Moral obligations to view advertising?

Ashley Thorvaldson and Brian Mulrooney

Normal users of the internet are frequently confronted with banner ads: often obnoxious graphics trying to hock all manner of products and services. More sophisticated users will now find themselves a bit surprised, when using a public computer, because they long ago stopped seeing these displays on their own machines. This trick is achieved through the use of the Firefox browser, the AdBlock plugin, and Filterset G. With these three pieces of code running, the vast majority of graphically based ads on the internet simply vanish.

Now, an editorial on CNet suggests that using such technology may be immoral. In effect, web sites are providing you with content in exchange for your pupils grazing ever-so-briefly across the advertisements that pay their bills.

While I don’t feel convinced one way or the other about the moral issues involved in this particular case, it is an interesting kind of moral problem. The nature of what is ‘theft’ in a digitized world remains an intensely disputed one. This is the fundamental product of going for a world where products cost a significant amount per unit (with additional costs for design) to one where things may cost a lot to design, but can often be copied for free. That goes for everything from pop CDs to New York Times editorials, and dealing with it is one of the more interesting legal and business issues of the present time.

Public broadcasters and the web

The existence of the internet changes the economic logic of public broadcasting. Where, at one point, the BBC was a collection of channels, each showing one bit of their vast archive at a time, now much of it is online. That creates a huge database of materials, paid for by taxpayers, and ideally free to be accessed without copyright concerns. Being able to view documentaries like Dangerous Knowledge upon demand is a notable benefit, and one not adequately captured by private sector content generators who are not concerned about societal benefits not captured in their profits.

If all the world’s national broadcasters and other public generators of knowledge would open up their libraries comprehensively, it could make the internet an even more valuable thing than it already is. Unfortunately, that process seems likely to be piecemeal and marked by set-backs. Witness the BBC iPlayer dispute.

Chevron’s climate game

Remember when the BBC came up with a climate change game? Well, now Chevron has done so, as well. Apparently, all the data in the game came from the Economist Intelligence Unit. The BBC game suffered a fair bit of well-deserved criticism. I have yet to give the Chevron simulation a comprehensive try, but I am waiting with a fair bit of curiousity for a chance.

You can read a bit more about the Chevron game on R-Squared: a popular energy blog.

[9 September 2007] This game doesn’t really have much to it. By constraining you to the management of a single city over the span of a couple of decades, it excludes both the chronological and geographic scale at which real change needs to take place. Still, it is interesting from a corporate public relations standpoint. Unsurprisingly, the game simply forbids you from using a power balance that excludes petroleum.

Web abuse

Rideau Canal

Spam is terribly frustrating stuff, partly because of how it is inconvenient and partly because of how it is a cancer that wrecks good things. (See previous: 1, 2, 3) The ideal internet is a place of free and honest communication. Spammers create the need for extensive defenses and scrutiny which take time to maintain and diminish that openness and spontaneity.

If you think the spam in your email inbox is bad, just consider yourself lucky that you do not also have to deal with comment and trackback spam on two blogs, a wiki, YouTube videos, and a half dozen secondary places. There are even phony marketing bots on Facebook now: keep your eyes peeled for ‘Christine Qian’ and ‘her’ ilk.

In the end, while decentralized approaches to spam management are time consuming and annoying, they are probably better than centralized systems would be. With the latter, there is always the danger of the wholesale manipulation and censorship of what is able to find its way online, or be transmitted across the web.

Random numbers

Truly random numbers are hard to find, as patterns tend to abound everywhere. This is problematic, because there are times when a completely random string of digits is necessary: whether you are choosing the winner of a raffle or generating the one-time pad that secures the line from the White House to the Kremlin.

Using random radio crackle, random.org promises to deliver random data in a number of convenient formats (though one should be naturally skeptical about the security of such services). Another page, by Jon Callas, provides further information on why random numbers are both necessary and surprisingly tricky to get.

This comic amusingly highlights another aspect of the issue.

Facebook ecosystem

Milan’s Facebook ecosystem

It is nearly always interesting to see complex data presented in a new way – particularly as a visualization. The way this one arose was actually very mathematical, based on equations for modeling the strength of electromagnetic fields.

