz succeeds in giving distinct voices to his multiple narrators, though it wouldn’t have hurt to identify them at the beginning of each section. The book is also full of poignant and clever descriptions, though they may be a bit crass for some tastes. Diaz’s writing includes many untranslated Spanish passages, some of which at least provide hints of meaning to speakers of English and French, while some of which are simply incomprehensible without assistance. It also includes numerous references to science fiction and fantasy books, which are a passion of the novel’s titular figure.

Perhaps the most compelling aspect of the book is the way in which it effectively expresses the experience of living in a dictatorship that is also a police state: the arbitrary arrests, the inconsistent application of justice, the torture, the rapes, the fear, the spying between neighbours, the absurdity, and the inevitable abuse of power by the secret police. Diaz is very effective at conveying an impression (I cannot judge how accurate) of what the Dominican Republic was like under Rafael Trujillo, the man who looms over the book but whose assassination is relegated to a long footnote.

Reading The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao could serve as a bit of a vaccine for those who are frustrated by the imperfections of democracy and who wonder whether a benevolent despot might do better. With visceral language that makes for anxious reading, Diaz expresses the injustices that arise when power exists without oversight.

Flex your rights: anonymity

Being able to speak anonymously on the internet is an important right, in this age of increasingly constant surveillance. Because of organizations like the NSA, GCHQ, and Canada’s CSE, we can never know when our private conversations are actually being intercepted.

One tiny way to push back is to continue to be bold in asserting the importance of freedom of speech, even what circumstances compel that right to be used anonymously.

To leave anonymous comments on this site, just use whatever made-up name you like, including ‘anonymous’. If you use anon@sindark.com as your email address, you will get an anonymous logo beside your comment.

None of this is intended as an endorsement of the amorphous group ‘Anonymous‘.

Open thread: Libya

I haven’t had time to write anything about the ongoing situation in Libya, but I thought it would be worthwhile to have a discussion thread on the topic.

How do people interpret what is happening? As a democratic uprising? As a civil war? As a combination of the two?

What, if anything, should the international community do? Would imposing a no-fly zone be legal? Would it be a good idea?

Radio frequency ID security

Contact-free cards and authentication tokens have become common. These are the sort of things that you put close to a reader on the wall in order to open a door or perform a similar function. People use them to get into parking garages and offices, and even credit cards now allow you to pay without swiping or inserting your card. Of course, all this creates new security risks. All of these cards can be read at a moderately long distance with inexpensive hardware, which is one reason why it is a bit crazy that these chips are being put into passports. Furthermore, cloning these radio frequency identification (RFID) tags is often quite easy.

Your standard RFID tag is just a little chip with an antenna. When it receives a signal on a particular frequency, it chirps out its name. The card reader says: “Any RFID tags out there?” and it says: “12345678abc” or whatever string it contains. The string is transmitted in clear text, and it is always the same. Anyone with a device that can program RFID tags can easily copy it. These sorts of tags exist all over the place. An office tower might have a database listing the code inside the RFID tags used by each employee. It would then check the database each time someone used a card, to make sure the number was on the list.

This system can easily be attacked. Just stand outside a building with an appropriate antenna and recording equipment and you can capture the code from each person’s tag as they go in. You can then copy whichever you like to make your own access card.

More sophisticated tags use a challenge-response authentication protocol. That means they take an input value, perform a mathematical operation on it, and generate a response which they transmit. For instance, an absurdly simple rule would be something like ‘multiply input by two’. Then, the reader would say: “3” and any card that replied “6” would be accepted as valid. These tags tend to require a battery to run their computing hardware, so they are relatively rare.

This is harder to attack. You need to figure out what the rule is, and they are often cryptographic. That being said, the cryptography used is often either proprietary (which usually means ‘bad’) or out of date. With access to a few tags and some knowledge, it may well still be possible to reverse-engineer the algorithm being used and clone tags.

In addition, this kind of system can be attacked in real time, using a man-in-the-middle attack. Suppose I am in line at the grocery store, about to pay. I take out a dummy wireless credit card, while I have an antenna concealed in my jacket sleeve. The clerk’s RFID reader sends a challenge request, which my antenna picks up. I then re-broadcast that request with more power, so that all the tags nearby chirp up. Suddenly, everyone in line who has a wireless card is offering to pay for your groceries. Re-broadcast one of those responses back to the clerk’s card reader and you suddenly have free groceries. I suspect something similar would work with the more high-security access cards used by some offices.

Not all cloning is necessarily malicious. Phones are increasingly sophisticated radio transmitters and receivers. They can transmit voice calls on various frequencies, as well as access WiFi networks and interface with Bluetooth devices. Somebody should make a phone that can transmit and receive on the common frequencies used by RFID cards. Software could then be used to record the contents of a person’s existing cards. Instead of carrying one fob for your car, one card for work, one embedded in your transit pass, and a credit card, you could just program the functionality of all those RFID tags into one device.

Of course, doing such a thing would reveal how easy it is to copy RFID cards in the first place. That’s all it would be doing, however – making it obvious. Anybody who is malicious and capable can already copy these cards, though consumers often assume that they are secure (like they assume their cell phone calls cannot easily be intercepted by moderately resourceful crackers). By revealing how insecure most wireless authentication technologies are, this cell phone software could play an important role in raising awareness, and maybe even lead people to pressure politicians to get rid of those stupid wireless passports.

I mean really, does that have any non-evil uses at all? A passport clerk can easily scan a barcode or swipe a magnetic strip. Making them readable at a distance only helps spies and criminals. How easy would it be to build a bomb and connect it to a machine that constantly scans the vicinity for wireless-equipped passports? You could program it to explode when more than a set number of nationals of any country you dislike are within a particular distance. Alternatively, criminals could take advantage of chatty radio passports to identify promising targets for mugging.

Selling F15s

Does it strike anyone else as strange and somewhat objectionable that the United States is selling the F-15 attack aircraft to Saudi Arabia? Before being supplanted with the F22 and F35, the F15 had unmatched capabilities. As such, you need to wonder whether the United States would be better off keeping sales of the old plane restricted and being less bothered about developing new generations of attack aircraft during an era where they already possess complete air superiority.

A cynical perspective is that this all comes down to the arms industry. They can’t sell F-15s to the United States anymore, so they want new customers. Even better, they know that the United States will feel threatened by F15s in the hands of potentially unstable regimes like Saudi Arabia, and that the US will respond by purchasing more F22, F35s, and other hardware.

It’s like a gun shop that sells its newest weapons only to its best customers, but progressively makes each new weapon available to anyone with the cash. That keeps the best customers locked on an upgrade pathway and keeps weapon designers in business. Unfortunately, it also makes the world a riskier place, and wastes substantial resources that could be better applied to reducing poverty or building a more sustainable society.

Intrusion detection systems

One side of computer security is keeping people from getting unauthorized access: choosing good passwords, patching software to protect against known exploits, etc. But when you reach a more advanced level than that, intrusion detection systems (IDS) become an important way of detecting and mitigating attacks. These systems monitor the functioning of a computer system or account and produce some sort of alert if suspicious activity is ongoing.

For example, GMail includes a rudimentary IDS. It allows users to check whether anyone is logged into their account from another location. If you check the list and see only your home IP address and your phone, everything is probably fine. If some random IP address from Berlin or Mumbai or Tokyo is on there, someone has probably compromised your account.

IDS can be much more sophisticated than this. While GMail calls upon the user to keep an eye on things manually, automated systems can flag suspicious activity and produce warnings. A classic example would be a computer in a distant country accessing your GMail via POP3 and starting to download the entire contents of your archive. That is super suspicious and – if you are someone like Sarah Palin – potentially career-ending.

The same goes, naturally, for a situation where some random army private starts accessing and downloading thousands of diplomatic cables. Say what you will about the ethics of Wikileaks, but from a computer security perspective there should have been an IDS that spotted that aberrant pattern.

Attackers always get more sophisticated and their attacks always improve. As a consequence, those who want to defend computer systems must keep raising their own game by implementing sophisticated security strategies. Deploying IDS both on personal computers and within cloud services like GMail is one way in which people can become aware of breaches in time to stop them from becoming too severe. It’s never comfortable to learn that you are dealing with an intruder, but it is much better to have that awareness than to continue blindly forward while they persist in nefarious activities.

P.S. Does anyone know of a good IDS for Macs? Given how many people are on always-on internet connections these days, and given that all operating systems have security flaws that take time to fix, operating an IDS on one’s personal computer is probably a good security trade-off. Indeed, I am planning to set up a second system unconnected to the internet, next time I buy a new desktop machine. It is axiomatic that any computer connected to the internet is vulnerable.

Security in prisons

For the good of society at large, it does make sense to isolate some particularly dangerous people from the general population. At the same time, society has an obligation to manage imprisonment in a sensible way, including by avoiding the vindictive temptation to make prisons themselves Hobbesian jungles in which those who are incarcerated have no personal security, and only bad examples to follow. Rather than locking up more and more people in worse and worse conditions, we should lock up fewer and treat them better. The probable result of that is less cost and harm to society, along with a chance at genuine rehabilitation for those who do commit crimes.