The dense cluster on the left is a tangle of high school and undergrad. The much smaller grouping on the right is Wadham College, Oxford. All around the edges and bottom are relatively or entirely isolated people – evidence of how many people I meet and random and at a sufficient level to warrant a Facebook linkage.

Encrypting personal communication

Statue outside the National Archives

Personal use of encrypted communication is yet another example of so-called ‘network effects.’ (These have been mentioned previously: 1, 2, 3.) The basic idea is that the more widespread certain technologies become, the more useful they are to everyone using them. The most commonly cited examples are telephones and fax machines; back when only a few people had them, they had limited utility. You would need alternative channels of communication and you would waste time deciding which one to use and exchanging instructions about that with other parties. Once telephones became ubiquitous, each one was a lot more powerful and convenient. The same can be said for email addresses.

Good free software exists that allows the encryption of emails at a level where it would challenge major organizations to read them. While this may not protect an individual message that falls under scrutiny, it changes the dynamic of the whole system. It is no longer possible to filter every email passing along a fibre-optic cable for certain keywords, for instance. You would need to crack every one of them first.

Making the transition to the routine use of encryption, however, requires more effort than the adoption of telephones or email. While those technologies were more convenient than their predecessors, encryption adds a layer of difficulty to communication. You need to have the required software, key pairs generated, and passphrases. It is possible to make mistakes and encrypt things such that you can never access them again.

As such, there is a double barrier to the adoption of widespread communication encryption: people must deal with the added difficulties involved in communicating in this way and with the problem that hardly anyone uses such systems now. If there is nobody out there with whom you can exchange PGP encrypted messages, you aren’t too likely to bother with acquiring and using the software. It is entirely possible that those two constraints will prevent widespread adoption for the foreseeable future.

One nice exception to this rule is Skype. Users may not know it, but calls made over Skype are transmitted in encryption form, very considerably increasing the difficulty of intercepting them. The fact that users do not know this is happening greatly increases the level of usage (you cannot avoid using it). While such systems may well not be as secure as explicit encryption efforts undertaken by senders and recipients, they may be a useful way to increase overall adoption of privacy technology. Such ‘invisible encryption’ could also be usefully incorporated into stores of personal data, such as the contents of GMail accounts.

PS. For anyone who decides to give PGP a try, my public key is available here.

Footprints all over the web – Google Web History

Red brick facade and fire escapes

When I am online, I usually have at least one Google service open. At home, I usually have a Google Mail window open at all times, as well as Google Calendar. At work, it is only the latter. What I didn’t know until today is that whenever you are logged into your Google account, Google is tracking your web usage through a system called Web History. Accessing the system allows you to ‘pause’ the recording and even delete what is already there. While the listings disappear from your screen, there is good reason to doubt whether they vanish from Google’s records.

It is common knowledge that Google saves every search query that gets input into it, and does so in a way that can be linked to an individual computer. The web history service, however, has more troubling implications. Whether you are at work, at home, or at an internet cafe, you just need to be logged into any Google service for it to be operating. Since more than one computer can be logged into a Google account at once, and there is no indication on either machine that this is happening, anybody who gets your password can monitor your web usage, as well as your email and any other Google services you use. Given how common keyloggers have become, this should worry people.

One very helpful feature Google could implement would be the option to show when and where you last logged into your account. That way, if someone has been peeking at your email from London while you have been in Seattle, you know that it may be time to change your password. Also desirable, but much less likely to happen, would be a requirement that services like GMail store your information as an encrypted archive. Even if the encryption was based on your password and a relatively weak cipher, it would make it impractical for either Google or malicious agents with access to their information storage systems to undertake the wholesale mining of the information therein.

The final reason for which this is concerning has to do with cooperation between companies and governments. It is widely rumoured that companies including Microsoft and Yahoo have helped the Chinese government to track down and prosecute dissidents, by turning over electronic records held outside China. Given the increasingly bold snooping of both democratic and authoritarian governments, a few more layers of durable protection built into the system would be prudent and encouraging.