Sending non-violent offenders to prison doesn’t really make any sense. This is particularly true when it comes to non-violent drug criminals: a class that includes ordinary users, but also producers and smugglers. Treating drugs as a criminal problem only makes them more problematic for society by making them a lucrative racket for organized crime groups, and by ensuring that those who operate in this business can only settle disputes through violence. As with alcohol and gambling, society should recognize that prohibition causes more harm than good and undertake a transition from a drug policy founded on criminal law to one founded on evidence-based medicine and harm reduction.

Similarly, having prisons in which inmates fear for their personal safety doesn’t make sense. Living with that kind of stress simply has to be harmful to the human mind, and likely to exacerbate whatever issues led to their imprisonment in the first place. When someone is branded with a criminal record and ‘ex-convict’ status, it already becomes hard enough for them to sustain themselves and any dependents financially in the future. Adding traumatic years of fear and violence to that can only worsen things.

Plausibly, reducing the prison population by excluding non-violent offenders could allow for more resources to be devoted to each prisoner who remains. These could allow for greater personal security, through measures like reducing over-crowding, and for genuine rehabilitation programs focused on things like addressing existing addiction problems and developing skills that are in demand in job markets.

The idea that criminals are bad people who deserve to be punished for their wickedness probably belongs in the Middle Ages. As we learn more about human psychology, we learn that people are profoundly influenced by the environments they inhabit and that people respond in predictable ways to circumstances like stress and deprivation. Rather than seeing criminals as wicked individuals who should be expelled from society to the greatest possible degree, I think it makes sense to have a bit more pragmatism and compassion and to establish systems that minimize the harmfulness of crime while giving criminals better options.

Oversight over institutions of armed power

On Yes, Prime Minister, a character describing a situation in which a document was leaked discusses the difference between what you do when you really want to find the source of a leak and what you do when it is all just for show. When it is for show, he says, you conduct a leak inquiry. If it is for a serious investigation, you call in ‘Special Branch’.

Reading through the Wikipedia entry on ‘Special Branch’ gave me a bit of pause. It seems like the term is used to refer to two different types of sub-organizations, within broader security structures like national police forces and armies.

Outward intelligence gathering

One sort of Special Branch is the macho Jack Bauer sort that wears flak jackets and drops in on terrorists from helicopters. They are also the ones with the machines for listening to private phone calls and reading private emails, back doors into supposedly confidential databases, and other such legally dubious trickery.

Having some kind of organization of this sort is important – especially for keeping genuinely dangerous things like biological and nuclear weapons away from terrorists. At the same time, giving such an organization an increasingly broad mandate just increases the risk that the organization itself will become abusive, or that the intelligence it collects will be used for inappropriate purposes.

There has to be some kind of meaningful, outside, civilian scrutiny of such organizations. If they are allowed to sit up at the top of the chain deciding who can trust who, we cannot allow them to be a secretive band of unknown people. It may render them less effective as an intelligence organization, to be subject to civilian oversight, but it is ultimately important for the security of society that this be so.

Quite possibly, governments shouldn’t have any organizations that they are not prepared to appear before a fairly elected legislature (in secret, perhaps) and answer detailed questions about.

Internal oversight

The other sort of Special Branch answers the question: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? They are a response to the reality that organizations like armies and police forces attract bullies – people who are themselves attracted to power. At times, such people will abuse that power. That danger is increased enormously when the people are put within structures that will protect them, regardless of what they do. If the police force protects officers who use excessive force, their violent tendencies are likely to get worse.

Having a Special Branch to check for this kind of corruption in the rest of the service makes a lot of sense, and is an important check on police power. After all, a bad police officer is a scary thing. They are armed with weapons and power, and the judge will almost always take their word for how a situation went (unless there are photos or a video).

Changing balance

On Yes, Prime Minister, I think they were talking about the internal sort of Special Branch, looking for wrongdoing within powerful organizations. These days, I fear the outward-looking type of Special Branch has grown more powerful by comparison, partly by capitalizing on the fear people have of terrorism (despite the tiny chance of being a victim).

When people are fearful of non-governmental forces, they can easily err and make the government overly mighty. People also need to maintain in their minds the corresponding fear of abuse by government itself. The government is so powerful that it can do considerable harm by accident, and its control over information is such that we may never really know what accidents or abuse have taken place.

Terrorists can kill some innocent civilians – maybe a lot if they get hold of something dangerous. But the police can create a police state. They can seize the government with one of their own by force, if the other institutions of the state become weak enough. We need independent people watching over them more than we need them to be looking into the local radical cell.